By Park Jung-won
On April 16, North Korea test-fired two new short-range missiles capable of being armed with tactical nuclear weapons into the East Sea. Many North Korea watchers, particularly progressive-oriented elements in South Korean society, had been skeptical of the possibility that the North could fire a nuclear weapon at South Korea.
However, this successful North Korean test has made such optimistic views seem naive. If North Korea were to fire low-yield nuclear weapons at a low apogee to attack Seoul tomorrow, South Korea would have no means of intercepting them.
In the current Russia-Ukraine war, American intelligence sources suggest that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons if it fails to defeat Ukraine with conventional combat methods. It is not unthinkable that the nuclear threat to South Korea from North Korea could in the future become exactly the same as Ukraine now faces from Russia.
It is natural for citizens in a normal democratic country to raise such concerns. It is not normal to shy away from them but instead worry about politics. What use are political battles between conservatives and progressives if the country is left more vulnerable to a nuclear attack? Nevertheless, not a few South Korean citizens and politicians seem to think that the cases of Ukraine and South Korea are fundamentally different.
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the bizarre scene of South Korean lawmakers during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's video address to the National Assembly on April 11. Despite the fact that the tragic pictures coming out of Ukraine echoed those of the Korean War, only about 50 of 300 lawmakers attended Zelenskyy's speech. Some of those in attendance did not even concentrate on his speech, instead looking at their cellphones, chatting or dozing off.
North Korea's repeated military provocations this year have demonstrated that South Korea's three-decade attempt to denuclearize its northern neighbor has completely failed. On the Korean Peninsula, the Roh Tae-woo administration took an active approach to North Korea at the end of the Cold War, signing the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization with the North in 1991.
Since then, successive South Korean governments, up to the Moon Jae-in administration, have implemented various inter-Korean policies that have emphasized exchanges and cooperation, with the expectation that if they helped North Korea economically, it would give up its nuclear program and change politically. But all of these efforts have failed. Even more frustrating is that, in light of such a disastrous policy failure, not a single leader in successive South Korean governments has ever acknowledged this or apologized for it.
In an interview with the Washington Post published on April 14, President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol said that if North Korea initiates denuclearization work, his administration will provide various benefits such as economic and humanitarian assistance. Does Yoon really believe that North Korea will give up its strong nuclear capability, into which it has poured almost all of its state resources for decades, in return for such tiny economic assistance from South Korea?
The stated goal of President Joe Biden's administration on the North Korean nuclear issue is complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID). However, it has not given a concrete answer as to how it can achieve this goal, given that North Korea is now believed to possess about 60 nuclear weapons, with an expected increase in its stockpile to 200 by 2027.
If North Korea launches a short-range missile armed with a tactical nuclear warhead at a city or U.S. military base in South Korea, will the U.S. respond by retaliating against North Korea using its "nuclear umbrella" to protect its ally? Many South Koreans are very doubtful.
Given that achieving North Korea's denuclearization has become virtually impossible under the current sanctions-oriented framework, which features a lack of consistent commitment by China and Russia as clearly illustrated by the recent North Korean ICBM test and the subsequent deadlock in the U.N. Security Council for further sanctioning, the incoming Yoon administration should rethink from scratch its stance toward the issue of North Korean denuclearization.
If the U.S. does not guarantee "substantial deterrence" and only continues to oppose nuclear sharing (as it does with the NATO model), South Korea will inevitably have no choice but to arm itself with nuclear weapons to escape being held hostage by North Korea's nuclear threat indefinitely. As many American security experts have observed, South Korea has already reached a point where it should seriously consider nuclear armament.
In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, South Korea can claim justification for its withdrawal from the treaty by presenting the overriding interests of its national security.
China would obviously impose severe sanctions on South Korea in that case. But South Korea could then demand that China step forward by firmly pressuring North Korea into denuclearizing. Negotiations on the denuclearization of North Korea in any true sense would only be possible after this phase.
In a farewell interview with JTBC, Moon dismissed those politicians who want to consider the nuclear armament of South Korea as being "absurd" without providing persuasive alternatives. His position seems very complacent, even if his statement was made before the heightened security situation created by North Korea on April 25.
On that day its leader, Kim Jong-un, announced the decision to expand his country's doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence to include the possibility of preemptive strikes for its "fundamental interests."
Yoon should communicate the urgency of South Korea's situation by presenting all options, including the possibility of a nuclear-armed South Korea, to Biden during their summit on May 21. It is South Korea, not the North, that needs brinkmanship now.
Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.
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However, this successful North Korean test has made such optimistic views seem naive. If North Korea were to fire low-yield nuclear weapons at a low apogee to attack Seoul tomorrow, South Korea would have no means of intercepting them.
In the current Russia-Ukraine war, American intelligence sources suggest that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons if it fails to defeat Ukraine with conventional combat methods. It is not unthinkable that the nuclear threat to South Korea from North Korea could in the future become exactly the same as Ukraine now faces from Russia.
It is natural for citizens in a normal democratic country to raise such concerns. It is not normal to shy away from them but instead worry about politics. What use are political battles between conservatives and progressives if the country is left more vulnerable to a nuclear attack? Nevertheless, not a few South Korean citizens and politicians seem to think that the cases of Ukraine and South Korea are fundamentally different.
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the bizarre scene of South Korean lawmakers during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's video address to the National Assembly on April 11. Despite the fact that the tragic pictures coming out of Ukraine echoed those of the Korean War, only about 50 of 300 lawmakers attended Zelenskyy's speech. Some of those in attendance did not even concentrate on his speech, instead looking at their cellphones, chatting or dozing off.
North Korea's repeated military provocations this year have demonstrated that South Korea's three-decade attempt to denuclearize its northern neighbor has completely failed. On the Korean Peninsula, the Roh Tae-woo administration took an active approach to North Korea at the end of the Cold War, signing the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization with the North in 1991.
Since then, successive South Korean governments, up to the Moon Jae-in administration, have implemented various inter-Korean policies that have emphasized exchanges and cooperation, with the expectation that if they helped North Korea economically, it would give up its nuclear program and change politically. But all of these efforts have failed. Even more frustrating is that, in light of such a disastrous policy failure, not a single leader in successive South Korean governments has ever acknowledged this or apologized for it.
In an interview with the Washington Post published on April 14, President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol said that if North Korea initiates denuclearization work, his administration will provide various benefits such as economic and humanitarian assistance. Does Yoon really believe that North Korea will give up its strong nuclear capability, into which it has poured almost all of its state resources for decades, in return for such tiny economic assistance from South Korea?
The stated goal of President Joe Biden's administration on the North Korean nuclear issue is complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID). However, it has not given a concrete answer as to how it can achieve this goal, given that North Korea is now believed to possess about 60 nuclear weapons, with an expected increase in its stockpile to 200 by 2027.
If North Korea launches a short-range missile armed with a tactical nuclear warhead at a city or U.S. military base in South Korea, will the U.S. respond by retaliating against North Korea using its "nuclear umbrella" to protect its ally? Many South Koreans are very doubtful.
Given that achieving North Korea's denuclearization has become virtually impossible under the current sanctions-oriented framework, which features a lack of consistent commitment by China and Russia as clearly illustrated by the recent North Korean ICBM test and the subsequent deadlock in the U.N. Security Council for further sanctioning, the incoming Yoon administration should rethink from scratch its stance toward the issue of North Korean denuclearization.
If the U.S. does not guarantee "substantial deterrence" and only continues to oppose nuclear sharing (as it does with the NATO model), South Korea will inevitably have no choice but to arm itself with nuclear weapons to escape being held hostage by North Korea's nuclear threat indefinitely. As many American security experts have observed, South Korea has already reached a point where it should seriously consider nuclear armament.
In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, South Korea can claim justification for its withdrawal from the treaty by presenting the overriding interests of its national security.
China would obviously impose severe sanctions on South Korea in that case. But South Korea could then demand that China step forward by firmly pressuring North Korea into denuclearizing. Negotiations on the denuclearization of North Korea in any true sense would only be possible after this phase.
In a farewell interview with JTBC, Moon dismissed those politicians who want to consider the nuclear armament of South Korea as being "absurd" without providing persuasive alternatives. His position seems very complacent, even if his statement was made before the heightened security situation created by North Korea on April 25.
On that day its leader, Kim Jong-un, announced the decision to expand his country's doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence to include the possibility of preemptive strikes for its "fundamental interests."
Yoon should communicate the urgency of South Korea's situation by presenting all options, including the possibility of a nuclear-armed South Korea, to Biden during their summit on May 21. It is South Korea, not the North, that needs brinkmanship now.
Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.
