Can Korea and Japan survive issues of history?

By Ahn Ho-young

Korea's Supreme Court rendered its final ruling on the case brought by victims of forced labor during the Japanese occupation of Korea against Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Corp. in October, 2018. Since then, relations between Seoul and Tokyo have been in a deep freeze.

Japan insists that Korea is not complying with international law, in particular the Claims Agreement concluded between the two countries in 1965. The Korean government counters that it has to respect the ruling of the independent court here.

It was against such a backdrop that the Japanese government imposed an embargo ― that impacted Korean companies ― on the export of essential parts for manufacturing semiconductors, a key export item for Korea, in July, 2019. Several months later, the South Korean government responded by declaring that it would suspend the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) agreement between the two countries as a countermeasure against the Japanese embargo on semiconductor parts.

Several Japanese officials and politicians sought my views on the suspension of the GSOMIA agreement at the time. I said I was deeply concerned and disappointed by Korean government's action. I swiftly added that I had been equally concerned and disappointed by the action taken by the Japanese government earlier in July.

This was because the Japanese action violated a delicate firewall existing between the issues of history and the issues of cooperation in other areas. The observance of the firewall had enabled Korea and Japan to develop bilateral relations to mutual benefit for several decades irrespective of issues of history flaring up between the two countries from time to time.

I was recently reminded of these exchanges with Japanese colleagues two years ago, as I read an interview with Yoshimasa Hayashi, the new foreign minister of Japan. Hayashi gave a press conference on Nov. 11, the day he was inaugurated.

His answer to the question on Korea-Japan relations appeared to me to be along the following lines; "Korea-Japan relations are very important and must get sufficient attention. But, it will have to wait until issues of history are first be resolved, for which Korea must provide an answer."

The first part was encouraging to me. With respect to the second part, I wonder if Hayashi could have gone a step further, as a leading member of "Kochikai," one of the most moderate factions within the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which has typically supported a dovish foreign policy, including diplomatic engagement with Korea.

For example, he could have said: "I urge the Korean government to provide an answer to the forced labor issues. In the meantime, I will not be bogged down by these issues, because there are so many other urgent issues Korea and Japan must address together. I will go ahead and engage the Korean government to jointly address them." In fact, such an approach is what we need, given the current geopolitical and economic situation in Northeast Asia and beyond.

At the same time, such an approach would have worked as a stronger and far more effective incentive for the Korean government to diligently seek solutions for issues on history as well. In fact, there are a large number of issues which the two countries can engage in for mutual benefit, starting from some multilateral ones.

One such issue is Korea joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). As a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, China and Chinese Taipei, apply for accession to the CPTPP, there is an increasing call for Korea to join it as well. One of the challenges facing Korea is Japan's presumed sabotage of its accession, as Tokyo tries to link this to the issues of history. Hayashi, for example, could declare that such a presumption is misplaced.

Another possible multilateral forum where Korea and Japan could further strengthen cooperation is the Quad. I have long argued through this page as to why Korea must seriously consider participating in Quad activities. Sato Masahisa, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense in Japan's House of Councillors was recently asked by a Korean newspaper about his views on Korea joining the Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, India and Australia. He answered "Japan will welcome Korea joining the free world camp, even if we will continue to have questions about Korea's credibility."

I am often reminded of all the efforts we used to make together between Korea and Japan at multilateral fora. Korea's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s owed a lot to the advice and cooperation we used to get from our Japanese colleagues, including Makoto Taniguchi, who was the OECD's deputy secretary-general at the time.

During the Great Recession of 2008, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) emerged as a key institution for the global financial system, and was dubbed "the fourth pillar" of the architecture of global economic governance. In the process of joining the FSB, Korea again enjoyed the support and cooperation of Japanese officials, including Ambassador Yoichi Otabe, who used to be the G20 sherpa for the Japanese prime minister at the time.

Were there no issues of history at the time of Korea's accession to the OECD or the FSB? There were. However, officials of Korea and Japan at the time were mindful of the advantage of adhering to the aforementioned firewall.

Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.