Japanese influence on Korea

By Mark Peterson

Japan's influence on Korea is still visible in some ways. And invisible in other ways. The Japanese colonial occupation of Korea was a failure in all regards, politically, morally, ethically. But the evil results of the occupation remain in many ways.

The obvious affects include the diplomatic mistrust of Japan and resentment of Japanese actions during the occupation (1910-45) and after the liberation of Korea as well. Sore points between Korea and Japan flare up every now and then, most often over the "comfort women" ― accepting responsibility and providing compensation ― and contention over the Dokdo islets, Korean territory, and the use of the term the "Sea of Japan" that Korea argues to be the "East Sea."

But there are other issues, some of them centered on historical interpretations. For example, there is more than ample evidence that the royal family of Japan, the Yamato clan, may well have come from the Korean Peninsula. It is clear there was Korean migration from the peninsula to the Japanese islands ― as was there migration from China. The movement was from China, or north of China, to the Korean Peninsula, and then onward to Japan. Use of Chinese characters and the adoption of Buddhism and then Confucianism are prime examples of the movement of culture.

There is much made of Japanese connections with prhistoric Korea, with the Japanese claiming that the cultural flow was from Japan to Korea, to Baekje and Gaya, like a river flowing upstream. Rivers don't flow upstream and the cultural flow did not backwash from Japan to Korea.

Some of the confusion on this point is centered on the Japanese connection with Gaya. Japan even has a word for it, "Mimana". And the Japanese claim is even that Mimana was a colony of Japan. This is "upstream flow" thinking, and rather impossible. Gari Ledyard, now retired from Columbia University and one of the true pioneers in Korean studies in America, has offered a much more reasonable explanation for the connection between Gaya and Yamato Japan.

He argues that the movement of people and culture from Gaya to Japan and similarly movement of people from Japan to Gaya was because in the pre-statecraft era, the connection between the peninsula and the islands were not of those between states or kingdoms, but rather the area should be viewed as a "thalassocracy" ― a political entity based on connections by the sea. Really, in this pre-state, pre-historic time, Korea was not yet Korea, and Japan was not yet Japan, rather, smaller tribal entities existed. And the Korean tribes had strong connections to the Japanese tribes and in fact, if we think of the term thalassocracy, the tribes were united over the waters.

History can be abused. When Japan's imperialism started to grow and saw an opportunity to expand to Korea, the rationale was that Japan once had a colony in Korea ― Mimana!

There are aspects of the Japanese occupation that remain below the surface, unseen by many. The fact that Korea was divided after the surrender of Japan in 1945 is a particularly galling fact. Korea became the victim of Japanese imperialism once again. In the European theater, Germany, the aggressor, was partitioned and given to four parties, the US, England, France, and the USSR. Three sectors combined to make West Germany.

The USSR maintained control of East Germany for four-and-a-half decades. In the Pacific Theater, Japan was the aggressor, but rather than partitioning Japan, it was Korea that was divided between the U.S. and the USSR. And the "temporary" division is still in place 75 years afterward. It was not Japan that divided Korea, but it was preference for Japan that led to Korea again being victimized.

Finally, it is a rather arcane point of view, but the historiography of Korea has been negatively affected by Japan in a theoretical way. The problem did not originate in Japan, but rather in the evolutionary ideology of Western Europe where the idea of "stages" of history developed.

Called Marx's stages of development, it begins with "Primitive Communism," then "Slavery," then "Feudalism," then "Capitalism," and finally "Communism." There are many problems with this evolutionary developmental scheme, and yet parts of it stuck. Though from a Western European mindset, the Japanese seemed to fit the scheme because of their pronounced feudalism historically.

The part that fit the Japanese best, the feudalism stage, became the club with which to beat Korea ― so to speak. Korean historians, wanting to know where they fit in the developmental scheme of world history, have tried to find "feudalism" in their history ― and it's not really there. Maybe early Goryeo? But the progression of the scheme does not work, one stage to the next.

Rather than trying to fit into alien intellectual frameworks, Korea is better off establishing its own scheme of developmental history in which Korea's strong suit, a strong centralized state is the crowning achievement. In this regard, rather than being secondary to Japan's development, Korea is actually more advanced, having basically skipped the "stage" of feudalism. But unfortunately, there are many in Korean society that still try to keep up with Japan in a mistaken hegemonic historiography that should be discarded.

Mark Peterson (markpeterson@byu.edu) is professor emeritus of Korean, Asian and Near Eastern languages at Brigham Young University in Utah.