Case for South Korean sanctions on Russia

By Troy Stangarone

If there was ever any illusion that Russia didn't intend to invade Ukraine, that is gone now. Russian troops have entered into Ukraine with the clear intent to remove its democratically elected government. While Ukraine may seem a world away from the Korean Peninsula, what happens on the plains of Eastern Europe will reverberate all of the way to Korea.

Since the end of World War II, the world has worked to put in place institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization in order to maintain the peace, allow for negotiated solutions to disputes, and for commerce to remain uninterrupted. Russia's actions in Ukraine will strain those institutions and norms, if not break them in a way that reshapes how states interact with each other ― and not for the better.

For this reason alone South Korea's signal that it will support sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine is important. It is in the interest of members of the international community to defend international law and their own innate interest not to allow norms of military force or economic coercion outside of international rules to take hold as a means for settling disputes.

However, as with the United States and its allies in Europe, the deeper reality is that once this crisis ends Russia will still remain a nuclear-armed state that nations must deal with, even if Moscow faces years of isolation. In this context, sanctions are a balance between ensuring that Russia pays a price for its use of military force to deter other states that would do so, but also in not eliminating the prospect for any cooperation with Russia. Nevertheless, part of that calculation also relates to the factors that drove Russia's actions ― its claim of threats to its security.

In this area, much of the focus has been on Russia's argument that Ukraine's potential membership of NATO was unacceptable. Throughout the crisis Putin has continued to emphasize his grievances with NATO's expansion towards Russia's border and what he perceives to be a threat from Ukraine's mere existence if it is not in Russia's orbit. At times, Putin has gone so far as to suggest that Ukraine is a fictional state that only has the right to exist as part of Russia.

In his speech to the Russian people, Putin again emphasized that he believed "it is only a matter of time" before Ukraine would join NATO. He also tried to justify his actions as working to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He remarked that "If Ukraine acquires weapons of mass destruction, the situation in the world and in Europe will drastically change, especially for us, for Russia." He went on to state that "We cannot but react to this real danger, all the more so since, let me repeat, Ukraine's Western patrons may help it acquire these weapons to create yet another threat to our country."

Of course, Putin failed to note that the former Communist bloc states that have joined NATO did so to ensure that Russia would never again occupy them, something that remains a concern due to Russia's invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, now twice, since the end of the Cold War. Putin also failed to mention that, unlike North Korea, Ukraine had no intention of developing weapons of mass destruction, but gave them up under assurances by Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom that its territorial sovereignty would be protected.

Sanctions are important for reinforcing the norms of the U.N. Charter that borders are not changed through force, but for also reinforcing that states should be able to choose their own foreign policy.

South Korea has announced that it will join the ban on some Russian banks in the SWIFT banking system and export controls on strategic materials, but similar to many European countries, economic interests will play a factor in sanctions development and energy sanctions are unlikely.

One key component of any package would be export controls on hi-technology products. South Korea's decision to enforce U.S. and EU export controls is key to limiting Moscow's access to high-tech products but it could include autonomous controls on these materials. Seoul should also consider autonomous sanctions on Russia in other areas. These could also include financial sanctions, prohibition on imports such as vodka or similar items to many European countries as well as a refusal to engage in sporting events with Russia. Even small sanctions help to send a signal to Moscow that it needs to reverse course or face greater isolation.

Sanctions on Russia are also likely to have little effect on talks with North Korea. Pyongyang will take note of how little security assurances mattered for defending Ukraine and cling tighter to its nuclear weapons, though it may not say this as Russia remains a conduit for North Korean sanctions evasion. With Russia likely to be isolated diplomatically in the short to medium term, there is no positive role that Putin could play on the Korean Peninsula.

Ultimately, if Russia is able to remove the government of a sovereign nation with little consequence, the world will move closer to a new order that might allow powerful states to do as they wish and international law and norms become increasingly irrelevant. That is an outcome that is in the interest of only Russia and perhaps a few other countries. In the short term, sanctions on Russia will have an impact on South Korean firms, but deeper issues are at play.

Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.