By Troy Stangarone
It shouldn't be surprising that the United States and South Korea have yet to reach an agreement on Seoul's contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea given the way the talks have gone.
Imagine if your insurance company sent you a notice that next year your policy was going to increase by more than 400 percent. We all expect prices to rise over time and are willing to pay reasonable increases, but an increase of 400 percent would be seen as completely unreasonable.
In the case of an insurance policy, most individuals would simply find a new insurer that was willing to provide the same coverage at a more reasonable price. But alliances are different.
Military alliances are a deeper relationship than an insurance policy. South Korea and the U.S. fought side by side during the Korean War, but also in Vietnam and they worked together to ensure the safety of shipping off the Horn of Africa.
The alliance at its core is commitment by both countries to work together to ensure their national security and to lend military support should one of the allies find its territory under attack in the Pacific region, but both countries have also invested significantly in building a more robust economic and cultural relationship that extends beyond the military alliance.
While South Korea spends more on national defense than NATO and most U.S. allies, there may be a legitimate discussion to be had on how Seoul can contribute more. In that context the Trump administration may never have truly expected South Korea to accept a reported request of $5 billion. But as a starting point for negotiations it made reaching a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) needlessly difficult.
The U.S. request has come down significantly, but the decision to furlough some 4,000 South Koreans working for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic only complicated the discussions.
The furloughs were clearly designed to pressure South Korea in the negotiations, but were damaging in that they did not reflect what the U.S. was doing domestically to protect jobs nor were they reflective of American values.
While the furlough issue has been resolved, the talks face a new challenge. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that the Pentagon has presented the White House with options for reducing the U.S. military presence in South Korea. The options are reported to be part of a broader review of how to position U.S. forces internationally and potential overseas reductions.
The U.S. has already announced that it will withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany and former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell suggested that allied contributions were a factor when he remarked that Americans "are getting a little bit tired of paying too much for the defense of other countries," including South Korea.
Withdrawing some U.S. troops from South Korea, however, is more complex than the planned withdrawal from Germany. Contrary to the remarks by former Ambassador Grenell, the American public is actually quite supportive of U.S. troops in South Korea.
According to polling done by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 69 percent of Americans think that the U.S. troop presence should be either maintained or increased. Only 16 percent of Americans think it should be reduced. The survey also found a strong bipartisan majority of Americans view the alliance as strengthening U.S. national security.
Congress shares that support. It has specifically placed language in the National Defense Authorization Act prohibiting the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea below 28,500 without the secretary of defense certifying that the reduction is in U.S. national security interest and that U.S. allies be consulted on the reduction.
While these provisions would not necessarily preclude the Trump administration from reducing troop levels in South Korea, it does reflect the opposition in Congress to reductions.
While there is a lack of support in the United States for reducing U.S. troop levels in South Korea, Seoul and Washington should not be opposed to the idea of U.S. troop reductions or restructuring.
But rather than as part of cost-sharing talks, the issue of changes to the USFK presence should be in the context of what U.S. force structure best supports the mission of deterring North Korea, defending against potential attacks against South Korea and promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
A better approach would be for the U.S. and South Korea to agree to a two- or three-year agreement at a reasonable increase and then use that time to engage in serious discussions about the future of the alliance.
That would allow for a proper assessment of the alliance's needs and potential future threats that would help inform for both sides what the U.S. force posture should look like in the years ahead.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
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Imagine if your insurance company sent you a notice that next year your policy was going to increase by more than 400 percent. We all expect prices to rise over time and are willing to pay reasonable increases, but an increase of 400 percent would be seen as completely unreasonable.
In the case of an insurance policy, most individuals would simply find a new insurer that was willing to provide the same coverage at a more reasonable price. But alliances are different.
Military alliances are a deeper relationship than an insurance policy. South Korea and the U.S. fought side by side during the Korean War, but also in Vietnam and they worked together to ensure the safety of shipping off the Horn of Africa.
The alliance at its core is commitment by both countries to work together to ensure their national security and to lend military support should one of the allies find its territory under attack in the Pacific region, but both countries have also invested significantly in building a more robust economic and cultural relationship that extends beyond the military alliance.
While South Korea spends more on national defense than NATO and most U.S. allies, there may be a legitimate discussion to be had on how Seoul can contribute more. In that context the Trump administration may never have truly expected South Korea to accept a reported request of $5 billion. But as a starting point for negotiations it made reaching a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) needlessly difficult.
The U.S. request has come down significantly, but the decision to furlough some 4,000 South Koreans working for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic only complicated the discussions.
The furloughs were clearly designed to pressure South Korea in the negotiations, but were damaging in that they did not reflect what the U.S. was doing domestically to protect jobs nor were they reflective of American values.
While the furlough issue has been resolved, the talks face a new challenge. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that the Pentagon has presented the White House with options for reducing the U.S. military presence in South Korea. The options are reported to be part of a broader review of how to position U.S. forces internationally and potential overseas reductions.
The U.S. has already announced that it will withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany and former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell suggested that allied contributions were a factor when he remarked that Americans "are getting a little bit tired of paying too much for the defense of other countries," including South Korea.
Withdrawing some U.S. troops from South Korea, however, is more complex than the planned withdrawal from Germany. Contrary to the remarks by former Ambassador Grenell, the American public is actually quite supportive of U.S. troops in South Korea.
According to polling done by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 69 percent of Americans think that the U.S. troop presence should be either maintained or increased. Only 16 percent of Americans think it should be reduced. The survey also found a strong bipartisan majority of Americans view the alliance as strengthening U.S. national security.
Congress shares that support. It has specifically placed language in the National Defense Authorization Act prohibiting the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea below 28,500 without the secretary of defense certifying that the reduction is in U.S. national security interest and that U.S. allies be consulted on the reduction.
While these provisions would not necessarily preclude the Trump administration from reducing troop levels in South Korea, it does reflect the opposition in Congress to reductions.
While there is a lack of support in the United States for reducing U.S. troop levels in South Korea, Seoul and Washington should not be opposed to the idea of U.S. troop reductions or restructuring.
But rather than as part of cost-sharing talks, the issue of changes to the USFK presence should be in the context of what U.S. force structure best supports the mission of deterring North Korea, defending against potential attacks against South Korea and promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
A better approach would be for the U.S. and South Korea to agree to a two- or three-year agreement at a reasonable increase and then use that time to engage in serious discussions about the future of the alliance.
That would allow for a proper assessment of the alliance's needs and potential future threats that would help inform for both sides what the U.S. force posture should look like in the years ahead.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
