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| U.S. President Donald Trump hosts a meeting inside the Cabinet Room at the White House on Nov. 19. Reuters-Yonhap |
By Oh Young-jin
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This wishful vision causes an optical illusion that raises Korea's expectations and thus triggers friction between the two allies. To sum it up, the U.S. does not see Korea as much of a negotiating partner, meaning that it sees itself as superpower and senior partner in the alliance, and should therefore get its way with Korea, and thinks it is granting favors to Korea, when Korea thinks it can get a deal with the U.S. through negotiations.
A couple of days ago, I stumbled on a report from a vernacular newspaper that called for a barter deal with the United States. It came down to Korea paying whatever the U.S. wants it to pay in return for removing restrictions on its eventual nuclear armament.
This suggested barter deal is nothing new as some in Seoul have been calling for Korea to have its own nuclear program to counter the ever-sophisticated North Korean nuclear arsenal. But the idea may now be gaining currency as the Trump administration demands a five-fold increase in Korea's contribution to the upkeep of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and Korea needs something to counter it.
Hidden in plain sight in this suggestion is Korea's wish to persuade the U.S. to be fair in the ongoing dispute between Korea and Japan.
The U.S. is relentlessly putting pressure on Korea not to withdraw from the Korea-Japan intelligence sharing pact or GSOMIA (general security of military information agreement). Korea is threatening to pull out in retaliation against Japan's trade sanctions.
Washington says that it is a matter for the two countries to settle, but its demand that Seoul remain in the GSOMIA falls nothing short of taking sides with Tokyo.
In both cases ― the suggested barter on the cost sharing and GSOMIA ― the U.S. is highly unlikely to change its mind for two reasons. First, the U.S. is a superpower and is used to dictating terms and conditions on allies or foes, a tendency that has been strengthened under President Trump. Second, it sees Japan as a more important ally than Korea. So the U.S. expects Korea to succumb to its wish.
Even any vicious landlord would not ask a tenant to pay five times the current rent. But Washington is doing exactly that, even though their relationship is not as such. It is more like a neighborhood bully shaking down a storeowner in the name of protection. However, that thuggish attitude, if amplified to a state level, is typical of big powers and prevents any chance of a negotiated settlement. It is more like a take-it-or-leave it basis.
Trump has done away with any finesse of doing that in contrast to previous U.S. governments. Being short of going "manomano" with the U.S. for now, China would be no different and, considering its dynastic practices, it would be worse when it reaches U.S. status, being more forceful and rude in getting its way.
What emboldens the U.S.? First of all, it believes with a reasonable degree of reality that it can get away with whatever it wants. In this sense, it is not implausible that the U.S. threatens to pull out its troops and then does so if it does not get what it wants. Although it recently denied a report about a U.S. withdrawal, such a threat exists as long as the troops are in Korea.
If the U.S. settles for less than a 500 percent increase, Korean bureaucrats would like to claim that it is a "victory" that is attributed to their negotiating prowess. The victory for Korea would not be possible in the first place because the two sides are on an uneven field titling in U.S. favor with the U.S. calling the shots. Most likely, Washington would see such a deal as a favor.
In this context, bartering to loosen the reins for Korea's armament is just fiction and wishful thinking; the fact that nonproliferation is two pillars of U.S. foreign policy objectives is a more specific reason that stands in the way of Seoul going nuclear.
The U.S. stance on the GSOMIA row shows how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy (IPS) works. Its non-interference reconfirms what the U.S. priority is. The U.S. uses Japan as its primary deputy and cooperates with Tokyo to contain continental rivals, now China and previously the Soviet Union.
The U.S. withdrew from South Korea in January 1950 and six months later the North supported by Josef Stalin and China's leader Mao Zedong mounted massive attacks on the South, triggering the bloody three-year Korean War. Seven decades ago, the trigger for the invasion was the U.S. Acheson Line that excluded Korea out of its defense perimeter at the start of the U.S.-Soviet cold war rivalry. Now, the IPS may end up following the same logic, with the U.S. making the same choice ― ditching Korea and embracing Japan.
Now the problem is that Korea is bound to demand a bigger say in bilateral affairs and that the U.S. consider it as negotiating partner. Previously, when it was the superpower in its peak form, the U.S. would coerce Korea to back down. Now, it is not clear.
Oh Young-jin (foolsdie@gmail.com, foolsdie5@koreatimes.co.k) is digital managing editor of The Korea Times.
