Diplomacy and N. Korea dilemma

By Desaix Anderson

Road to catastrophe?

Commentators regularly speak of 24 years of failure in policy toward the Democratic Republic of Korea, but, since Pyongyang began to threaten to build nuclear weapons, the only period of respite followed the Agreed Framework, signed by President Clinton and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in 1994. The agreement froze North Korea's nuclear facilities with inspections for eight years, in exchange for a U.S.-led agreement to construct in North Korea two light water nuclear reactors and provide 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year to the North.

As the second Executive Director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from late 1997 until early 2001, I observed a change in attitude toward the U.S. and others to evolve gradually but positively. Pyongyang's early and constant reference to "U.S. hostility" mellowed somewhat. Relations with the US evolved, leading to a visit by Secretary of State Madeline Albright in October 2000, prospectively followed by a visit by President Clinton when he was expected to sign an agreement to prohibit the development of ballistic missiles. This promising development was not realized by the end of Clinton's term, and President Bush chose not to pursue it. KEDO itself also was able to increasingly conduct fairly normal negotiations with senior North Korean officials. I am convinced that Pyongyang had begun seriously to believe that "US hostility" was being overcome and that trust was beginning to build between the U.S. and KEDO with North Korea.

During a March 7, 2001, visit to Washington by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, "Both Presidents (Kim and Bush) reaffirmed their commitment to continue the 1994 Agreed Framework and called on North Korea to join in taking the needed steps for its successful implementation." But privately Bush told Kim that it was difficult to deal with the North Korean dictator. President George W. Bush included North Korea in his first State of the Union Address in January 2002 as part of an Axis of Evil, along with Iraq, and Iran. These actions shattered the tentative trust that had been built up by the Agreed Framework. Subsequently, Bush seized on indications that the DPRK was constructing a uranium enrichment facility to question the Agreed Framework. Rather than demand inspections of the suspected site, as the U.S. had successfully done in 1998, Bush terminated the agreement. The DPRK left the NPT in January 2003, and relations rapidly returned to deep hostility.

Although in the second Bush Administration, Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill made a valiant effort to resurrect an agreement with North Korea, and a tentative agreement on denuclearization was concluded in 2005. But Pyongyang quickly backed down, possibly because of Kim Jong Il's declining health, and this glimmer of hope was squashed.

Sadly, in my view, President Obama's "strategic patience" allowed this problem to fester.

Trump diplomacy

President Trump's quixotic approach to North Korea must be bewildering to Pyongyang and probably fuels Kim Jong-un's daring bravado. From "fire and fury" to describing Kim Jong-un as a smart fellow, Trump has set an erratic stage. But the North Korean explosion September 2 of a nuclear device six to 16 times the strength of the Hiroshima bomb has resulted in a strange and dangerous series of moves.

Most striking was Trump's precipitous threat to terminate the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement and his labeling of South Korea's policy toward North Korea as "appeasement." These were hazardous charges against a vital partner. Diplomacy at any level is not all cocktail parties. It is understanding, and knowing how to deal with allies and opponents in effective ways. A cardinal rule is not to undermine your allies' interests and intentions. I hope that Trump made effective amends in his September 4 call to ROK President Moon Jae-in.

Second, Trump's threats to withdraw from the Iran agreement would be tragic, but also would have serious implications for constructing a meaningful agreement with Pyongyang. In contrast, the Iran agreement should be upheld by the Trump administration, since it is the model for what we should be seeking through negotiations with North Korea. It should be very clear that repudiation of the Iran agreement would allow Iran to pursue nuclear enrichment and weapons on day two, not theoretically in year ten. Our goal should be an agreement with North Korea along the lines of the Iran agreement. In the Iran agreement, America's international credibility is on the line, with implications for Pyongyang. If we cannot behave rationally and dependably as a partner in stopping nuclear threats, our role in future international leadership looks bleak.

Finally, a smart negotiator does not embarrass key players who are crucial to solutions. We should immediately develop a common strategy with South Korea and Japan for dealing with North Korea and China. You cannot enlist Chinese support, however, and within a few weeks declare its efforts ineffectual, or threaten to end bi-lateral trade. There is no satisfactory solution to the North Korean problem without China playing a major, positive role. We need to tighten rapidly and severely the screws on the North Korean economy and only China can advance this goal. China's concerns about North Korea are well known ― collapse of the North Korean regime, floods of refugees, and North Korea's being absorbed by South Korea to form a U.S.-oriented regime on China's border. Throughout its modern history one of China's greatest fears ― whether in Vietnam or Korea ― has been having American bases on China's border.

For any hope of success for restraining North Korea, a diplomatic strategy is imperative. To pursue such, Trump should send a formidable diplomat to Beijing to make absolutely clear to the Chinese leadership what our goals are vis-à-vis North Korea and what they are not. He should point out clearly China's own interests in resolving the North Korea calamity. He should also assure the Chinese, that we do not seek the overthrow of the Kim regime, but its policies must change, or its leadership change. He might suggest that after a reliable cessation of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threats, U.S.-ROK exercises could be reduced commensurately. The envoy should discuss ways in which China and the U.S. might change the calculus in Pyongyang. Among other possibilities, in the event of collapse of the Northern regime the U.S. would only send American troops to the North with Chinese troops to find jointly and dispose of any nuclear weapons and ballistic missile materials remaining in North Korea; that the U.S. would not establish military bases above the current DMZ; we would cooperate to realize the goal of reconciliation between North and South; and reunification would only take place as might be worked out by the Koreans themselves. We should also project joint Chinese-U.S. efforts to manage refugee problems and provide economic assistance for North Korea's economic development. The envoy should remain in Beijing until he/she has effectively alleviated all these concerns and agreed on joint efforts.

However, we develop our strategy, we must strengthen quickly defenses of South Korea, Japan, Guam and the United States. We should not hesitate to employ cyber means to disable North Korea's capabilities.

Diplomacy may not save us from disaster on the Korean Peninsula, but, bolstered by pressure, it should be our top priority, managed by our best diplomatic talents.

Desaix Anderson was principal deputy assistant secretary, East Asia, 1989-1992, and executive director, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 1997-2001.