Inter-Korean prospects in first half of 2022

By Yang Moo-jin

A new year has begun. When U.S. President Joe Biden was inaugurated in January of last year, there were high expectations of a new opportunity to improve relations with North Korea. Unfortunately, no tangible results were made. However, the uncertainty of the situation on the Korean Peninsula has decreased and a positive atmosphere has been created for the resumption of dialogue.

Recently, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan made it clear that Washington's policy on North Korea is neither the Obama administration's strategic patience, nor the Trump administration's grand bargain, but a diplomatic engagement for a step-by-step approach toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. There is no significant difference in positions between North Korea and the U.S. on the methodology of denuclearization, which is the phased and simultaneous implementation of the Singapore Joint Statement.

South Korea and the U.S. seem to have reached a significant consensus on the push for the end-of-war declaration through close consultations. If North Korea responds to the proposal for an end-of-war declaration, it will be possible to resume negotiations for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea puts the withdrawal of the U.S.' hostile policy towards it as a prerequisite that must be proposed by South Korea and the U.S. for genuine dialogue without conditions.

However, since 2018, North Korea has continued to keep its promises to suspend nuclear and ICBM tests, leaving adequate room for improved relations, as seen in the restoration of the inter-Korean communication line on Oct. 4 of last year.

At the Plenary Meeting, no specific messages regarding North Korea's policy toward South Korea and its foreign policy were sent. But unlike at the beginning of last year, no mention was made of nuclear, missile, and other strategic weapons. This seems to be deliberate in order to prepare for the negotiation phase by keeping military tensions from escalating.

Based on these evaluations, let me examine how some major events scheduled for the first half of this year will affect the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

First, the Beijing Winter Olympics in early February will be the first test to see whether inter-Korean relations improve.

As the United States diplomatically boycotts the Winter Olympics and North Korea still has not vaccinated its people against COVID-19, an opportunity to improve relations is unlikely to present itself. However, if North Korea decides to send a high-ranking diplomatic envoy with regards to North Korea-China relations, there is still a possibility that an unexpected situation will occur.

Additionally, the joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises scheduled for the first half of this year can be a watershed event for the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea criticized South Korea for its military exercises in March of last year as well as mentioning the annulment of the Comprehensive Military Agreement. One week after the exercises were concluded, the North test-fired a short-range ballistic missile.

An atmosphere of reconciliation arrived on the Korean Peninsula in 2018 when President Moon Jae-in said in December of 2017 that the joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises could be put off for the duration of the Winter Olympics.

Ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics and Paralympics, scheduled to run from February to March, respectively, it is time to seriously consider postponing the military exercises for the consistent management of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the creation of an atmosphere of peace.

Fortunately, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the "Olympic Truce" resolution in December 2021. Now it is time to emphasize the purpose of the resolution, calling on states to stop hostile activities and build a peaceful world through sports and the Olympic ideals for the period of the Beijing Winter Olympics and hopefully beyond.

Lastly, the South Korean presidential election is scheduled to be held in early March. When the new government takes office in May, North Korea could once again carry out strategic provocations in order to take the lead.

Although there were similar concerns when the U.S. administration of President Joe Biden entered office at the beginning of last year, that didn't actually happen. Not only could the conversation be damaged, but China would most likely oppose North Korea's provocations.

North Korea should realize that nuclear tests and long-range missile provocations, which are carried out whenever new governments in South Korea and the U.S. assume power, have backfired with the eventual enforcement of sanctions and intensification of pressure.

Looking back, I think that the COVID-19 pandemic and the vulnerable health care system in North Korea were variables, which prevented the North from responding to dialogue to turn the situation around.

If South Korea can afford to provide a large amount of COVID-19 vaccines to North Korea, it could be a huge opportunity to improve relations.

Even before that, however, North Korea could resume communication through a video-conferencing system set up by the South Korean government for inter-Korean dialogue.

Reunions of separated families via video links could also be held during the Lunar New Year's holiday this year.

Furthermore, the fact that North Korea emphasized the resolution of its agrarian problems, including the development of better crops, securing of fertilizers and responding to climate change during the Plenary Meeting, it could be willing to discuss inter-Korean cooperation. I hope that the process of peace on the Korean Peninsula will resume energetically in the New Year.

Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.kr) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies and vice chairman of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is also a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy consultant at the Ministry of Unification.