By Cho Byung-jae
The positive results of the South Korea-U.S. summit are expected to encourage a resumption in dialogue between the United States and North Korea, as well as between the two Koreas. However, prior experience warns that hard work and creativity are required to go beyond mere engagement in dialogue and to achieve tangible progress in relations with North Korea.
In their joint statement on May 21, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to pursue diplomacy and dialogue "based on previous inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK commitments, such as the 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement" ― a move that I also recommended in my previous Korea Times article on Feb. 18.
The acknowledgement of the Singapore Joint Statement is particularly meaningful because it specifies the "complete denuclearization" not only of "North Korea," but of "the Korean Peninsula," which is more reciprocal and comprehensive.
The term "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" was first coined in 1991, when South Korea and the U.S. pressed North Korea to accept IAEA inspections, as part of its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to forgo nuclear reprocessing, while North Korea demanded the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and the creation of a "Nuclear-Free Zone" on the peninsula.
In addition to reaffirming previous inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea commitments, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to a "calibrated and practical approach" toward North Korea in their joint statement.
This agreement comes across as an attempt to set realistic goals and as an acknowledgement that the denuclearization process is bound to take time. North Korea is likely to view the results of these talks positively, given that it has considered the Singapore Joint Statement to be one of Kim Jong-un's key diplomatic achievements.
However, resumed dialogue does not immediately guarantee progress in bilateral relations. As a precondition to dialogue, North Korea has demanded the withdrawal of the U.S.' "hostile policy." What North Korea means by "hostile policy" is still unclear. While the withdrawal of a "hostile policy" certainly seems to include the suspension of U.S.-South Korea military exercises and the lifting of economic sanctions, these conditions alone have not proven to be sufficient.
For instance, previously, the U.S. announced the cessation of U.S.-South Korea military exercises at the Singapore summit, and expressed a willingness to lift certain sanctions against North Korea in Hanoi. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit ended up being a "no deal" meeting.
If the memoir of John Bolton, the former U.S. national security advisor, is accurate, the fundamental cause of the breakdown in talks in Hanoi was the difference in approaches by the two sides. Kim Jong-un wanted a step-by-step approach. He proposed a trade-off between the complete dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the lifting of five U.N. sanctions against North Korea. He suggested that the remaining issues be resolved successively with the development of mutual trust.
Trump's approach was different. He requested Kim Jong-un to submit a "full baseline declaration" of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic-missile programs, and asserted that this would be the starting point of any disarmament talks. Kim refused. In his point of view, such a declaration in the absence of mutual trust one-sidedly exposed North Korea to potential U.S. attacks.
Should the U.S.-North Korea dialogue resume with the same U.S. demand for a full baseline declaration, it is likely to end up in the same stalemate that we witnessed in Hanoi. As hard as it sounds, exploring ways to engage North Korea without demanding a full baseline declaration as a starting point will be critical in determining future progress in bilateral relations.
In this regard, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken has suggested that the U.S. policy on North Korea follow the example of Iran. One of the most prominent features of the Iran nuclear deal ― called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ― was the incorporation of "sunset" provisions, in which key nuclear restrictions expire after years 8, 10 and 15, allowing Iran to build up its uranium enrichment capability legally. These provisions allowed for a certain degree of uncertainty around Iran's nuclear future, against the backdrop of expectations that Iran would go through a major transformation over the next 10-25 years.
Although leaving an element of uncertainty could seem like an appealing proposition, the situation with North Korea is notably different from that with Iran. North Korea, unlike Iran, is already a nuclear state. Leaving its nuclear future open-ended is not politically viable. After all, the JCPOA faced much criticism and failed to obtain the endorsement of the U.S. Congress specifically because it left this room for uncertainty.
Constructing a roadmap for the complete denuclearization of the peninsula while allowing mutual respect is a difficult task. In this regard, some advocate a "limited arms control approach," focused on "preventing the threat from getting worse" rather than pushing to eliminate the threat immediately and completely. In the end, finding a new formula for mutual threat reduction will be crucial for South Korea and the U.S. in taking a "calibrated and practical approach" on the North Korean issue.
Cho Byung-jae (bjcho81@gmail.com) is a visiting professor emeritus at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University. Cho was a career diplomat and his last position in the Foreign Ministry was as the chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy.
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In their joint statement on May 21, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to pursue diplomacy and dialogue "based on previous inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK commitments, such as the 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement" ― a move that I also recommended in my previous Korea Times article on Feb. 18.
The acknowledgement of the Singapore Joint Statement is particularly meaningful because it specifies the "complete denuclearization" not only of "North Korea," but of "the Korean Peninsula," which is more reciprocal and comprehensive.
The term "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" was first coined in 1991, when South Korea and the U.S. pressed North Korea to accept IAEA inspections, as part of its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to forgo nuclear reprocessing, while North Korea demanded the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and the creation of a "Nuclear-Free Zone" on the peninsula.
In addition to reaffirming previous inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea commitments, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to a "calibrated and practical approach" toward North Korea in their joint statement.
This agreement comes across as an attempt to set realistic goals and as an acknowledgement that the denuclearization process is bound to take time. North Korea is likely to view the results of these talks positively, given that it has considered the Singapore Joint Statement to be one of Kim Jong-un's key diplomatic achievements.
However, resumed dialogue does not immediately guarantee progress in bilateral relations. As a precondition to dialogue, North Korea has demanded the withdrawal of the U.S.' "hostile policy." What North Korea means by "hostile policy" is still unclear. While the withdrawal of a "hostile policy" certainly seems to include the suspension of U.S.-South Korea military exercises and the lifting of economic sanctions, these conditions alone have not proven to be sufficient.
For instance, previously, the U.S. announced the cessation of U.S.-South Korea military exercises at the Singapore summit, and expressed a willingness to lift certain sanctions against North Korea in Hanoi. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit ended up being a "no deal" meeting.
If the memoir of John Bolton, the former U.S. national security advisor, is accurate, the fundamental cause of the breakdown in talks in Hanoi was the difference in approaches by the two sides. Kim Jong-un wanted a step-by-step approach. He proposed a trade-off between the complete dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the lifting of five U.N. sanctions against North Korea. He suggested that the remaining issues be resolved successively with the development of mutual trust.
Trump's approach was different. He requested Kim Jong-un to submit a "full baseline declaration" of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic-missile programs, and asserted that this would be the starting point of any disarmament talks. Kim refused. In his point of view, such a declaration in the absence of mutual trust one-sidedly exposed North Korea to potential U.S. attacks.
Should the U.S.-North Korea dialogue resume with the same U.S. demand for a full baseline declaration, it is likely to end up in the same stalemate that we witnessed in Hanoi. As hard as it sounds, exploring ways to engage North Korea without demanding a full baseline declaration as a starting point will be critical in determining future progress in bilateral relations.
In this regard, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken has suggested that the U.S. policy on North Korea follow the example of Iran. One of the most prominent features of the Iran nuclear deal ― called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ― was the incorporation of "sunset" provisions, in which key nuclear restrictions expire after years 8, 10 and 15, allowing Iran to build up its uranium enrichment capability legally. These provisions allowed for a certain degree of uncertainty around Iran's nuclear future, against the backdrop of expectations that Iran would go through a major transformation over the next 10-25 years.
Although leaving an element of uncertainty could seem like an appealing proposition, the situation with North Korea is notably different from that with Iran. North Korea, unlike Iran, is already a nuclear state. Leaving its nuclear future open-ended is not politically viable. After all, the JCPOA faced much criticism and failed to obtain the endorsement of the U.S. Congress specifically because it left this room for uncertainty.
Constructing a roadmap for the complete denuclearization of the peninsula while allowing mutual respect is a difficult task. In this regard, some advocate a "limited arms control approach," focused on "preventing the threat from getting worse" rather than pushing to eliminate the threat immediately and completely. In the end, finding a new formula for mutual threat reduction will be crucial for South Korea and the U.S. in taking a "calibrated and practical approach" on the North Korean issue.
Cho Byung-jae (bjcho81@gmail.com) is a visiting professor emeritus at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University. Cho was a career diplomat and his last position in the Foreign Ministry was as the chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy.
