By Cho Byung-jae
This past January, Joe Biden, the Democratic presidential candidate at the time, shared his foreign policy plans in an essay in the Foreign Affairs Magazine titled "Why America Must Lead Again."
He asserted that the U.S. should "confront China's abusive behaviors and human rights violations," but "seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues … such as climate change, nonproliferation and global health security." He added that the "most effective way" to counter China is "to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners."
Since then, Democratic foreign policy and security experts, many of whom are expected to fill senior roles in the Biden administration, seem to have reached a consensus on several points regarding U.S. policy on China. Firstly, they agree that the era of "constructive engagement" is over and that the U.S. and China are strategic competitors.
Fifty years of the U.S. engagement policy, undertaken with hopes that China would change, has proven to be a failure. Yet, it is tough to bring China to its knees when the country is all-around stronger than the former Soviet Union on many fronts. The best solution, then, would be to mobilize national power and find a way to coexist. Conflict with China is not a problem that requires a quick fix, but a challenge that needs to be managed in the long term.
Secondly, Biden's advisers acknowledge that America's resources are not unlimited. Naturally, cooperation with allies and partners will be prioritized. As Biden pointed out in his essay, the U.S. alone accounts for approximately 25 percent of the global GDP. When it is joined by allies in Europe and Asia, that figure becomes 50-60 percent, a scale China cannot overlook.
Finally, Biden's advisers do not target U.S. military primacy in the Indo-Pacific region. With the rise of China, they have witnessed changes in the global balance of power. In their perspective, what the U.S. needs to focus on is to reaffirm its security commitments with allies and aim for deterrence of China's provocations.
The Biden camp's grasp of the situation and overall policy prescription sound surprisingly realistic, but then again, such an approach seems only fitting. The fact of the matter is that problems concerning the rise of China, the return of Russia, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Iranian expansionism, climate change and the influx of refugees have long existed before Trump's presidency.
These challenges call for a coolheaded, long-term approach rather than just strong rhetoric. However, it remains to be seen whether the Biden administration can maintain such realism in the face of widespread domestic sentiment to "contain and confront China." While it may campaign for "anything but Trump," replacing four years of China bashing from the White House will not be easy.
In assessing the development of U.S.-China relations over the past two decades, people have often thought of the Thucydides Trap. Can the existing hegemony, the U.S., form a new relationship with the emerging power, China, without going to war? When China called for "a new type of major power relationship" and advocated for "Asia for Asians," the U.S. suspected China was scheming to displace its influence in the Western Pacific.
When President Obama came up with "Pivot to Asia," China complained that the U.S. was trying to impede its growth. Thereafter, China revealed plans to "March West" for the establishment of a new regional security and economic order in the Eurasian landmass in a move seemingly aimed at outflanking the U.S.
Nevertheless, what assuages concerns is the high possibility that talks will resume under the Biden administration. During Obama's presidency, the U.S. and China held the semi-annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), alternating between Washington and Beijing to discuss critical issues such as the economy, diplomacy, and military. Although these meetings did not resolve all of their disagreements, they did prevent a breakdown in bilateral relations.
Prior to commencing talks with China, the U.S. will attempt to reaffirm security commitments with allies, and endeavor to restore trust. Also, as pledged, Biden will organize a global Summit for Democracy. Since the objective of the forum will be good governance rather than the creation of an exclusive group of countries, South Korea is likely to consider participating. Neither would China find the forum objectionable if it does not project hostility toward its governance.
The Biden administration, which values alliances, is expected to cooperate with South Korea to resolve bilateral issues such as defense cost-sharing in a mutually beneficial fashion. Also, it is likely to make a coordinated effort to secure peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Perhaps, it is not unreasonable to hope for a re-enactment of the late 1990s, when the South Korean and U.S. governments, under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Bill Clinton, respectively, succeeded in strengthening their alliance and improving inter-Korean relations at the same time.
Cho Byung-jae (bjcho81@gmail.com) is the secretary-general of the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) and also a visiting professor emeritus at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of the Kyungnam University. Cho was a career diplomat and his last position at the Foreign Ministry was the chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy.
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He asserted that the U.S. should "confront China's abusive behaviors and human rights violations," but "seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues … such as climate change, nonproliferation and global health security." He added that the "most effective way" to counter China is "to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners."
Since then, Democratic foreign policy and security experts, many of whom are expected to fill senior roles in the Biden administration, seem to have reached a consensus on several points regarding U.S. policy on China. Firstly, they agree that the era of "constructive engagement" is over and that the U.S. and China are strategic competitors.
Fifty years of the U.S. engagement policy, undertaken with hopes that China would change, has proven to be a failure. Yet, it is tough to bring China to its knees when the country is all-around stronger than the former Soviet Union on many fronts. The best solution, then, would be to mobilize national power and find a way to coexist. Conflict with China is not a problem that requires a quick fix, but a challenge that needs to be managed in the long term.
Secondly, Biden's advisers acknowledge that America's resources are not unlimited. Naturally, cooperation with allies and partners will be prioritized. As Biden pointed out in his essay, the U.S. alone accounts for approximately 25 percent of the global GDP. When it is joined by allies in Europe and Asia, that figure becomes 50-60 percent, a scale China cannot overlook.
Finally, Biden's advisers do not target U.S. military primacy in the Indo-Pacific region. With the rise of China, they have witnessed changes in the global balance of power. In their perspective, what the U.S. needs to focus on is to reaffirm its security commitments with allies and aim for deterrence of China's provocations.
The Biden camp's grasp of the situation and overall policy prescription sound surprisingly realistic, but then again, such an approach seems only fitting. The fact of the matter is that problems concerning the rise of China, the return of Russia, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Iranian expansionism, climate change and the influx of refugees have long existed before Trump's presidency.
These challenges call for a coolheaded, long-term approach rather than just strong rhetoric. However, it remains to be seen whether the Biden administration can maintain such realism in the face of widespread domestic sentiment to "contain and confront China." While it may campaign for "anything but Trump," replacing four years of China bashing from the White House will not be easy.
In assessing the development of U.S.-China relations over the past two decades, people have often thought of the Thucydides Trap. Can the existing hegemony, the U.S., form a new relationship with the emerging power, China, without going to war? When China called for "a new type of major power relationship" and advocated for "Asia for Asians," the U.S. suspected China was scheming to displace its influence in the Western Pacific.
When President Obama came up with "Pivot to Asia," China complained that the U.S. was trying to impede its growth. Thereafter, China revealed plans to "March West" for the establishment of a new regional security and economic order in the Eurasian landmass in a move seemingly aimed at outflanking the U.S.
Nevertheless, what assuages concerns is the high possibility that talks will resume under the Biden administration. During Obama's presidency, the U.S. and China held the semi-annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), alternating between Washington and Beijing to discuss critical issues such as the economy, diplomacy, and military. Although these meetings did not resolve all of their disagreements, they did prevent a breakdown in bilateral relations.
Prior to commencing talks with China, the U.S. will attempt to reaffirm security commitments with allies, and endeavor to restore trust. Also, as pledged, Biden will organize a global Summit for Democracy. Since the objective of the forum will be good governance rather than the creation of an exclusive group of countries, South Korea is likely to consider participating. Neither would China find the forum objectionable if it does not project hostility toward its governance.
The Biden administration, which values alliances, is expected to cooperate with South Korea to resolve bilateral issues such as defense cost-sharing in a mutually beneficial fashion. Also, it is likely to make a coordinated effort to secure peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Perhaps, it is not unreasonable to hope for a re-enactment of the late 1990s, when the South Korean and U.S. governments, under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Bill Clinton, respectively, succeeded in strengthening their alliance and improving inter-Korean relations at the same time.
Cho Byung-jae (bjcho81@gmail.com) is the secretary-general of the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) and also a visiting professor emeritus at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of the Kyungnam University. Cho was a career diplomat and his last position at the Foreign Ministry was the chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy.
