By Yun Byung-se
Recently, we had both good news and bad news on the nuclear postures of nuclear-armed states. Good news, the long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the Biden administration will soon be released as its classified version was sent to Congress last month.
All eyes were drawn to the three-paragraph summary on the Pentagon's factsheet which stated, "The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners." It followed the reference in the 2010 Obama NPR. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste A. Wallander further told the U.S. House Armed Services Committee that "the NPR language does not apply exclusively to nuclear attack but extends to extreme circumstances that would require the United States to defend allies and partners."
Since U.S. President Joe Biden entered office with two objectives for nuclear weapons policy: "the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal should be to deter ― and, if necessary, retaliate against ― a nuclear attack," the 2022 NPR is interpreted as Biden's retreat from his longtime pursuit of a "no first use" or "sole purpose" policies.
This is a welcome development for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. Over the last several months, they conveyed strong concern to the Biden administration over the prospect of a departure from a long-standing policy of "flexible deterrence" for several reasons, especially worrisome shifts in nuclear strategies of Russia, China and North Korea ― bad news.
Their concern soon became a reality when Russian President Vladimir Putin "ordered to move Russia's deterrence forces to a special regime of combat duty" on Feb. 27 vis-a-vis Ukraine. Some weeks later, his spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in an interview with CNN, saying, "if it is an existential threat for our country, then it can be used in accordance with our concept of domestic security."
The nuclear contingency in Ukraine and its potential consequences on NATO members reportedly triggered a team of national security officials of the U.S. and its allies to sketch out gruesome scenarios in case President Putin unleashes his stockpiles of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
Trigger-happy North Korea lost no time in taking advantage of U.S. preoccupations with Russia and China and emulated Moscow in a more direct and harsh form. Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, publicly warned last week that "North Korea opposes war but would use nuclear weapons if South Korea attacked" in an apparent response to South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook's earlier remarks on preemptive capabilities.
But it is probably aimed at the incoming conservative South Korean government as well. The significance of Kim's statement is that this was the first time North Korea made a clear and direct threat to use nuclear weapons "against South Korea" ― its treasured nuclear sword only supposedly targeted the U.S. before then.
North Korea's possible preemptive use of its nuclear weapons drew much attention when Kim Jong-un instructed the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021 to advance DPRK's tactical nuclear weapons, meaning a new focus on smaller and lighter nuclear warheads for actual use and to achieve nuclear "preemptive" and retaliatory attack capability.
A powerful warning came from Major Gen. Ferdinand Stoss, director of Plans and Policy for U.S. Strategic Command, who is in charge of strategic war plans, contingency planning, the integration of strategic deterrence activities with allies and partners. At a virtual conference in March last year, he said, "It's not about the range. It is not about the yield. It's about "first use" of it. I would argue that even if you have a low-yield weapon, it could be used in the theater, it could have a very strategic impact effect… I would determine that if a weapon like that was used with ill will that would be a "strategic attack" and that you would have lost strategic deterrence with that weapon being used."
This analysis is in line with last year's report by the U.N. Security Council's Expert Panel on DPRK sanctions which warned the possibility of DPRK being capable of mounting nuclear warheads on all ranges of ballistic missiles, including miniaturized nuclear warheads. For example, as Russia appears to have integrated its non-strategic nuclear forces into its war-fighting strategy, North Korea is rapidly benchmarking the Russian model by developing the KN-23 missile ― DPRK version of Russia's nuclear-capable Iskander missile.
This is a major reason why the U.S. and South Korean military authorities are expecting a seventh North Korean nuclear test in the near future. With utmost concern, they agreed last month to develop a new operational plan to reflect the new grim reality. Ambassador Sung Kim, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, also told reporters last week that Pyongyang could conduct a missile or nuclear test to mark the anniversary of the birth of its founding leader Kim Il-sung that falls on today, April 15.
As Gen. Stoss remarked at the above-mentioned virtual meeting, we have entered a new era when failure in nuclear deterrence is not ruled out. The warheads of North Korea's missiles can now be nuclear or conventional. Such dual capability presents a serious challenge as the U.S. and South Korea will have to determine their response to missile launches within a few seconds.
Thus, North Korea's new nuclear posture increases the likelihood that a conflict on the peninsula could escalate into a nuclear war. Over the last several years, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and his High Representative for Disarmament have warned that the possible use of nuclear weapons, intentionally, by accident or through miscalculation, is all together greater than it has been since the darkest days of the Cold War." What was unthinkable is now becoming thinkable.
This is the hard reality to be faced by the new South Korean administration to be inaugurated next month, making them sleepless. Just as NATO allies rushed to have the nuclear crisis scenarios meeting on Ukraine, nuclear crisis management mechanism should be no less a top priority for South Korea and the U.S. than extended deterrence and nuclear diplomacy in the two allies' overarching nuclear strategy vis-a-vis North Korea.
As such, the unusual hearty welcome to President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's policy consultation delegation by the U.S. administration and the Congress as well as substantive strategy session between the two sides last week are a very good start and groundwork for normalizing and upgrading the alliance.
Yun Byung-se is former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
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All eyes were drawn to the three-paragraph summary on the Pentagon's factsheet which stated, "The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners." It followed the reference in the 2010 Obama NPR. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste A. Wallander further told the U.S. House Armed Services Committee that "the NPR language does not apply exclusively to nuclear attack but extends to extreme circumstances that would require the United States to defend allies and partners."
Since U.S. President Joe Biden entered office with two objectives for nuclear weapons policy: "the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal should be to deter ― and, if necessary, retaliate against ― a nuclear attack," the 2022 NPR is interpreted as Biden's retreat from his longtime pursuit of a "no first use" or "sole purpose" policies.
This is a welcome development for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. Over the last several months, they conveyed strong concern to the Biden administration over the prospect of a departure from a long-standing policy of "flexible deterrence" for several reasons, especially worrisome shifts in nuclear strategies of Russia, China and North Korea ― bad news.
Their concern soon became a reality when Russian President Vladimir Putin "ordered to move Russia's deterrence forces to a special regime of combat duty" on Feb. 27 vis-a-vis Ukraine. Some weeks later, his spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in an interview with CNN, saying, "if it is an existential threat for our country, then it can be used in accordance with our concept of domestic security."
The nuclear contingency in Ukraine and its potential consequences on NATO members reportedly triggered a team of national security officials of the U.S. and its allies to sketch out gruesome scenarios in case President Putin unleashes his stockpiles of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
Trigger-happy North Korea lost no time in taking advantage of U.S. preoccupations with Russia and China and emulated Moscow in a more direct and harsh form. Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, publicly warned last week that "North Korea opposes war but would use nuclear weapons if South Korea attacked" in an apparent response to South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook's earlier remarks on preemptive capabilities.
But it is probably aimed at the incoming conservative South Korean government as well. The significance of Kim's statement is that this was the first time North Korea made a clear and direct threat to use nuclear weapons "against South Korea" ― its treasured nuclear sword only supposedly targeted the U.S. before then.
North Korea's possible preemptive use of its nuclear weapons drew much attention when Kim Jong-un instructed the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021 to advance DPRK's tactical nuclear weapons, meaning a new focus on smaller and lighter nuclear warheads for actual use and to achieve nuclear "preemptive" and retaliatory attack capability.
A powerful warning came from Major Gen. Ferdinand Stoss, director of Plans and Policy for U.S. Strategic Command, who is in charge of strategic war plans, contingency planning, the integration of strategic deterrence activities with allies and partners. At a virtual conference in March last year, he said, "It's not about the range. It is not about the yield. It's about "first use" of it. I would argue that even if you have a low-yield weapon, it could be used in the theater, it could have a very strategic impact effect… I would determine that if a weapon like that was used with ill will that would be a "strategic attack" and that you would have lost strategic deterrence with that weapon being used."
This analysis is in line with last year's report by the U.N. Security Council's Expert Panel on DPRK sanctions which warned the possibility of DPRK being capable of mounting nuclear warheads on all ranges of ballistic missiles, including miniaturized nuclear warheads. For example, as Russia appears to have integrated its non-strategic nuclear forces into its war-fighting strategy, North Korea is rapidly benchmarking the Russian model by developing the KN-23 missile ― DPRK version of Russia's nuclear-capable Iskander missile.
This is a major reason why the U.S. and South Korean military authorities are expecting a seventh North Korean nuclear test in the near future. With utmost concern, they agreed last month to develop a new operational plan to reflect the new grim reality. Ambassador Sung Kim, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, also told reporters last week that Pyongyang could conduct a missile or nuclear test to mark the anniversary of the birth of its founding leader Kim Il-sung that falls on today, April 15.
As Gen. Stoss remarked at the above-mentioned virtual meeting, we have entered a new era when failure in nuclear deterrence is not ruled out. The warheads of North Korea's missiles can now be nuclear or conventional. Such dual capability presents a serious challenge as the U.S. and South Korea will have to determine their response to missile launches within a few seconds.
Thus, North Korea's new nuclear posture increases the likelihood that a conflict on the peninsula could escalate into a nuclear war. Over the last several years, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and his High Representative for Disarmament have warned that the possible use of nuclear weapons, intentionally, by accident or through miscalculation, is all together greater than it has been since the darkest days of the Cold War." What was unthinkable is now becoming thinkable.
This is the hard reality to be faced by the new South Korean administration to be inaugurated next month, making them sleepless. Just as NATO allies rushed to have the nuclear crisis scenarios meeting on Ukraine, nuclear crisis management mechanism should be no less a top priority for South Korea and the U.S. than extended deterrence and nuclear diplomacy in the two allies' overarching nuclear strategy vis-a-vis North Korea.
As such, the unusual hearty welcome to President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's policy consultation delegation by the U.S. administration and the Congress as well as substantive strategy session between the two sides last week are a very good start and groundwork for normalizing and upgrading the alliance.
Yun Byung-se is former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
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