By Yun Byung-se
This month marks a historic milestone for us Koreans ― the 30th anniversary of the two Koreas' simultaneous admission to the United Nations.
I remember many sleepless nights, working tirelessly with my colleagues at what was then South Korea's Observer Mission to the U.N. to complete this mission. September 17, 1991, the day when our national flag was hoisted at U.N. Headquarters, remains a vivid memory, as it coincided with "World Peace Day."
One week later, then President Roh Tae-woo made Korea's first-ever keynote speech at the U.N. General Assembly as the leader of a new member state. This anniversary is a timely reminder of what it meant to South Korea's post-Cold War global diplomacy, as we look to the future.
The road to the U.N., a smooth pro forma procedure for most member states under the "universality principle," was bumpy and treacherous for us, for well-known reasons ― among others, the long-standing Cold War confrontational stance among permanent members of the Security Council who had major stakes on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States supported South Korea while the Soviet Union and China stood behind the North, objecting to the South's sole entry. For Kim Il-sung, Pyongyang's "supreme" leader, the idea of simultaneous entry directly clashed with his long―cherished scheme of founding a single Korea federation under one "red flag."
Regardless, simultaneous admission was made possible thanks to the well synchronized mix of the meltdown of the Cold War and South Korea's agile move to seize this opportunity with its Nordpolitik or Northern Policy. Indeed, Seoul successfully normalized its relations with the Soviet Union a year before in September 1990, and communicated with Beijing via its U.N. and Hong Kong channels. As in the German case, strong U.S. backing was a key factor.
While the two Germanys were also simultaneously admitted to the U.N., 24 years after their formal division, it took 43 years for the two Koreas to join. Whereas the two Germanys reunified in 1990, realizing the "Wir sind ein Volk" (We are one nation) slogan ― 17 years after their U.N. membership ― the two Koreas still have a long way to go.
From the standpoint of foreign policy makers and historians, South Korea's U.N. admission diplomacy merits special attention from several aspects.
First, it was a very rare case of a unilateral surrender by Pyongyang to Seoul's diplomatic pressure and persuasion, buttressed by overwhelming support from the community of nations that included North Korea's patrons.
Second, two ultimatums were decisive ― South Korea's ultimatum memorandum of April 5, 1991 to the U.N. Security Council and ensuing, yet quiet, ultimatum by Chinese Premier Li Peng to his North Korean counterpart during his visit to Pyongyang in May, 1991. The South Korean memorandum that I had the honor of drafting notified all U.N. members of Seoul's unstoppable resolve to submit its admission application in 1991, hoping the North would follow suit.
Its additional key message was that if the bid were to be again vetoed, it would not only be against the Republic of Korea (ROK) but the will of U.N. members. China took this message seriously and notified Pyongyang that it could no longer deny the legitimate cause of South Korea's entry. Three weeks later, North Korea grudgingly announced that it would drop its opposition to the simultaneous entry. The last phase of a decades-long U.N. admission war concluded with a happy ending.
Third, this drama was immediately followed by a series of historic developments in and around the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas announced the Basic Agreement as well as a denuclearization declaration. The U.S. then announced the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from the South. And South Korea and China engaged in a series of meetings between their foreign ministers and other high-level representatives that finally led to the normalization of relations in August 1992.
Unfortunately, this honeymoon was short-lived, and both Koreas went their own ways. Contrasting their track records since 1991 is an exercise in sadness.
For North Korea, its record is disastrous. Less than two years after its U.N. membership, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); it then proceeded to conduct six nuclear tests and launch all kinds of ballistic missiles in violation of about a dozen legally-binding U.N. Security Council resolutions over the last fifteen years, including this month; it is the first country to officially declare itself a "nuclear-armed state" in its constitution; and its human rights abuses are a standing item at the U.N. Human Rights Council. In short, Pyongyang is like a serial offender in its non-compliance with the U.N. Charter and related resolutions.
In contrast, South Korea has expanded its role to make up for the late start. Seoul has served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council twice and is now aspiring for a third term. It has also held the prestigious presidencies of the U.N. General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Council and Peace-building Commission, to name just a few.
It is now among the ten largest financial contributors to the U.N. budget and developmental assistance. Among other achievements, it is home to Ban Ki-moon, the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations (2007―16).
For South Korea, U.N. entry was pivotal to globalizing its diplomacy beyond the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region, addressing challenges in all three pillars of the Charter: peace, development, and human rights. Now, global priorities including climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic response and nuclear non-proliferation will be high on its agenda.
Looking ahead, the key task for Korean diplomacy is to live up to its commitment to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the world, and ultimately realizing reunification. As U.N. Secretary―General Antonio Guterres said recently, "this anniversary is a painful reminder of the lack of peace on the peninsula." Amid new strategic competition between the U.S. and China, we need a new agenda for sustainable peace and a hard-nosed strategy to build a new kind of Korea.
Yun Byung-se is the former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of the Korea Peace Foundation and a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and taskforces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
 |
I remember many sleepless nights, working tirelessly with my colleagues at what was then South Korea's Observer Mission to the U.N. to complete this mission. September 17, 1991, the day when our national flag was hoisted at U.N. Headquarters, remains a vivid memory, as it coincided with "World Peace Day."
One week later, then President Roh Tae-woo made Korea's first-ever keynote speech at the U.N. General Assembly as the leader of a new member state. This anniversary is a timely reminder of what it meant to South Korea's post-Cold War global diplomacy, as we look to the future.
The road to the U.N., a smooth pro forma procedure for most member states under the "universality principle," was bumpy and treacherous for us, for well-known reasons ― among others, the long-standing Cold War confrontational stance among permanent members of the Security Council who had major stakes on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States supported South Korea while the Soviet Union and China stood behind the North, objecting to the South's sole entry. For Kim Il-sung, Pyongyang's "supreme" leader, the idea of simultaneous entry directly clashed with his long―cherished scheme of founding a single Korea federation under one "red flag."
Regardless, simultaneous admission was made possible thanks to the well synchronized mix of the meltdown of the Cold War and South Korea's agile move to seize this opportunity with its Nordpolitik or Northern Policy. Indeed, Seoul successfully normalized its relations with the Soviet Union a year before in September 1990, and communicated with Beijing via its U.N. and Hong Kong channels. As in the German case, strong U.S. backing was a key factor.
While the two Germanys were also simultaneously admitted to the U.N., 24 years after their formal division, it took 43 years for the two Koreas to join. Whereas the two Germanys reunified in 1990, realizing the "Wir sind ein Volk" (We are one nation) slogan ― 17 years after their U.N. membership ― the two Koreas still have a long way to go.
From the standpoint of foreign policy makers and historians, South Korea's U.N. admission diplomacy merits special attention from several aspects.
First, it was a very rare case of a unilateral surrender by Pyongyang to Seoul's diplomatic pressure and persuasion, buttressed by overwhelming support from the community of nations that included North Korea's patrons.
Second, two ultimatums were decisive ― South Korea's ultimatum memorandum of April 5, 1991 to the U.N. Security Council and ensuing, yet quiet, ultimatum by Chinese Premier Li Peng to his North Korean counterpart during his visit to Pyongyang in May, 1991. The South Korean memorandum that I had the honor of drafting notified all U.N. members of Seoul's unstoppable resolve to submit its admission application in 1991, hoping the North would follow suit.
Its additional key message was that if the bid were to be again vetoed, it would not only be against the Republic of Korea (ROK) but the will of U.N. members. China took this message seriously and notified Pyongyang that it could no longer deny the legitimate cause of South Korea's entry. Three weeks later, North Korea grudgingly announced that it would drop its opposition to the simultaneous entry. The last phase of a decades-long U.N. admission war concluded with a happy ending.
Third, this drama was immediately followed by a series of historic developments in and around the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas announced the Basic Agreement as well as a denuclearization declaration. The U.S. then announced the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from the South. And South Korea and China engaged in a series of meetings between their foreign ministers and other high-level representatives that finally led to the normalization of relations in August 1992.
Unfortunately, this honeymoon was short-lived, and both Koreas went their own ways. Contrasting their track records since 1991 is an exercise in sadness.
For North Korea, its record is disastrous. Less than two years after its U.N. membership, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); it then proceeded to conduct six nuclear tests and launch all kinds of ballistic missiles in violation of about a dozen legally-binding U.N. Security Council resolutions over the last fifteen years, including this month; it is the first country to officially declare itself a "nuclear-armed state" in its constitution; and its human rights abuses are a standing item at the U.N. Human Rights Council. In short, Pyongyang is like a serial offender in its non-compliance with the U.N. Charter and related resolutions.
In contrast, South Korea has expanded its role to make up for the late start. Seoul has served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council twice and is now aspiring for a third term. It has also held the prestigious presidencies of the U.N. General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Council and Peace-building Commission, to name just a few.
It is now among the ten largest financial contributors to the U.N. budget and developmental assistance. Among other achievements, it is home to Ban Ki-moon, the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations (2007―16).
For South Korea, U.N. entry was pivotal to globalizing its diplomacy beyond the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region, addressing challenges in all three pillars of the Charter: peace, development, and human rights. Now, global priorities including climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic response and nuclear non-proliferation will be high on its agenda.
Looking ahead, the key task for Korean diplomacy is to live up to its commitment to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the world, and ultimately realizing reunification. As U.N. Secretary―General Antonio Guterres said recently, "this anniversary is a painful reminder of the lack of peace on the peninsula." Amid new strategic competition between the U.S. and China, we need a new agenda for sustainable peace and a hard-nosed strategy to build a new kind of Korea.
Yun Byung-se is the former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of the Korea Peace Foundation and a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and taskforces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
![[INTERVIEW] Busan has potential to be world-class city, mayor says](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/K2023012900054_7252383219ed8.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[ANALYSIS] Pandemic awakens demand for data-driven automation](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/63a1298bd0fd4bae8e4f5e8b8d5d0161.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
