By Troy Stangarone
 |
While there is speculation that the test is an attempt to pressure the United States in talks over the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons, the test also highlights an important question. What will North Korea's military look like after the dismantlement of its nuclear program?
While North Korea has been coy about the nature of the test, under Kim Jong-un it has sought to develop more modern weaponry.
In recent years, Pyongyang has worked to extend the range of its artillery and develop the capability to launch ballistic missiles from a submarine. It has also sought to move into high tech weaponry with the deployment of drones and robust cyber capabilities.
Even with these advances, absent its nuclear deterrent North Korea would likely feel compelled to develop more modern conventional forces to offset the loss of its nuclear capabilities.
For much of its existence, North Korea has focused on numerical superiority and asymmetric means to defend against the technologically superior forces of the United States and South Korea to defend the regime.
With 1.3 million North Koreans under arms, including 200,000 special forces, North Korea has the world's fourth-largest military.
According to South Korea's Ministry of National Defense, the North Korean People's Army also has 4,300 tanks, 1,800 more than South Korea. These forces are augmented with 8,600 artillery pieces and over 5,500 multiple rocket launcher systems, the artillery that threatens Seoul.
Despite recent efforts to modernize its equipment, North Korea's conventional forces were underfunded as it pushed to develop its nuclear and missile program.
A recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that North Korea had not kept pace with changes in regional militaries and is largely dependent on legacy systems based on technology from or built in the Soviet Union and China up until the 1970s.
While North Korea has sought to develop its own tanks, for example, its most advanced tank, the Pokpung-ho, is believed to only be able to penetrate modern tanks from the flank or the rear. In a frontal assault they would not be able to take on U.S. or South Korean tanks.
North Korea's air and naval forces also continue to be made up of aging legacy systems. While North Korea is estimated to have over 800 fighter aircraft, its most recent purchase was Kazakh MiG21s in 1999.
To compensate for the deterioration of its air capabilities, North Korea has sought to improve its air defense systems. Similarly, it may seek to offset the disadvantage of its limited naval forces by improving its anti-ship missiles.
While North Korea could bring significant force to bear in a conflict, it is clear that its ability to launch or deter an attack without nuclear weapons would be limited.
If an agreement is reached to dismantle North Korea's nuclear programs, we should expect Pyongyang to undertake a military modernization to compensate for the loss of its nuclear forces, with China and Russia as potential suppliers of new weapons.
This would likely entail a move into more modern weaponry for its ground forces, with upgrades for its air and naval forces as well. North Korea would also likely look to augment it is growing cyber capabilities and usage of drones and other high-tech weaponry.
This of course raises the question of proliferation. Free of sanctions and allowed to purchase new military hardware, North Korea's conventional forces would not only grow in strength but have new opportunities to sell its own equipment abroad.
As Dr. Bruce Bechtol has recently documented in a new book, "North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa," North Korea even under sanctions has a fairly robust arms trade with Syria, Iran, and countries in Africa.
While North Korea could look to become a legitimate low cost, high quality international arms dealer, it cannot be discounted that it would seek to grow its relationship with more questionable states.
If North Korea does dismantle its nuclear weapons, a substantial portion of its missiles, and potentially its other weapons of mass destruction, it would be unrealistic to assume that it would be content to defend itself with a military that has a significant disadvantage and risk the Finlandization of the regime's foreign policy.
Although no state would be likely to attack North Korea, such an outcome would potentially be internally fatal to the regime's survival.
The military agreement from the last inter-Korean summit is one part of the discussion of North Korea's future force posture.
However, if the United States, South Korea, and the other powers in the region want the denuclearization process to proceed successfully, reaching an understanding on the future force structure of the North Korean military will likely have to be part of any deal.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
