By Lee Seong-hyon
With President Moon Jae-in's term winding down, and with Seoul and Beijing's relationship to mark their 30th anniversary next year, now may be an appropriate time to pause and ask some questions about the quality of Moon's diplomatic outreach to China ― from the Chinese perspective.
One of the interesting questions is this: Moon is known to be the most "pro-China" South Korean leader in recent decades. Then, why hasn't Chinese leader Xi Jinping attempted a single visit to South Korea during Moon's term, despite Moon's repeated invitations?
COVID-19 serves as a convenient diplomatic cover. Both Seoul and Beijing officials often cite it as the primary reason. But interviews with Chinese interlocutors reveal a more nuanced picture.
Even during the pandemic period, for instance, Xi has fielded numerous virtual summits with many state leaders. Xi has one scheduled with President Biden next month too. But there are none scheduled with Moon. There have been no announcements of a summit scheduled with Moon in the near future.
This situation warrants further probing. This author's preliminary research reveals that the Chinese side doesn't see the necessity of holding a summit with Moon.
From China's perspective, there are two occasions that warrant a summit: one, when its relationship with another nation is supremely good (this condition includes the compatibility of their state ideology, say, North Korea), and two, when the relationship is not necessarily good, but the other nation is important enough that they feel the need to sort out their issues at the top leadership level (in the case of, say, the U.S.).
"South Korea belongs to neither category," one interlocutor told me.
It all started with THAAD. It sowed discord in bilateral relations between the two countries, as we know. The THAAD issue has as its substance the issue of security, but from the Chinese view, it also has a problem of style in the way that the Moon government conveyed the matter with China. And that boils down to inconsistency in messaging.
Back in January 2017 when Moon was a presidential candidate, he took the position that the THAAD deployment decision should be postponed for the next president to decide. China saw this strategic ambiguity posture as favoring China. China came to have such a view because Moon's interlocutors hinted that Moon, once elected, would not approve of the deployment of THAAD.
When the incumbent President Park Geun-hye in 2016 made a public announcement about the deployment of THAAD, Moon's interlocutors still assured the Chinese side that Moon would reverse the move. He did not.
After getting elected, Moon referred to the THAAD deployment as something "temporary," leaving leeway. For a while, such messaging gave hope to the Chinese side. However, the Chinese side got frustrated when the "temporary" deployment actually become a "permanent" one through the course of Moon's presidency until today.
When the Chinese side took issue with the THAAD's powerful radar facing China, Moon's interlocutors told them that the direction of the radar could be reoriented, so that it would not face the Chinese side. But at that time they weren't sure whether the South Korean side has authority over the U.S. military asset operated by the U.S. military personnel inside a U.S. military base in South Korea. South Korea doesn't.
The ritual of Seoul sending mixed messages, stretched over a year, really frustrated the Chinese interlocutors, who also felt heat when they reported it to the senior Chinese leadership, who got angry and also felt humiliated.
Slowly and gradually, the Chinese side developed distrust toward the Moon administration and its wordings. Recently, the Chinese side reportedly also concluded that the Moon administration's so-called "3-No Promise" doesn't hold water.
"The Moon government says one thing and does another," said a Chinese scholar who advises the government. "We have a trust problem with the Moon administration."
The "3-No Promise" refers to the Moon government's assurance to China that there will be no additional THAAD, no joining the U.S. missile defense network and no Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral military alliance. The South Korean government officially calls it "positions," not "promises." However, Moon's critics called it "humiliating diplomacy."
China's distrust toward Moon deepened after Moon held a summit with Biden in Washington. The joint statement mentioned not only the "South China Sea," but also "Taiwan." The latter's inclusion really upset the Chinese side, prompting the Chinese side to embark on a "fact-finding" mission via Zoom conferences with South Koreans.
"Let's say that China and South Korea hold a summit. That will help Moon's political party in the upcoming election. But how can it help China?" posed a Chinese interlocutor.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
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One of the interesting questions is this: Moon is known to be the most "pro-China" South Korean leader in recent decades. Then, why hasn't Chinese leader Xi Jinping attempted a single visit to South Korea during Moon's term, despite Moon's repeated invitations?
COVID-19 serves as a convenient diplomatic cover. Both Seoul and Beijing officials often cite it as the primary reason. But interviews with Chinese interlocutors reveal a more nuanced picture.
Even during the pandemic period, for instance, Xi has fielded numerous virtual summits with many state leaders. Xi has one scheduled with President Biden next month too. But there are none scheduled with Moon. There have been no announcements of a summit scheduled with Moon in the near future.
This situation warrants further probing. This author's preliminary research reveals that the Chinese side doesn't see the necessity of holding a summit with Moon.
From China's perspective, there are two occasions that warrant a summit: one, when its relationship with another nation is supremely good (this condition includes the compatibility of their state ideology, say, North Korea), and two, when the relationship is not necessarily good, but the other nation is important enough that they feel the need to sort out their issues at the top leadership level (in the case of, say, the U.S.).
"South Korea belongs to neither category," one interlocutor told me.
It all started with THAAD. It sowed discord in bilateral relations between the two countries, as we know. The THAAD issue has as its substance the issue of security, but from the Chinese view, it also has a problem of style in the way that the Moon government conveyed the matter with China. And that boils down to inconsistency in messaging.
Back in January 2017 when Moon was a presidential candidate, he took the position that the THAAD deployment decision should be postponed for the next president to decide. China saw this strategic ambiguity posture as favoring China. China came to have such a view because Moon's interlocutors hinted that Moon, once elected, would not approve of the deployment of THAAD.
When the incumbent President Park Geun-hye in 2016 made a public announcement about the deployment of THAAD, Moon's interlocutors still assured the Chinese side that Moon would reverse the move. He did not.
After getting elected, Moon referred to the THAAD deployment as something "temporary," leaving leeway. For a while, such messaging gave hope to the Chinese side. However, the Chinese side got frustrated when the "temporary" deployment actually become a "permanent" one through the course of Moon's presidency until today.
When the Chinese side took issue with the THAAD's powerful radar facing China, Moon's interlocutors told them that the direction of the radar could be reoriented, so that it would not face the Chinese side. But at that time they weren't sure whether the South Korean side has authority over the U.S. military asset operated by the U.S. military personnel inside a U.S. military base in South Korea. South Korea doesn't.
The ritual of Seoul sending mixed messages, stretched over a year, really frustrated the Chinese interlocutors, who also felt heat when they reported it to the senior Chinese leadership, who got angry and also felt humiliated.
Slowly and gradually, the Chinese side developed distrust toward the Moon administration and its wordings. Recently, the Chinese side reportedly also concluded that the Moon administration's so-called "3-No Promise" doesn't hold water.
"The Moon government says one thing and does another," said a Chinese scholar who advises the government. "We have a trust problem with the Moon administration."
The "3-No Promise" refers to the Moon government's assurance to China that there will be no additional THAAD, no joining the U.S. missile defense network and no Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral military alliance. The South Korean government officially calls it "positions," not "promises." However, Moon's critics called it "humiliating diplomacy."
China's distrust toward Moon deepened after Moon held a summit with Biden in Washington. The joint statement mentioned not only the "South China Sea," but also "Taiwan." The latter's inclusion really upset the Chinese side, prompting the Chinese side to embark on a "fact-finding" mission via Zoom conferences with South Koreans.
"Let's say that China and South Korea hold a summit. That will help Moon's political party in the upcoming election. But how can it help China?" posed a Chinese interlocutor.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
