By Lee Seong-hyon
Inside the museum of the Independence Hall of Korea, there is an old photo of men in uniforms, sitting in groups forming the English acronym, "KIA," which stands for the Korea Independence Army. KIA was established on Sept. 17, 1940, in the Chinese city of Chongqing (Chungking), by the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) during the 1910-45 Japanese colonial rule of Korea.
Kim Gye-dong, a professor emeritus at Yonsei University who wrote the book, "Division of the Korean Peninsula: Whose Responsibility?" in 2012, shared an interesting story related to the KPG that merits a wider readership for history buffs.
During World War II, 28 countries participated in the Allied Forces, and nine of them were provisional governments or governments in exile. The difference between a "provisional government" and a "government in exile" is that a provisional government is a government established temporarily abroad, whereas a government in exile is a government in which the government of a country has been moved overseas. Therefore, the KPG was not a government in exile. As such, provisional governments lack legitimacy compared to governments in exile, according to Kim.
Surely, the lack of legitimacy was a factor for the U.S. not to recognize the KPG in China, but there was another important factor: the KPG and its army, the KIA, were too dependent on China. The U.S. was therefore worried that they would likely become pro-China if they arrived on the Korean Peninsula after WWII.
Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea from 1948 to 1960, was active in the United States at that time, and he persistently demanded that the U.S. government recognize the KPG and allow its KIA troops to participate in the war against Japan.
However, the United States did not accept it. In the U.S. at that time, there was a difference of opinion between the State Department and the Defense Department on the issue of approving of the provisional government. The State Department did not intend to approve it, but the Defense Department (which was called the War Department at the time) wanted to recognize the KPG and the KIA troops as participants in the war against Japan.
The U.S. military subsequently established a plan, called Operation NAPKO, in 1943, which was a plan to utilize Koreans in the war against Japan. The plan was to have Koreans participate in the war, but not by using the KIA troops in China. Instead, it would select and train Koreans from among Japanese prisoners of war managed by the United States, and would use them for military operations, such as reconnaissance and intelligence on the Korean Peninsula.
The reason for not using the KIA was that the U.S. military had acquired the "Nine Rules" (Junseung 9 Gaehang) document that the KIA had secretly signed with the Chinese military. According to the document, the KIA was completely subordinated to the Chinese military and its troop movements were even subject to Chinese military approval.
The U.S. State Department opposed Operation NAPKO, but at the strong insistence of the Defense Department, the plan was finally approved at a reduced scale, with the condition that the U.S. government would be able to select and train the personnel directly. Accordingly, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) led the formation of a reconnaissance and intelligence unit and began preparations. However, due to the prolonged time delay it took in discussing the matter internally within the U.S. government, the Allies' victory came first, before the plan was put into action.
Even though the U.S. aided China during World War II, it was also worried about China's strong influence on the Korean Peninsula in the anticipated post-war process. Therefore, it did not recognize the KPG and tried to use the Korean military units that the United States itself had created.
The U.S. was thinking ahead and already very interested in the formation of a U.S. sphere of influence in Northeast Asia, according to Kim. Therefore, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Washington pushed forward an agreement on the trusteeship of the countries that the United States would lead, and after that, the proposal to divide the Korean Peninsula across the 38th parallel.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He is the former director of the Center for Chinese Studies at Sejong Institute.
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Kim Gye-dong, a professor emeritus at Yonsei University who wrote the book, "Division of the Korean Peninsula: Whose Responsibility?" in 2012, shared an interesting story related to the KPG that merits a wider readership for history buffs.
During World War II, 28 countries participated in the Allied Forces, and nine of them were provisional governments or governments in exile. The difference between a "provisional government" and a "government in exile" is that a provisional government is a government established temporarily abroad, whereas a government in exile is a government in which the government of a country has been moved overseas. Therefore, the KPG was not a government in exile. As such, provisional governments lack legitimacy compared to governments in exile, according to Kim.
Surely, the lack of legitimacy was a factor for the U.S. not to recognize the KPG in China, but there was another important factor: the KPG and its army, the KIA, were too dependent on China. The U.S. was therefore worried that they would likely become pro-China if they arrived on the Korean Peninsula after WWII.
Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea from 1948 to 1960, was active in the United States at that time, and he persistently demanded that the U.S. government recognize the KPG and allow its KIA troops to participate in the war against Japan.
However, the United States did not accept it. In the U.S. at that time, there was a difference of opinion between the State Department and the Defense Department on the issue of approving of the provisional government. The State Department did not intend to approve it, but the Defense Department (which was called the War Department at the time) wanted to recognize the KPG and the KIA troops as participants in the war against Japan.
The U.S. military subsequently established a plan, called Operation NAPKO, in 1943, which was a plan to utilize Koreans in the war against Japan. The plan was to have Koreans participate in the war, but not by using the KIA troops in China. Instead, it would select and train Koreans from among Japanese prisoners of war managed by the United States, and would use them for military operations, such as reconnaissance and intelligence on the Korean Peninsula.
The reason for not using the KIA was that the U.S. military had acquired the "Nine Rules" (Junseung 9 Gaehang) document that the KIA had secretly signed with the Chinese military. According to the document, the KIA was completely subordinated to the Chinese military and its troop movements were even subject to Chinese military approval.
The U.S. State Department opposed Operation NAPKO, but at the strong insistence of the Defense Department, the plan was finally approved at a reduced scale, with the condition that the U.S. government would be able to select and train the personnel directly. Accordingly, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) led the formation of a reconnaissance and intelligence unit and began preparations. However, due to the prolonged time delay it took in discussing the matter internally within the U.S. government, the Allies' victory came first, before the plan was put into action.
Even though the U.S. aided China during World War II, it was also worried about China's strong influence on the Korean Peninsula in the anticipated post-war process. Therefore, it did not recognize the KPG and tried to use the Korean military units that the United States itself had created.
The U.S. was thinking ahead and already very interested in the formation of a U.S. sphere of influence in Northeast Asia, according to Kim. Therefore, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Washington pushed forward an agreement on the trusteeship of the countries that the United States would lead, and after that, the proposal to divide the Korean Peninsula across the 38th parallel.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He is the former director of the Center for Chinese Studies at Sejong Institute.
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