Cold War redux

By John Burton

North Korea stands to benefit from the war in Ukraine. Why? Because Russia may be more willing to ignore international sanctions and provide Pyongyang with what it needs: oil, grain and fertilizer among other crucial products.

With North Korea facing a possible famine amid a recent COVID-19 outbreak, this aid would be instrumental in rescuing the country from any chance of collapse.

Moscow previously voted for and adhered to U.N. sanctions on North Korea because it wanted, in part, to attract investment from South Korea and promote economic cooperation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin once believed that South Korea could play a crucial role in helping achieve his goal of revitalizing the Russian Far East and helping build up his country's technology sector. He also sought Seoul's assistance in engaging in joint development projects in North Korea, including improving its railroad network, electricity grids and oil and gas pipelines in a bid to stabilize the Korean Peninsula.

But few of these projects ever materialized, and relations between Moscow and Seoul began cooling as South Korea drew closer to the U.S in confronting Russia and China. Any prospect of economic cooperation now looks dead as Seoul has agreed to support sanctions for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow has called an "unfriendly" move. The election of Yoon Suk-yeol has only deepened the divide between Seoul and Moscow since the new conservative president has signaled a clear tilt toward the U.S.

Russia is likely to justify breaking sanctions against North Korea by making an argument similar to what it has used to justify its attack on Ukraine. While Moscow claims that the invasion of Ukraine was a defensive move to stop the expansion of NATO, it can claim that North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons is a rational response to a perceived military threat from the U.S.

Russia's attitude on North Korea may also have a bearing on China's support for Pyongyang. Beijing was previously willing to support international sanctions as part of an effort to promote North Korea's denuclearization. But China, along with Russia, has recently been backsliding on the sanctions issue. Both countries in May vetoed a U.S.-drafted U.N. Security Council resolution that proposed tightening sanctions after North Korea conducted a series of ballistic missile tests.

Both Moscow and Beijing argue that easing sanctions is the best way to persuade Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table with Washington, while they blame the U.S. for deliberately raising tensions to enlist South Korea and Japan in a new Cold War in Northeast Asia. The deteriorating relations between the U.S. and what used to be known as the Sino-Soviet bloc would thus potentially benefit North Korea.

Adding to the mix is North Korea's traditional policy of playing off China and Russia to get what it wants from both countries. Pyongyang has leaned toward Beijing in recent years, but a Russia that is becoming increasingly isolated internationally may now decide to increase aid to North Korea to restore its influence.

Putin's historical viewpoint also could play a role in his policy toward North Korea. He has referenced the Soviet Union's victory in World War II, or the Great Patriotic War, in his conflict with Ukraine, saying he wants to "denazify" the country. Affiliated with this, Moscow also remembers that it helped establish the North Korean state in 1945 as it defeated Japan.

This historical legacy continued with the military aid that the Soviet Union gave North Korea during the Korean War. Moreover, Putin wants to play a role in reshaping the future of Northeast Asia as he seeks to regain the regional influence that Moscow enjoyed in the Soviet period.

Western sanctions are now forcing Russia to adopt the model of North Korea and Iran, international pariah states that nonetheless can survive for years. This will strengthen Moscow's identity of interests with Pyongyang.

This could pave the way for the resumption of Russia-North Korea trade relations reminiscent of the Soviet period when Moscow provided subsidized supplies of goods to Pyongyang.

The most obvious product that Russia could provide is oil, its number one export. Moscow is already selling crude oil at discounted prices to China and India as Western markets start to close. Russia could afford to supply oil to North Korea at near-bottom rates due to the steep rise of global oil prices that are compensating for reduced volume of exports. Grain and fertilizer could be supplied to North Korea on similar terms.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a trip to Iran last week to signal support for the Tehran government while condemning the West's "aggressive policies." He also called for the need "to reconfigure their economic relations" to strengthen their resistance. Will Pyongyang be a future stop on Lavrov's itinerary?

John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.