Dignified silence over Dokdo

Politically, economically and culturally, Korea and Japan have great reasons to be good neighbors, yet Seoul-Tokyo relations have plummeted once again. Why? You guessed it: Dokdo.

By Andrew Salmon

Politically, economically and culturally, Korea and Japan have great reasons to be good neighbors, yet Seoul-Tokyo relations have plummeted once again. Why? You guessed it: Dokdo.

Could ― should ― Koreans emotionally desensitize themselves to this issue?

I’d suggest yes. It is unnecessary for Koreans to explode every time Tokyo states its position because the basic facts of sovereignty are stark: Korea holds Dokdo. Japan does not.

Naturally, ownership is not 10 points of the law in international disputes. If Korea had invaded the islet and displaced Japanese citizens, or if Japan had proven its historical claims, there could be international pressure to withdraw. Neither is the case. The islets were (until recently) uninhabited, and Tokyo has not proven historical ownership.

This makes Tokyo powerless to challenge the status quo. The battleship Yamato is not going to appear out of the rising sun and disembark samurai or Marines. Those days are over. Japan’s armed forces, while powerful, are constitutionally among the least deployable on earth; a war with South Korea over Dokdo is unthinkable.

Korea has secured de facto ownership of Dokdo and, citing historical evidence, claims de jure rights. With the dispute outside the military and legal spheres and in the PR space, who ― Japan or Korea ― is winning the global opinion war?

When it comes to persuasion, as any marketer will attest, there are two key drivers: rationality and emotion. Problem: Over Dokdo, Koreans deploy little of the former ― and what there is hardly compelling. Instead, they employ lots of the latter, and much of it is self-defeating.

On the rational front: Poorly designed and badly written ads in U.S. daily newspapers and on Times Square billboards don’t sell the issue to Americans. (Beyond, perhaps, Korean-Americans, who are already believers.)

Preventing visiting Japanese politicians on a “fact-finding tour” from leaving their arrival airport suggests an unwillingness even to discuss matters. This raises a question: If Korea’s case is so strong, why not crush Japan with argument?

Moreover, denial that a dispute exists is a head-in-the sand approach. Koreans may hate it, but Japan does dispute ownership. Ergo, it is a diplomatic issue: Dokdo is marked on global maps as disputed territory. (And since the latest blow-up, more international media outlets seem to be using the term “Liancourt Rocks” than “Dokdo.”)

On the emotional front, the “comfort women” issue is one that, I suspect, most people worldwide side with Koreans on. All that is needed to win global sympathy and allies is to relate the women’s tragedy. Few can fail to be moved by their stories, or angered by Japan’s World War II brutality.

Dokdo engenders no such emotion; it is not a person, it is two rocks. Comfort women are victims of one of history’s beastliest regimes. Dokdo is a territorial spat between democracies.

And emotive Korean displays may actually lose potential allies.

President Lee’s recent visit to Dokdo and inflammatory speechifying does not look like masterly diplomacy ― it looks like a lame duck playing to a nationalistic gallery.

Koreans, who chew off fingertips at protests, shoot burning arrows into the Japanese ambassador’s residence and crash trucks into the gates of the Japanese embassy do not look sympathetic. They look like lunatics.

Political protests at Olympic events are a no-no, and no amount of bluster by the domestic vox populi (“It was not planned;” “It was not a political statement;” etc) will change IOC minds. Worsening the incident was that the winners appeared to be rubbing the noses of the losers in defeat, rather than being magnanimous in victory and acting in a sportsmanlike manner.

So what should be the communications strategy?

Korea could go on the offensive, hire a multi-national PR agency, and raise the debate in Japanese media. (Not all of which sees issues through nationalistic prisms.) Linking Dokdo’s sovereignty to Japan’s World War II aggression could be effective, for most of the world is neither informed about, nor interested in, Korean colonial history.

But I propose a different approach. Silence ― a dignified silence. Koreans could simply decline to swallow the bait each time Japan squeaks.

If Korea pipes down, it would be left to the Japanese to assert their case. The government’s powerlessness on this matter leaves it to the Japanese far right to continue pushing the issue and keeping it current.

Few media favor far-right causes, and ultra-nationalism is the core of far-right movements. (Hence Koreans’ frequently explosive nationalistic displays could well be tarnishing the national brand.) If Japanese rightists present a maniacal face to the world, that helps Korea’s case.

There is not a damned thing Tokyo can do to prevent Korea exercising sovereignty over Dokdo. Currently, their only strategy is triggering Korean passions and making Koreans look like hyper-nationalists. In this strategy, they have enjoyed some success.

I am not saying Dokdo should be disregarded in bilateral fora. What I am saying is that it is feasible, in both personal and diplomatic discourse, to have a gentlemanly disagreement. In the course of the Dokdo disagreement, Korea holds all the cards ― so why not employ some gentlemanly restraint?

Andrew Salmon is a Seoul-based reporter and author. His latest work, “Scorched Earth, Black Snow,” was published in London in June. Reach him at andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk.