Global order under stress on WWI anniversary

By Andrew Hammond

Seventy heads of state and government, including Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, commemorated in Paris Sunday's centenary of the end of World War I.

The landmark event, hosted at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier underneath the Arc de Triomphe, has prompted much reflection on the state of international relations today given the parallels with the early 20th century.

All last week, President Emmanuel Macron visited French battlefields, saluting the millions of dead of the 1914-18 war. He warned that the world may be sleepwalking toward another deadly conflict due to the return of nationalism and the weakening of the rules-based international order that was upheld for seven decades by the United States. This international order, he asserts, is being eroded by trade protectionism, a decline in democracy, great power rivalry, and a drift toward authoritarian populist rule.

What Macron's comments underline is that, just as 100 years ago, the global order is under stress and this is being driven, in part, by a significant movement in global power taking place. Today, power is shifting most rapidly to key developing countries in Asia, with China a primary beneficiary so far. This contrasts with the early 20th century when Germany and the United States were among the key "rising nations."

Much like a century ago, geopolitical tensions are mounting as "revisionist nations" challenge key elements of the international order. This is partly driven by rising economic powers resurrecting nationalism and claims for resources.

This underlines that it is perhaps Asia where the most tension and insecurity lies in terms of potential for a great power war. Despite Chinese President Xi Jinping's wise goal to seek "a new type of great power relationship" with the United States, learning the lessons of previous eras, his nation's remarkable rise is nonetheless unsettling the region, and indeed much of the world beyond.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe drew parallels in 2014 between the geopolitical landscape in Asia today and Europe on the eve of war in 1914. Yet, while the risk of a major war in Asia, or elsewhere, cannot be dismissed, there are some key differences today with the world of 100 years ago. These differences, in the absence of catastrophic miscalculation, make a major power war unlikely for the foreseeable future.

This is not least because memories of the First and indeed Second World Wars, linger powerfully even today. With justification, World War I was described as the "greatest seminal catastrophe" of the 20th century by U.S. diplomat George Kennan, who would later become the architect for the U.S. Cold War "containment strategy."

Aside from the many millions who died from 1914 to 1918, the war set in motion several developments which blighted the world for decades to come. These include the emergence of communism in Russia and ― as numerous historians assert ― the rise of Nazi Germany, sowing the seeds of World War II.

Another major difference between now and 100 years ago is the presence of nuclear weapons which, as during the Cold War, generally serve as a brake on major power conflict. It is noteworthy here that key emerging powers, including China and India, as well as established powers, such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, all possess nuclear arsenals.

A further fundamental change is that, unlike 1914, there is now a dense web of postwar international institutions, especially the United Nations, which continue to have significant resilience and legitimacy decades after their creation.

While these bodies are imperfect, and in need of reform, the fact remains that they have generally enabled international security, especially with five of the key powers all on the U.N. Security Council. And this is one key reason why, at Sunday's memorial ceremony in Paris, Macron opened a three-day Paris Peace Forum intended to produce practical initiatives to shore up multilateral governance inaugurated with U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

In addition, the relative balance between the two leading powers today is different today from a century ago. That is, the gap between the United States and China is greater today than that between the United Kingdom and Germany in the early 20th century.

Indeed, perhaps the biggest consequence of World War I was the dawn of the "American century" in which the United States emerged as the world's most powerful nation. To be sure, the country has undergone relative decline, and China is now the largest economy in the world based on purchasing power parity data.

However, the United States remains significantly ahead of China on most measures of national strength, including military might, and is likely to enjoy an overall advantage for years. Indeed, unlike the United Kingdom in the 20th century, there are indications that U.S. power will remain resilient potentially for decades to come, buoyed by factors such as the country's "energy revolution" which has potentially far-reaching geopolitical consequences.

Taken overall, the prospect of a major power war for the foreseeable future is therefore not as high as a century ago. The relative global balance of power is different today, partly because of the resilience of U.S. power. Moreover, nuclear weapons and the international institutions that generally act as a restraining force against major conflict did not exist 100 years ago.

Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.