By Sandip Kumar Mishra
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These meta-narratives are works in progress that are informed and placed in the context of each other and it would be a euphemism to believe official statements of the involved states that they are disconnected from each other. It would also be futile to ascertain which comes first and which follows the other.
Since the 2008 global financial crisis and becoming the world's second-largest economy in 2010, and more specifically since the coming of President Xi Jinping in 2013, China has overtly behaved as if it has "arrived" on the global stage.
Xi has indicated that the old dictum of Deng Xiaoping in "build your strength and hide your capabilities" is no longer relevant. He seeks to show off Chinese strength and its role in global politics. He demands "Asia for Asians," as well as "great-power relations" with the U.S. in the format of the G2.
China does not only seek to revise the economic architecture of the region through the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but has also become more "assertive" in the security domain.
China's changed posture is quite evident when it took a tough stance in its disputes with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, unilaterally declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, refused to accept the verdict of the International Tribunal on the South China Sea dispute, built artificial islands in the South China Sea and overreacted on the installation of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.
On the other hand, after a relative decline in U.S. capacity in the regional economic and political landscapes of the Asia-Pacific, Washington is still insistent on being a resident power in the region. It is not ready to give up its position and has been trying to remain the prime mover in regional politics through its allies.
First, it articulated its policy for the region in the form of "pivot to Asia" during the Barack Obama period and now it has been encouraging the formation of QUAD. The network has its sprouts in the Malabar naval exercises, which happen annually among the U.S., India and Japan. Australia has also been involved occasionally.
To bring India more into the Asia-Pacific, a deliberate attempt by the U.S. and Japan is also visible in the use of "Indo-Pacific" instead of Asia-Pacific to describe the region. The U.S. seeks to maintain a "free and open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) with QUAD.
The Indo-Pacific strategy does not name China as an opponent but it would be naive not to see the writing on the wall. Bilaterally, the U.S. has been in a "trade war" with China, which is being largely fought through tariffs or restrictions on each other's exports.
Amid these two powerful trends in the Asia-Pacific, it's important for concerned countries to explore a possible "third way" for the region. Actually, the Asia-Pacific is the world's fastest growing region and any disruption caused by the China-U.S. contest would negatively affect most of the regional countries.
For the same reason, countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and others are uncomfortable about a lack of inclusiveness or say in both the powerful alternatives presented to them.
It's important to ensure stability of the Asia-Pacific in both economic and security domains through an open multi-polar regional system where inter-state relations are rule based, norm based and institutionalized.
Even India, which is considered part of QUAD, is not entirely in agreement with it. In June 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized inclusiveness in the FOIP at the Shangri-La Dialogue.
Actually, it's interesting to note that many regional countries have been trying to avoid these two meta-narratives by proclaiming their own middle-range models for regional politics. India's Act East Policy, South Korea's New Northern and Southern Policy and Taiwan's New Southbound Policy are examples of such attempts to explore possibilities of a "third way."
Here it's important to underline that a "third way" does not mean discarding the two powerful trends. It only intends their moderation. The "third way" would be in agreement with the AIIB and BRI but would like to avoid China's desire to dominate the region.
Similarly, it would support the OFIP in the security domain but would insist inclusiveness in it and also keep it open for China if Beijing is ready to work for the common objective.
Though it would not be easy for such articulation of the "third way" to create its place amid these two big trends, the idea must be given a good hearing, as well as serious consideration, by the region's countries for a better future for the Asia-Pacific.
The author is associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He can be reached at sandipmishra10@gmail.com.
