By Liang Tuang Nah
It would seem that before the ink on the joint statement signed between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore had figuratively dried, prospects for North Korea's negotiated denuclearization are already beginning to dim.
Despite Kim's apparent commitment to total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as agreed to on June 12 in Singapore, follow-up talks held between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and North Korean senior official Kim Yong-chol on July 6 and 7 have revealed the North's serious reluctance to implement nuclear disarmament.
In response to the aforementioned talks, Pyongyang has denounced Washington for making "gangster-like" demands for the former to denuclearize, while characterizing the meeting as "regrettable." Also, keeping true to their historical grandiose style, the DPRK's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that the Pompeo-Kim talks have led to a "dangerous phase that might rattle our willingness for denuclearization that had been firm."
What is the Kim regime trying to accomplish?
To begin with, one wonders whether the Kim regime is even cognizant of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the international community considers the North Korean nuclear and missile programs to be illegal, thus mandating dismantlement and closure as dictated under multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. As such, Pyongyang has absolutely no grounds to protest U.S. attempts to get the former to disarm, making its accusation linking U.S. diplomacy to "gangsterism" little more than political theater.
Next, the North Koreans enunciated that they expected the Americans to propose confidence building measures which would be reciprocated by the North. While this does sound reasonable considering the lack of trust between both parties, one can't help but perceive it as an attempt to avoid addressing denuclearization.
Subsequently, the Kim regime's negotiating strategy became more evident with Pyongyang's insistence on discussing a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, which revealed its true intention.
Even as the DPRK complained that Pompeo and his advisers were adopting delaying tactics to evade having to discuss a peace treaty, it is indeed telling that the KCNA did not mention any irreversible denuclearization measures that Pyongyang was willing to implement in exchange for progress towards its much desired peace declaration.
From the desire for confidence building measures, to the intention of securing a permanent peace agreement at this early stage of negotiations, it is apparent that Kim Jong-un wants to "have his cake and eat it too." Specifically, Kim wants to permanently retain some of his nuclear and missile arsenal or failing which, preserve as much of his nuclear and missile programs for as long as possible.
Concurrently, he also wants to win the ultimate diplomatic victory by securing a contractual peace on the Korean Peninsula, and hence winning lasting regime longevity for his family, all on his terms. Metaphorically, it would imply a midget defeating a behemoth in a geostrategic wrestling match of global significance.
As for further deduced insights into Pyongyang's motivations, it seems to have disregarded the earlier reciprocal concessions made by both itself and the Trump administration. Following the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea on May 24, President Trump unilaterally suspended large scale U.S.-ROK military exercises, which the Kim regime has historically branded as disguised training for an invasion of the DPRK.
Regardless of the fact that North Korea has on many occasions expressed much anxiety and hostility vis-a-vis such exercises, they have openly downplayed the significance of this concession, and have not reciprocated with further steps towards denuclearization or tension reduction.
If Kim wanted to demonstrate sincerity in negotiations, he would have announced further substantive concessions like the decommissioning of his missile testing site or even an invitation for the International Atomic Energy Agency to come to the DPRK for an inspection visit. This would then place the reciprocative ball in Washington's court. Sadly, Pyongyang has instead chosen to partake in calculative political hardball.
The North's attempt to erode sanctions
Inasmuch as Chairman Kim denies that comprehensive UNSC economic sanctions from 2016 onwards coercing the DPRK's nuclear disarmament, were a significant motivational factor behind his international diplomatic outreach, culminating in his summit with Trump in Singapore, June 12, the fact remains that economic pressure was having a substantial effect proving the bankruptcy of his "byongjin" ideology championing both nuclear arms possession and economic development.
As Kim himself said to Chinese President Xi Jinping during his third summit with the latter this year in June, "We are feeling great pain due to economic sanctions." Thereafter, Kim appealed to Xi for assistance in getting the international sanctions lifted as a reward for successfully concluding the Trump-Kim summit. In response, Xi promised to do his "utmost" to satisfy Kim's request.
Reading between the lines on this issue could lead us to deduce that Kim is trying to gain sanctions relief merely for engaging in international diplomacy without having implemented any serious and irreversible denuclearization measures.
Having seen how long denuclearization negotiations have been going on, where the first serious contacts between Pyongyang and Washington took place in the early 1990s under the leadership of Kim's grandfather, Kim Il-sung, Jong-un might believe that if he can drag out the status-quo for long enough, the international community might accept his nuclear arsenal out of sheer diplomatic fatigue.
Additionally, as North Koreans are already used to painful levels of economic deprivation, any unofficial relaxation of cross-border trade, even if relatively minor, between China and North Korea will provide much needed relief of financial duress to Pyongyang, thereby reinforcing any tendency towards nuclear arms intransigence on Kim's part, leading to weakening prospects for the North's irreversible and verifiable denuclearization.
The way forward
To his credit, Secretary Pompeo did not react angrily to North Korea's accusation that U.S. diplomacy towards the latter was "gangster-like." Dispassionately examining Washington's current diplomatic and strategic options, one could surmise that the Trump administration's current approach of continuing to negotiate with the Kim regime is the right one to adopt.
Moreover, until serious irreversible nuclear concessions are acceded to Kim, economic duress needs to be maintained on his regime, even if this entails secondary sanctions being levied on parties which dare to trade with the DPRK.
Moreover, it would behoove Secretary Pompeo and other principal advisers to Trump to advise him not to be overly eager to compromise with Pyongyang at the expense of America's strategic position or influence in Northeast Asia.
Even if Trump is eager to strike a deal in order to offset his other controversial domestic and international policies, someone needs to pull him aside and remind him that in this game of geopolitical strategic poker, it is the U.S. that holds the stronger cards as the world's sole superpower and not an impoverished dictatorship with unproven prototype nuclear missiles, and which according to military defector accounts, has difficulty ensuring that even its soldiers have three square meals a day.
Liang Tuang Nah, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Military Studies Program, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
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Despite Kim's apparent commitment to total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as agreed to on June 12 in Singapore, follow-up talks held between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and North Korean senior official Kim Yong-chol on July 6 and 7 have revealed the North's serious reluctance to implement nuclear disarmament.
In response to the aforementioned talks, Pyongyang has denounced Washington for making "gangster-like" demands for the former to denuclearize, while characterizing the meeting as "regrettable." Also, keeping true to their historical grandiose style, the DPRK's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that the Pompeo-Kim talks have led to a "dangerous phase that might rattle our willingness for denuclearization that had been firm."
What is the Kim regime trying to accomplish?
To begin with, one wonders whether the Kim regime is even cognizant of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the international community considers the North Korean nuclear and missile programs to be illegal, thus mandating dismantlement and closure as dictated under multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. As such, Pyongyang has absolutely no grounds to protest U.S. attempts to get the former to disarm, making its accusation linking U.S. diplomacy to "gangsterism" little more than political theater.
Next, the North Koreans enunciated that they expected the Americans to propose confidence building measures which would be reciprocated by the North. While this does sound reasonable considering the lack of trust between both parties, one can't help but perceive it as an attempt to avoid addressing denuclearization.
Subsequently, the Kim regime's negotiating strategy became more evident with Pyongyang's insistence on discussing a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, which revealed its true intention.
Even as the DPRK complained that Pompeo and his advisers were adopting delaying tactics to evade having to discuss a peace treaty, it is indeed telling that the KCNA did not mention any irreversible denuclearization measures that Pyongyang was willing to implement in exchange for progress towards its much desired peace declaration.
From the desire for confidence building measures, to the intention of securing a permanent peace agreement at this early stage of negotiations, it is apparent that Kim Jong-un wants to "have his cake and eat it too." Specifically, Kim wants to permanently retain some of his nuclear and missile arsenal or failing which, preserve as much of his nuclear and missile programs for as long as possible.
Concurrently, he also wants to win the ultimate diplomatic victory by securing a contractual peace on the Korean Peninsula, and hence winning lasting regime longevity for his family, all on his terms. Metaphorically, it would imply a midget defeating a behemoth in a geostrategic wrestling match of global significance.
As for further deduced insights into Pyongyang's motivations, it seems to have disregarded the earlier reciprocal concessions made by both itself and the Trump administration. Following the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea on May 24, President Trump unilaterally suspended large scale U.S.-ROK military exercises, which the Kim regime has historically branded as disguised training for an invasion of the DPRK.
Regardless of the fact that North Korea has on many occasions expressed much anxiety and hostility vis-a-vis such exercises, they have openly downplayed the significance of this concession, and have not reciprocated with further steps towards denuclearization or tension reduction.
If Kim wanted to demonstrate sincerity in negotiations, he would have announced further substantive concessions like the decommissioning of his missile testing site or even an invitation for the International Atomic Energy Agency to come to the DPRK for an inspection visit. This would then place the reciprocative ball in Washington's court. Sadly, Pyongyang has instead chosen to partake in calculative political hardball.
The North's attempt to erode sanctions
Inasmuch as Chairman Kim denies that comprehensive UNSC economic sanctions from 2016 onwards coercing the DPRK's nuclear disarmament, were a significant motivational factor behind his international diplomatic outreach, culminating in his summit with Trump in Singapore, June 12, the fact remains that economic pressure was having a substantial effect proving the bankruptcy of his "byongjin" ideology championing both nuclear arms possession and economic development.
As Kim himself said to Chinese President Xi Jinping during his third summit with the latter this year in June, "We are feeling great pain due to economic sanctions." Thereafter, Kim appealed to Xi for assistance in getting the international sanctions lifted as a reward for successfully concluding the Trump-Kim summit. In response, Xi promised to do his "utmost" to satisfy Kim's request.
Reading between the lines on this issue could lead us to deduce that Kim is trying to gain sanctions relief merely for engaging in international diplomacy without having implemented any serious and irreversible denuclearization measures.
Having seen how long denuclearization negotiations have been going on, where the first serious contacts between Pyongyang and Washington took place in the early 1990s under the leadership of Kim's grandfather, Kim Il-sung, Jong-un might believe that if he can drag out the status-quo for long enough, the international community might accept his nuclear arsenal out of sheer diplomatic fatigue.
Additionally, as North Koreans are already used to painful levels of economic deprivation, any unofficial relaxation of cross-border trade, even if relatively minor, between China and North Korea will provide much needed relief of financial duress to Pyongyang, thereby reinforcing any tendency towards nuclear arms intransigence on Kim's part, leading to weakening prospects for the North's irreversible and verifiable denuclearization.
The way forward
To his credit, Secretary Pompeo did not react angrily to North Korea's accusation that U.S. diplomacy towards the latter was "gangster-like." Dispassionately examining Washington's current diplomatic and strategic options, one could surmise that the Trump administration's current approach of continuing to negotiate with the Kim regime is the right one to adopt.
Moreover, until serious irreversible nuclear concessions are acceded to Kim, economic duress needs to be maintained on his regime, even if this entails secondary sanctions being levied on parties which dare to trade with the DPRK.
Moreover, it would behoove Secretary Pompeo and other principal advisers to Trump to advise him not to be overly eager to compromise with Pyongyang at the expense of America's strategic position or influence in Northeast Asia.
Even if Trump is eager to strike a deal in order to offset his other controversial domestic and international policies, someone needs to pull him aside and remind him that in this game of geopolitical strategic poker, it is the U.S. that holds the stronger cards as the world's sole superpower and not an impoverished dictatorship with unproven prototype nuclear missiles, and which according to military defector accounts, has difficulty ensuring that even its soldiers have three square meals a day.
Liang Tuang Nah, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Military Studies Program, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
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