By Sandip Kumar Mishra
There has been incredible progress over the last few months which has brought some hope that North Korea may be denuclearized. A few months ago the situation was so scary on the Korean Peninsula that the imminent possibility of a military conflict with the North was quite strong.
The U.S. and North Korean leaders' statements and actions were inflammatory, irresponsible and dangerous. It made it almost impossible for South Korea to make any intervention in the process and the phrase "Korea passing" was often used to describe the contest. This context must be kept in mind to evaluate the inter-Korea summit and its outcomes. Furthermore, it must be made absolutely clear that even though South Korea does not officially say it, the changes in the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula are definitely not a product of the U.S. policy of "maximum pressure."
The current developments are products of either "Kim Jong-un's strategy" and "Moon Jae-in's opportunism" or "Moon Jae-in's strategy" and "Kim Jong-un's opportunism." Although many naysayers feel that it is basically the first case, I would like to argue the opposite and attribute credit to South Korea for genuinely raising hope. Actually, Moon's policy toward North Korea has begun a process that has a strong possibility to moderate North Korean behavior and even lead to its denuclearization. The April 27 summit was one of the episodes of the process. In a gradual, determined and systematic way, the Moon administration tried to first make space for its North Korea policy and then operationalize its "Moonshine policy" which has resulted in renewed hope about the denuclearization of North Korea.
Even though there has been less than satisfactory movement on the nuclear and missile issues, South Korea has definitely been able to establish more connections with North Korea through the process, and the inter-Korea summit.
In the Panmunjeom declaration, both Koreas agreed to end the 1950-53 Korean War with a peace treaty by the end of this year. The leaders of two Koreas are scheduled to meet again in the autumn. Defense talks between North and South Korea will also begin soon along with the resumption of family reunions. Road and rail connecting projects are going to be restarted as both countries have agreed to implement their 2000 and 2007 agreements. Both countries have also agreed to have a peaceful fishing zone around the NLL. Even on the nuclear and missile issues, North Korea had announced a self-moratorium and agreed for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Actually, the Rodong Sinmun published on April 28 did mention "complete denuclearization."
The naysayers might say that until now, North Korea had not given up anything substantial nor after the accomplishment of the threshold level in nuclear and missile technologies, through its new strategy Pyongyang has been able to reach out to South Korea and China, and is able to fulfill its eternal wish to deal with the U.S. directly at the highest level, raising its stature in regional politics along with giving hope for its tottering economy. This line of argument premises that North Korea has not changed overnight and has actually been playing out its oft-repeated shrewd strategy to come out of isolation amid economic hardship.
This skepticism about North Korea's strategy and intent is quite valid and it would be inappropriate to say that enough has been achieved by South Korea or the international community in the process of denuclearizing the North. However, it would be equally inappropriate not to see the broader dynamics which have been responsible for North Korea's changed posture in recent months. Actually, Kim has realized that if isolation and economic hardship are not addressed and its saber-rattling with the U.S. continues, a military conflict could not be very far off.
Even though such a military conflict might be disastrous for South Korea and Japan, it would definitely wipe North Korea off the face of the earth. This would not serve the goal of survival for North Korea and the regime.
In such a context, Kim worked hard to acquire maximum offensive and defensive capacities in the last few years and now looks to use them diplomatically to ensure his survival. In the broad North Korean game, nuclear and missile programs are very essential and it would be very reluctant to give them up. However, these programs are certainly dispensable for the supreme goal of survival.
Actually, in the given context of mistrust, denuclearization would not be acceptable to North Korea. However, if a process of trust-building and genuine assurance of its survival is laid out and if the North by its own assessment finds them reliable, the relevance of nuclear and missile arsenals for North Korea might diminish. It might even lead finally to the denuclearization of North Korea.
Actually, the Moonshine strategy has been formulated on this understanding.
Furthermore, South Korea is aware that any denuclearization of North Korea would seek at least two pre-conditions. One, it should not look like it is succumbing to external pressure. Two, the security and stability of North Korea and its regime must obtain trustworthy assurance. For the same reason, South Korea has allowed space for the North Korean strategy to project domestically that Pyongyang has been doing all these things it is doing voluntarily rather than because of the pressure/intervention of South Korea or the U.S. For example, North Korea had announced a self-moratorium on its nuclear and missile tests along with other positive gestures without linking them to its interactions with South Korea or the U.S.
South Korea has also brought the issue of a peace treaty and other trust building measures to assure North Korea about its intent.
Until now South Korea's strategy appears to be working and irrespective of outcomes mentioned in the Panmunjeom declaration, its significance cannot be overstated. Even if North Korea and the U.S. are unable to move forward and the process gets derailed, it would be unfair not to recognize the statesmanship and hard work of the Moon administration to bring new hope for Korea.
The author (sandipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor of Korean studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
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The U.S. and North Korean leaders' statements and actions were inflammatory, irresponsible and dangerous. It made it almost impossible for South Korea to make any intervention in the process and the phrase "Korea passing" was often used to describe the contest. This context must be kept in mind to evaluate the inter-Korea summit and its outcomes. Furthermore, it must be made absolutely clear that even though South Korea does not officially say it, the changes in the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula are definitely not a product of the U.S. policy of "maximum pressure."
The current developments are products of either "Kim Jong-un's strategy" and "Moon Jae-in's opportunism" or "Moon Jae-in's strategy" and "Kim Jong-un's opportunism." Although many naysayers feel that it is basically the first case, I would like to argue the opposite and attribute credit to South Korea for genuinely raising hope. Actually, Moon's policy toward North Korea has begun a process that has a strong possibility to moderate North Korean behavior and even lead to its denuclearization. The April 27 summit was one of the episodes of the process. In a gradual, determined and systematic way, the Moon administration tried to first make space for its North Korea policy and then operationalize its "Moonshine policy" which has resulted in renewed hope about the denuclearization of North Korea.
Even though there has been less than satisfactory movement on the nuclear and missile issues, South Korea has definitely been able to establish more connections with North Korea through the process, and the inter-Korea summit.
In the Panmunjeom declaration, both Koreas agreed to end the 1950-53 Korean War with a peace treaty by the end of this year. The leaders of two Koreas are scheduled to meet again in the autumn. Defense talks between North and South Korea will also begin soon along with the resumption of family reunions. Road and rail connecting projects are going to be restarted as both countries have agreed to implement their 2000 and 2007 agreements. Both countries have also agreed to have a peaceful fishing zone around the NLL. Even on the nuclear and missile issues, North Korea had announced a self-moratorium and agreed for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Actually, the Rodong Sinmun published on April 28 did mention "complete denuclearization."
The naysayers might say that until now, North Korea had not given up anything substantial nor after the accomplishment of the threshold level in nuclear and missile technologies, through its new strategy Pyongyang has been able to reach out to South Korea and China, and is able to fulfill its eternal wish to deal with the U.S. directly at the highest level, raising its stature in regional politics along with giving hope for its tottering economy. This line of argument premises that North Korea has not changed overnight and has actually been playing out its oft-repeated shrewd strategy to come out of isolation amid economic hardship.
This skepticism about North Korea's strategy and intent is quite valid and it would be inappropriate to say that enough has been achieved by South Korea or the international community in the process of denuclearizing the North. However, it would be equally inappropriate not to see the broader dynamics which have been responsible for North Korea's changed posture in recent months. Actually, Kim has realized that if isolation and economic hardship are not addressed and its saber-rattling with the U.S. continues, a military conflict could not be very far off.
Even though such a military conflict might be disastrous for South Korea and Japan, it would definitely wipe North Korea off the face of the earth. This would not serve the goal of survival for North Korea and the regime.
In such a context, Kim worked hard to acquire maximum offensive and defensive capacities in the last few years and now looks to use them diplomatically to ensure his survival. In the broad North Korean game, nuclear and missile programs are very essential and it would be very reluctant to give them up. However, these programs are certainly dispensable for the supreme goal of survival.
Actually, in the given context of mistrust, denuclearization would not be acceptable to North Korea. However, if a process of trust-building and genuine assurance of its survival is laid out and if the North by its own assessment finds them reliable, the relevance of nuclear and missile arsenals for North Korea might diminish. It might even lead finally to the denuclearization of North Korea.
Actually, the Moonshine strategy has been formulated on this understanding.
Furthermore, South Korea is aware that any denuclearization of North Korea would seek at least two pre-conditions. One, it should not look like it is succumbing to external pressure. Two, the security and stability of North Korea and its regime must obtain trustworthy assurance. For the same reason, South Korea has allowed space for the North Korean strategy to project domestically that Pyongyang has been doing all these things it is doing voluntarily rather than because of the pressure/intervention of South Korea or the U.S. For example, North Korea had announced a self-moratorium on its nuclear and missile tests along with other positive gestures without linking them to its interactions with South Korea or the U.S.
South Korea has also brought the issue of a peace treaty and other trust building measures to assure North Korea about its intent.
Until now South Korea's strategy appears to be working and irrespective of outcomes mentioned in the Panmunjeom declaration, its significance cannot be overstated. Even if North Korea and the U.S. are unable to move forward and the process gets derailed, it would be unfair not to recognize the statesmanship and hard work of the Moon administration to bring new hope for Korea.
The author (sandipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor of Korean studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
.
