Biden's Asia policy and Iranian conundrum

By Nehginpao Kipgen and Vikas Nagal

The Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" grand strategy was designed to pull the U.S. out of the Middle East quagmire and realign its military, diplomatic and economic power toward the Asia-Pacific region.

Even the Trump administration ― which pulled out of many of Obama's initiatives such as the Iran nuclear deal, Paris Climate Accord and the Trans-Pacific Partnership ― largely followed this approach.

But the Biden administration's recent military airstrike against Iranian proxies in eastern Syria near the Iraqi border has again brought to fore the "structural flaw" in the U.S. "Pivot to Asia" or its "rebalance" strategy. The U.S. cannot successfully extract itself from the Middle East and focus on countering China ― the new "geopolitical test" in the Asia-Pacific region ― without resolving the Iranian conundrum.

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that removed the U.S.-backed Shah regime, successive Republican and Democratic administrations have tried to counter Iran's revolutionary designs in the region, with varying degrees of success.

But the Bush administration changed the balance of power in the region with its decision to invade Iraq, removing a major obstacle to Iranian expansion in the region and engulfing the region in a wider sectarian war between the Shia and Sunni.

In the last two decades, the Iranian octopus had spread its tentacles around the region. It had single-handedly undermined American efforts to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq by supplying arms and ammunition to its proxies like Badr Brigade in Iraq and supporting populist politicians like Muqtada al-Sadr.

The Iranian regime has also propped up the Assad regime in Syria, with air support provided by the Russians. Iran supplied rockets and drones to Houthi rebels in the Yemen civil war. Iran has also constructed a land and air corridor to supply precision guided missiles and related technology to its most potent proxy force in the region i.e., Hezbollah.

The Obama administration's Middle East policy was focused on pulling U.S. troops out of Iraq and reorienting its strategy toward countering China in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, to successfully extract U.S. forces out of Iraq without throwing it into the pre-surge chaos, Iranian support was necessary. But the Obama administration's hasty withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the return of al-Qaida in a new guise further increased Iranian influence on the ground.

Iran's master tactician, General Qasem Soleimani was quickly dispatched to Iraq, to build a new Shia-dominated force, known as Popular Mobilization Unit and to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq. With the help of American airpower and Iranian proxies, Iraq managed to turn the tide of war against the Islamic State.

Ultimately, the rise of China, budgetary constraints, unpopularity of the Iraq war at home and the Obama administration's desire to borrow Nixon's administration vocabulary to have "peace with honor" in Iraq, the U.S. was forced to seek a grand re-rapprochement with the "Mullahs in Tehran."

The signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 was a watershed moment for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It was compared and contrasted with Nixon's visit to China, which not only helped the U.S. safely pull out of the Vietnam War, but also changed the trajectory of the Cold War.

Similarly, the nuclear deal was designed to "put Iranian nuclear ambition into a box" and metamorphose it into a status quo power by recognizing its legitimate security interest in the region.

But the Trump administration's short-sighted decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and re-impose secondary sanctions undermined his administration's strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region.

The Trump administration also supplied weapons such as precision guided missiles and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The relentless carpet-bombing campaign by the Saudi forces against the Houthis forced it further into the Iranian camp.

Despite crippling sanctions and relentless proxy warfare, the Trump administration failed to coerce the Iranian regime to come to the diplomatic table. In contrast, Ayatollahs doubled down on the confrontational approach and targeted commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, increased the supply of missiles and drones to Houthis and restarted its nuclear program by enriching uranium beyond 3.67 percent.

Following increased Iranian attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz in mid-2019, the Trump administration reluctantly deployed additional military assets like B-52 bombers and aircraft carriers in the region to restore deterrence. By mid-2020, when the impasse reached the inflation point after the killing of Qasem Soleimani, two aircraft carriers were deployed in the region.

Earlier in 2010, during the height of tensions with Iran, the Obama administration deployed two aircraft carriers in the region. According to some estimates, the deployment of two aircraft carriers at the time nearly broke the "power projection capabilities of aircraft carriers" and "depleted the readiness accounts to dangerous levels."

The Biden administration's dual-track approach toward Iran ― curtailing its nuclear program by rejoining the nuclear deal and containing the Iranian expansionist agenda by carrying out targeted military airstrikes against its proxies in the region ― is unlikely to succeed without a large deployment of naval and air powers in the region.

The resultant effect of such realignment will be a decreased presence of U.S. naval and air assets in other important regions such as the South China Sea. The biggest beneficiaries of these developments will be America's "systematic rivals" like China and Russia.

Dr. Nehginpao Kipgen is a political scientist, associate professor and executive director at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University. Vikas Nagal is a research assistant at CSEAS.