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I think three big trends are behind this hyper-uncertainty. The first is the great disruption. The pandemic has wreaked havoc on every aspect of human life, particularly economic and social. The pandemic's overall impact is estimated to be worse than that of the great recession caused by the 2007 global financial crisis. The longer the pandemic continues, the worse its repercussions will become, raising the specter of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The second is the great division. Competition is intensifying between the two most powerful states in the world, the United States and China. It started with trade and then moved to technology. Soon it is likely to spill over to finance and security. Furthermore, confrontation persists over China's human rights issues. The growing competition and confrontation will cause a structural disconnect between the two great powers. This great division will increasingly force the rest of the world to choose between the two sides.
The third is the great transformation. Digital and other emerging technologies are driving fundamental changes in how we work as well as how we receive education and medical care, and the pandemic is accelerating these changes. The current paradigm of industrial civilization based on market capitalism and liberal democracy is showing signs of fatigue, no longer able to cope with serious side effects like inequality.
Some experts call this fundamental paradigmatic transformation the Fourth Industrial Revolution. But others including myself think it may herald the beginning of a new civilization whose nomenclature is perhaps too early to determine. I tentatively call it a digital civilization. Envisioning a new paradigm for a new civilization will not be easy, given the existing value divide between the West led by the U.S. and the former East led by China and Russia.
Understanding and responding effectively to this trinity of trends will take robust global leadership. But the reality indicates the opposite, as the U.S. and China are increasingly preoccupied with mutual competition rather than providing leadership for the world. The declining global leadership engenders the hyper-uncertainty and sets a somber tone for the global security landscape of 2022 and beyond. Here are some salient points that I would like to highlight.
Firstly, this hyper-uncertainty will lead to rising tensions in the East and South China seas, particularly across the Taiwan Strait, a major fault line between the U.S. and China. Tension is likely to prolong, as neither the U.S. nor China can afford to be seen as weak vis-a-vis the other in the run-up to some of the most important political events slated for this year. President Xi is expected to get an unprecedented third term at the October party congress.
President Biden's Democratic Party is facing mid-term elections in November, which will serve as a confidence vote on his presidency. Tense U.S.-China relations will keep the regional states nervous, as they try to maintain close political and economic relations with both the U.S. and China.
Secondly, an arc of instability may emerge in weak spots in South Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. The main cause for instability in these regions is the perceived retreat of the U.S., as seen recently in the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. A power vacuum created by the U.S. retreat will likely embolden both states and non-state actors that have irredentist, religious or other violent extremist agendas. The ongoing saga in and around eastern Ukraine needs to be seen in this context, and therefore, we can assume it will most likely linger on.
Thirdly, global risks of inadvertent escalation of conflicts are rising. A source of particular concern is the growing possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and using them for mass disruption. While emerging cyber and bio-engineering technologies bring positive benefits for human life, they lower the entry barrier to biochemical weapons for malicious actors.
A WMD terrorist attack against a major power could trigger a rush retaliation by the attacked major power, which in turn could spark a series of misunderstandings and possibly an unintended armed conflict among major powers. To prevent this risk, therefore, it is an urgent priority for the major powers to set up a credible crisis management mechanism.?They also need to resume and expand the earlier cooperative work done through the Nuclear Security Summit process under the Obama administration of the U.S.
Last but not least, what do these troubling trends of hyper-uncertainty and instability mean for South Korea? Given the complexity and volatility in and around the Korean Peninsula, South Korea has no other choice but to prepare for the worst and work for the best simultaneously. It is possible that North Korea may attempt ill-advised provocations around the South Korean presidential election in March.
South Korea must work in advance with its allies and partners to conduct scenario-based planning to prepare for different types of contingencies. Proactive measures for deterrence and diplomacy also need to be in place to further lower the risks. These preparations must be done with the fluid global and regional security landscape in view.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as foreign affairs secretary for the South Korean president. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).