Why UN's relevance is at risk post-Ukraine

By Andrew Hammond

The unexpectedly strong rebuke of many Western countries and corporates to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has surprised many, yet three months later the U.N. is facing growing criticism of its own multilateral efforts to bring an end to the war.

To date, more than 30 countries ― representing more than 50 percent of the global economy ― have levied sanctions against Moscow. Moreover, some 500 corporates have cut or reduced their business ties with Russia by either withdrawing, suspending, scaling back and/or buying time by postponing future planned investment/development/marketing while continuing substantive business.

To be sure, the U.N. has taken a wide range of actions since Russia's invasion in February. The U.N. General Assembly has voted to suspend Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council.

The world body has also provided some 2.5 million people in the country with assistance, including 218 tons of emergency and medical supplies. Moreover, Secretary General Antonio Guterres visited Moscow on Tuesday to meet President Vladimir Putin.

However, U.N. agencies are struggling to reach civilians under siege in the east of Ukraine, where humanitarian assistance is sporadic. According to the U.N. itself, more than 12 million people need humanitarian assistance in Ukraine. Meanwhile the U.N. Security Council, where Russia is one of five permanent members with veto power, has failed to pass any resolutions condemning the war.

This has fueled criticism with, for instance, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, calling for the U.N. to exclude Russia from the Security Council. He has also said "we have to develop a new tool" capable of better maintaining peace in the decades to come.

Created in 1945 with an ambition of guaranteeing world peace and preventing another world war, the U.N. confers high influence on the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council ― the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom and France. For instance, Moscow has exercised its Security Council veto some 15 times in votes regarding its ally Syria since 2011. And this same veto power also guarantees that Moscow can never be removed from the Council, since the U.N. Charter allows the General Assembly to exclude a member only upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

This structural issue underlines why it is so hard for the U.N. to get on the front foot in Ukraine, but there are also wider issues, including the many non-Western states which have refused to take sides. Take the example of key emerging markets such as Brazil where President Jair Bolsonaro has said that his country "will not take sides," and Indian leaders who have reaffirmed a policy of nonalignment, with South Africa following a similar path.

For many countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, such nonalignment has significant appeal. A wide number depend heavily on trade, aid, investment and/or weaponry from both Western powers and from China, if not also from Russia.

Yet, while nonalignment may suit many states, it makes the job of international security harder. Reluctance to take sides in such a clear case of aggression can weaken international norms and undermine global security.

At this stage, many members of the approximately 160-strong so-called Non-Aligned Movement have condemned Russian attacks. Yet only one, Singapore, has imposed sanctions.

This makes it easier for Russia to sustain its military campaign, in effect sending a message that territorial aggression by major powers will be tolerated.

This is therefore a massive headache for the U.N. Yet, while the international body is much criticized, sometimes fairly, the last few years have underlined that it continues to have significant resilience and legitimacy more than three quarters of a century after its creation.

Indeed, one of the few potential silver linings of the coronavirus pandemic is that it has shown yet again how global challenges can best be tackled through international, coordinated action, often led by the U.N. And despite the decay of the post-1945 order, the remaining dense web of post-war international institutions, with the U.N. at its heart, continue to have major relevance decades after their birth.

Going forward, a fundamental driver of whether the U.N. will thrive, not just survive, well into the 21st century may rest less with Russia, but the direction of the relationship between China and the United States, the two most powerful members of the Security Council. It seems all set now for growing bilateral rivalry, and what some see as a new Cold War, that could see international cooperation erode, including military tensions increasing from the South China Sea outwards.

However, the relationship may yet contain unexpected potential for fruitful partnership, at the U.N. and beyond. Such growing bilateral cooperation is most likely if stronger partnerships can be embedded on issues like climate change, as proved the case during the Obama presidency, which may then potentially enable more effective ways of resolving hard power disputes, from trade to the military tensions in the South China Sea.

Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.