By John Burton
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made his opening bid in dealing with the new administration of President Joe Biden at the eighth congress of the ruling Workers' Party, which ended last week. The congress was deliberately held before Biden's inauguration this week to send a message on how Pyongyang views the situation.
It was not a reassuring one for Washington. Kim declared that the U.S. was North Korea's "foremost principal enemy" and added that North Korea would only negotiate from a position of strength as he outlined new nuclear and missile programs.
These included the development of tactical nuclear weapons suitable for local conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, long-range strategic missiles with multiple warheads that could reach most of the U.S. mainland, and nuclear submarines. This point was underscored when a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, described as "the world's most powerful weapon," was displayed in a military parade afterwards to celebrate the end of the congress.
This tough stance apparently anticipates that the Biden administration will adopt a more hardline policy toward North Korea than that of Donald Trump, who met Kim three times in a failed attempt to reach a nuclear deal.
Kim's remarks amounted to a defiant statement that North Korea will never give up its nuclear and missile arsenal, which it views as a legitimate self-defense measure.
But beyond the harsh rhetoric, things may not change much for the moment since Washington and Pyongyang will be distracted with other issues over the coming months.
The Biden administration will be focused on tackling the COVID-19 pandemic and possible domestic terrorist attacks by Trump supporters. Meanwhile, Kim will probably prefer to concentrate on economic recovery efforts after admitting the failure of the latest five-year economic plan. This was partly due to a sharp reduction in trade with China after Pyongyang last year closed its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, along with the effects of international sanctions and several natural disasters.
As a result, it might be in the interests of both countries to adopt a "wait and see" attitude toward each other. Although there is speculation that North Korea might soon resume major weapons tests, which have been suspended since 2017, to pressure Washington to ease sanctions, it might produce the opposite effect. Kim can ill afford to take such an action when the economy appears to be slowly imploding.
The display of military power might also have been staged to shore up Kim's political prestige in the face of the growing economic crisis. At the end of the congress, Kim assumed the title of general secretary of the Workers' Party, which signaled a tightening of his authority. There was also a shake-up in the Politburo with new members named.
The demotion of Kim's sister, Kim Yo-jong, in the party hierarchy suggests that despite the military bluster, the North Korea leader might be preparing to ease tensions with South Korea. Kim Yo-jong had played a highly visible role in criticizing Seoul.
Inter-Korean relations have been deadlocked following the failure of Kim's summit with Trump in Hanoi two years ago, which President Moon Jae-in helped to broker. Kim may be hoping that a renewed outreach to Seoul could lead to economic cooperation projects that Moon has been proposing, while driving a wedge between South Korea and the U.S.
Whether such a strategy will succeed will depend on Washington's response. Will the Biden administration, for example, decide to push for full-scale joint military exercises with the South in the spring? Trump reduced the size of the annual exercises in the past two years in a conciliatory gesture to Pyongyang.
Biden's appointment of Kurt Campbell as his top adviser on Asia on the National Security Council could result in increased strains with the Moon administration. As assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the administration of Barack Obama, Campbell was a key architect of the policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea, which led to a period of non-engagement with Pyongyang. A possible revival of this policy would clash with Moon's efforts to seek reconciliation with North Korea.
Campbell will likely modify Trump's demands that Seoul significantly increase its financial support to host the 28,000 American troops in South Korea, which has become a major irritant in bilateral relations. But he is also likely to press Seoul to take a firmer stand against China in cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. This places Moon in an awkward position since he would like to avoid being caught in the escalating rivalry between China, South Korea's biggest trading partner, and the United States, its major security ally.
As Pyongyang and Washington put down their markers at the beginning of the New Year, it looks like once again Seoul will be caught in the middle.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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It was not a reassuring one for Washington. Kim declared that the U.S. was North Korea's "foremost principal enemy" and added that North Korea would only negotiate from a position of strength as he outlined new nuclear and missile programs.
These included the development of tactical nuclear weapons suitable for local conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, long-range strategic missiles with multiple warheads that could reach most of the U.S. mainland, and nuclear submarines. This point was underscored when a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, described as "the world's most powerful weapon," was displayed in a military parade afterwards to celebrate the end of the congress.
This tough stance apparently anticipates that the Biden administration will adopt a more hardline policy toward North Korea than that of Donald Trump, who met Kim three times in a failed attempt to reach a nuclear deal.
Kim's remarks amounted to a defiant statement that North Korea will never give up its nuclear and missile arsenal, which it views as a legitimate self-defense measure.
But beyond the harsh rhetoric, things may not change much for the moment since Washington and Pyongyang will be distracted with other issues over the coming months.
The Biden administration will be focused on tackling the COVID-19 pandemic and possible domestic terrorist attacks by Trump supporters. Meanwhile, Kim will probably prefer to concentrate on economic recovery efforts after admitting the failure of the latest five-year economic plan. This was partly due to a sharp reduction in trade with China after Pyongyang last year closed its borders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, along with the effects of international sanctions and several natural disasters.
As a result, it might be in the interests of both countries to adopt a "wait and see" attitude toward each other. Although there is speculation that North Korea might soon resume major weapons tests, which have been suspended since 2017, to pressure Washington to ease sanctions, it might produce the opposite effect. Kim can ill afford to take such an action when the economy appears to be slowly imploding.
The display of military power might also have been staged to shore up Kim's political prestige in the face of the growing economic crisis. At the end of the congress, Kim assumed the title of general secretary of the Workers' Party, which signaled a tightening of his authority. There was also a shake-up in the Politburo with new members named.
The demotion of Kim's sister, Kim Yo-jong, in the party hierarchy suggests that despite the military bluster, the North Korea leader might be preparing to ease tensions with South Korea. Kim Yo-jong had played a highly visible role in criticizing Seoul.
Inter-Korean relations have been deadlocked following the failure of Kim's summit with Trump in Hanoi two years ago, which President Moon Jae-in helped to broker. Kim may be hoping that a renewed outreach to Seoul could lead to economic cooperation projects that Moon has been proposing, while driving a wedge between South Korea and the U.S.
Whether such a strategy will succeed will depend on Washington's response. Will the Biden administration, for example, decide to push for full-scale joint military exercises with the South in the spring? Trump reduced the size of the annual exercises in the past two years in a conciliatory gesture to Pyongyang.
Biden's appointment of Kurt Campbell as his top adviser on Asia on the National Security Council could result in increased strains with the Moon administration. As assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the administration of Barack Obama, Campbell was a key architect of the policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea, which led to a period of non-engagement with Pyongyang. A possible revival of this policy would clash with Moon's efforts to seek reconciliation with North Korea.
Campbell will likely modify Trump's demands that Seoul significantly increase its financial support to host the 28,000 American troops in South Korea, which has become a major irritant in bilateral relations. But he is also likely to press Seoul to take a firmer stand against China in cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. This places Moon in an awkward position since he would like to avoid being caught in the escalating rivalry between China, South Korea's biggest trading partner, and the United States, its major security ally.
As Pyongyang and Washington put down their markers at the beginning of the New Year, it looks like once again Seoul will be caught in the middle.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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