By Ahn Ho-young
President Joe Biden announced on April 14 that the withdrawal of U.S. forces will begin on May 1, in line with an agreement Trump's administration made with the Taliban. Since then, the Taliban began a strikingly rapid advance across the country, taking one regional capital after another, and reached the doorsteps of Kabul by Aug. 14. Next morning, it released a statement that "our forces do not want to enter Kabul through military means."
At the time, I sincerely hoped that this pause of the Taliban's advance and Afghan resistance would provide sufficient time to evacuate foreigners and Afghan citizens who had worked with the foreign community. However, on the same day, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and Kabul fell to the Taliban.
This started the stampede of the foreign community and tens of thousands of Afghans to the Karzai Airport in the hopes of flying out of Afghanistan. In the following two weeks, the U.S. and other countries could evacuate more than 100,000 foreigners and Afghans. However, there still remain a large number of foreigners and Afghans wishing to leave the country.
Afghans in particular braved grave risk to their life, passed through Taliban checkpoints, got to the airport, had to bear the threat of terrorist attacks and desperately waited for a chance to get out. This was a heart-wrenching scene of Kabul I read about and watched on TV every day.
Given the enormity of the tragedy, the blame game has started in Washington, D.C., and in many other places including the capitals of some U.S. allies. In the process, heavy blame is dumped on President Joe Biden. It looks unavoidable for some time. As Biden said in his speech on Aug. 16, "the buck stops with me" as president of the U.S. Getting the blame for making painful decisions should be part of the job. However, I wonder if all this blame game is fair or helpful, especially with respect to U.S. allies.
A frequent complaint from some NATO allies seems to be that they were not consulted sufficiently about the U.S. decision. I do not know the extent or the depth of consultation at this time. What I remember from my days as Korean ambassador in Brussels in 2011-12 was the constant process of consultation among NATO ambassadors.
At that time, Korea used to operate a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in the Parwan province of Afghanistan as a member of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and I used to attend NATO council meetings held in the ISAF format.
The ISAF was a genuinely multi-national institution, with the participation of all 28 NATO member countries and 24 non-NATO countries. During my time at ISAF meetings, the main theme of discussion was transition and transformation ― transition of ISAF responsibilities to Afghan forces and government by the end of 2014, after which ISAF forces would cease their combat mission and play only an advisory role.
Every ISAF meeting used to repeat the mantra of "In Together, Out Together," meaning that all the decisions and implementation of decisions would be made collectively by all members.
In fact, I, as a representative of a non-NATO country, envied the depth of consultation among NATO member countries. Most, if not all, NATO members used to have their offices at the NATO headquarters building, which enabled NATO diplomats and military personnel to live, work, dine and communicate in the same building.
It is because of this memory from my days in Brussels that it is not easy for me to understand some NATO allies' complaints about the lack of consultation provided by the U.S. If it was not sufficient, I think the main reason was because the U.S. itself was taken by surprise by the sudden collapse of Kabul as any other country was. I read even the Taliban was surprised.
An even bigger concern I have is the negative impact the recent developments in Kabul can have on the strength of the alliance. The most potent foreign policy theme pronounced by Biden has been "the U.S. is back." Now, in the aftermath of Kabul, the sincerity and the capacity of the U.S. behind this objective are being questioned even in the capitals of important U.S. allies. I do not think this helps the strategic interests of U.S. allies in any manner.
Watching the heart-wrenching scenes in Kabul, I cannot suppress my own deep sense of frustration. A recurring question in my mind is if the withdrawal from Kabul could have been arranged in a better way. Even President Biden, while emphasizing the inevitability of the decision to withdraw, acknowledges the failure of intelligence.
Having said that, the anger, frustration and self-questioning must not spill over and lead to questioning Biden's intention to stop the long-overdue bleeding in U.S. military and political resources and renew U.S. leadership around the world, based on strengthened relations with allies.
Graham Allison, a Harvard academic who coined and widely circulated the concept of the Thucydides trap several years ago, recently had this to say: "Biden deserves praise, not scorn, for taking a calculated risk in order to extract the U.S. from a failing effort in a misguided mission."
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
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At the time, I sincerely hoped that this pause of the Taliban's advance and Afghan resistance would provide sufficient time to evacuate foreigners and Afghan citizens who had worked with the foreign community. However, on the same day, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and Kabul fell to the Taliban.
This started the stampede of the foreign community and tens of thousands of Afghans to the Karzai Airport in the hopes of flying out of Afghanistan. In the following two weeks, the U.S. and other countries could evacuate more than 100,000 foreigners and Afghans. However, there still remain a large number of foreigners and Afghans wishing to leave the country.
Afghans in particular braved grave risk to their life, passed through Taliban checkpoints, got to the airport, had to bear the threat of terrorist attacks and desperately waited for a chance to get out. This was a heart-wrenching scene of Kabul I read about and watched on TV every day.
Given the enormity of the tragedy, the blame game has started in Washington, D.C., and in many other places including the capitals of some U.S. allies. In the process, heavy blame is dumped on President Joe Biden. It looks unavoidable for some time. As Biden said in his speech on Aug. 16, "the buck stops with me" as president of the U.S. Getting the blame for making painful decisions should be part of the job. However, I wonder if all this blame game is fair or helpful, especially with respect to U.S. allies.
A frequent complaint from some NATO allies seems to be that they were not consulted sufficiently about the U.S. decision. I do not know the extent or the depth of consultation at this time. What I remember from my days as Korean ambassador in Brussels in 2011-12 was the constant process of consultation among NATO ambassadors.
At that time, Korea used to operate a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in the Parwan province of Afghanistan as a member of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and I used to attend NATO council meetings held in the ISAF format.
The ISAF was a genuinely multi-national institution, with the participation of all 28 NATO member countries and 24 non-NATO countries. During my time at ISAF meetings, the main theme of discussion was transition and transformation ― transition of ISAF responsibilities to Afghan forces and government by the end of 2014, after which ISAF forces would cease their combat mission and play only an advisory role.
Every ISAF meeting used to repeat the mantra of "In Together, Out Together," meaning that all the decisions and implementation of decisions would be made collectively by all members.
In fact, I, as a representative of a non-NATO country, envied the depth of consultation among NATO member countries. Most, if not all, NATO members used to have their offices at the NATO headquarters building, which enabled NATO diplomats and military personnel to live, work, dine and communicate in the same building.
It is because of this memory from my days in Brussels that it is not easy for me to understand some NATO allies' complaints about the lack of consultation provided by the U.S. If it was not sufficient, I think the main reason was because the U.S. itself was taken by surprise by the sudden collapse of Kabul as any other country was. I read even the Taliban was surprised.
An even bigger concern I have is the negative impact the recent developments in Kabul can have on the strength of the alliance. The most potent foreign policy theme pronounced by Biden has been "the U.S. is back." Now, in the aftermath of Kabul, the sincerity and the capacity of the U.S. behind this objective are being questioned even in the capitals of important U.S. allies. I do not think this helps the strategic interests of U.S. allies in any manner.
Watching the heart-wrenching scenes in Kabul, I cannot suppress my own deep sense of frustration. A recurring question in my mind is if the withdrawal from Kabul could have been arranged in a better way. Even President Biden, while emphasizing the inevitability of the decision to withdraw, acknowledges the failure of intelligence.
Having said that, the anger, frustration and self-questioning must not spill over and lead to questioning Biden's intention to stop the long-overdue bleeding in U.S. military and political resources and renew U.S. leadership around the world, based on strengthened relations with allies.
Graham Allison, a Harvard academic who coined and widely circulated the concept of the Thucydides trap several years ago, recently had this to say: "Biden deserves praise, not scorn, for taking a calculated risk in order to extract the U.S. from a failing effort in a misguided mission."
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
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