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China-Japan relations critical to South Korea's post-NATO summit strategic planning

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By Choo Jae-woo

South Korea's NATO initiation got off on the right foot. Korea took the occasion of its first-ever NATO summit attendance on June 29-30 to prove its commitment to becoming a “global pivotal state.” It stood with the members' commitment to the perseverance of universal values and rules-based order with its wholehearted pronouncement of support for Ukraine. It also agreed to form a new partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol also shined at other sideline events during the summit. At the bilateral summit meetings with his NATO counterpart members, namely Poland, the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic and Great Britain, common grounds for economic security cooperation were established. At the trilateral meeting with the United States and Japan, security cooperation was announced to have been restored.

After a successful initiation, however, South Korea will have to pay its dues sooner or later. It will have to contribute to peace and stability in Europe. That will not only mean the NATO member states but also the regions like Ukraine that they are committed to support. Having already made explicit its pledge to become a global pivotal state, South Korea will have to be resilient with its support to the winning cause of the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, it will have to also live up to its promise to further develop cooperative security relations with the United States and Japan.

South Korea's commitments made at the NATO summit will come neither free nor without challenges. Some of these challenges may be collateral damage that is likely to arise from South Korea's unconditional pursuit of better relations with Japan and thereby misreading China's warnings. South Korea has already received some serious ― and sometimes excessive ― warnings from China. Beijing via its envoy on June 30 seriously warned Seoul to re-establish its relationship with the United States and China from a long-term interest perspective.

Prior to Yoon's departure, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson on June 23 expressed opposition. Beijing's distaste for South Korea and Japan's participation at the NATO Summit was in full expression through various channels coming before and after the summit. One came particularly after the release of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, in which China for the first time was defined as being of key strategic significance for the next decade and its threat status as a “systemic challenge” to the world.

South Korea's strategic and diplomatic game planning will be a great challenge. It is largely because the Yoon government's approach to building a so-called global pivotal state is one-dimensional. Once again, President Yoon in his summit speech showed a propensity to focusing heavily on issues pertaining to North Korea just as his predecessors did.

To become the kind of state it has declared it will, one must have the eye of a chameleon, the strategic mind of Sun Tzu ― author of the ancient Chinese classic “The Art of War” ― and the diplomatic insights of Henry Kissinger. Like the chameleon, you must be able to read your 360-degree surroundings and sometimes see what is behind your counterpart. Like Sun Tzu, you must know not only the enemy but also yourself. Like Kissinger, you must be able to read ahead of your counterpart's moves before making your own moves.

Beijing may be right with its claim that Seoul and Tokyo “seemed to have lost their independence by courting the Americans too much,” as a Chinese expert pointed out on June 29 in the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party media mouthpiece. South Korea, with hopes of rebuilding its alliance with the United States and amending relations with Japan, has been actively engaging in the security and diplomatic realm. On the security front concerning North Korea, for instance, South Korea agreed to hold a missile warning and ballistic missile search and tracking exercise at the Shangri-La Dialogue held on June 12.

For the first time in a collective fashion, they also addressed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. As for the Indo-Pacific region, the three nations “expressed strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo and increase tensions,” implying the “China threat.” The need to initiate a combined military exercise by the three nations was reiterated by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at their trilateral summit meeting on June 29.

South Korea seems to have some reservations about Kishida's suggestion. Before reaching its decision, Seoul must realize where Beijing's criticism is coming from. It is based on the ongoing conflicts with Japan. The feud between the two was started by Japan's tentative decision to station an incumbent military official at its representative office in Taipei this summer.

Once the scheme was revealed in early June, the Global Times went to an extreme with its editorial headline reading “Japan needs a head blow to wake up.” Beijing also exploded when it learned that Japan has been on the move to create a new unified commander post and a unified commander department that was to integrate all its Self-Defense Forces so as to, in the words of the editorial, “cope with China.” It went further by saying, “If an outsider wants to step in, we will 'break its leg.”?

South Korea must be reminded of China's demand to abide by the so-called “3 Nos” founded in 2017 as a means to solve the THAAD issue. One of the nos denies Seoul's furthering defense ties with Tokyo and Washington. Perhaps Seoul's intention is to indirectly rebuke the “3 Nos” as once promised by President Yoon during his presidential campaign. Seoul Korea must keep in mind that an unconditional focus on one side is susceptible to blind spots and collateral damage is bound to happen.

Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He was a visiting fellow of Brookings Institution.