By Choo Jae-woo
President Yoon Suk-yeol initiated his first foreign policy maneuver by announcing that Korea will join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). His announcement came about a week after he took office on May 10 and much earlier than when the IPEF was officially launched on May 23. The Korean public was in awe, fearing possible retaliatory action by China.
Korea in recent years has built the habit of considering China first before doing anything including in its national interests. What the country learned from the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery here and China's ensuing economic retaliation has taken a toll on the Korean people including decision-makers.
The Korean public's apprehension indeed proved to be well-founded as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi filed a complaint during a virtual meeting with his Korean counterpart later that evening. Wang expressed his opposition by emphasizing the IPEF's negative tendency to decouple and cut off supply chains with his country. He basically demanded that Korea maintain the stability and smooth operation of global industry and supply chains by reconsidering the president's decision to join the IPEF.
Wang later elaborated on China's opposition to the IPEF the day before its official launch. While casting strong skepticism on the prospective success of the framework, he was also highly critical of its inherent intent and purposes. He criticized it as an American attempt to create regional division and confrontation instead of cooperation. He also called on the United States to refrain from politicizing regional economic cooperation and warned that any future regional framework excluding China would be abandoned by "the times."
China's strong opposition sheds light on a new perspective with respect to Korea's rising geo-economic value. Koreans must realize this change in its strategic value to China and take advantage by emancipating themselves from their perpetual fear of China. It has already become apparent that it is more the case that China fears losing Korea, than Korea worries about China's punitive actions for joining current efforts by America, such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and its subset, the IPEF.
Beijing's concerns were made explicit just before Korea's presidential election in March. On two different occasions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media mouthpiece The Global Times employed editorials to convey warning messages to all of Korea's presidential candidates as well as to the president-elect. Such an endeavor is unheard of and unprecedented in past South Korean presidential elections.
On March 9, the day before the election, in the editorial, "China-South Korea ties must move forward not backward," it wanted the presidential candidates to realize the true intent behind America's Indo-Pacific Strategy. Claiming that the United States is either pressing or luring South Korea with a promise of interests to take sides with it against China, it said that the U.S.' intent is delusional. Acting as a good Samaritan, Beijing preached to Seoul about the consequences of falling into Washington's trap. It would mean Seoul falling into the frontline of a geopolitical competition in Northeast Asia. A strategic dichotomy ― as in "pro-China" or "pro-U.S." ― will not serve Seoul's strategic interests, the editorial insisted.
On the day after the election, another editorial was issued, with another "benign" warning message to then-President-elect Yoon. Recognizant of the president's foreign policy priority of rebuilding the alliance with the U.S., China took its anxiety to another level. While confessing that it understands South Korea's interest in the alliance, the CCP's mouthpiece cautioned that "Beijing-Seoul relations should not be seen as an appendix of Washington-Seoul relations."
Furthermore, it also cautioned on the issue of misinterpretation and misjudgment and that China will respect Korea when the latter has a good relationship with the U.S. ― a prevailing belief in Korean society. In the end, the gist of the message was to warn Seoul not to gamble between Washington and Beijing.
China's anxiety reflects its apprehension of Korea's strategic values potentially presenting a threat to its economic interests. In other words, it cannot afford to lose Korea in its supply chains. A disruption in Korea's supply of semiconductors, for instance, would be detrimental to China's aspiration to become a leading force in the 5G industry as well as Industry 4.0, as prescribed by China's national strategic plan, Made in China 2025, and its China Digital Transformation Strategies program. It would also hinder China's goal to become a strong and modern socialist state in 2049, following the realization of its socialist modernization mission by 2035.
For this reason, South Korea as a major manufacturing force in high-tech industries is vital enough to impact the outcomes of China's socialist modernization narratives. Against this background, Beijing cannot afford to subject Seoul to punitive measures just to keep it from veering off to IPEF, as it did with THAAD in 2016. On the contrary, IPEF now presents China with a new strategic dilemma. If it adopts retaliatory measures, it will only transpire to expose the vulnerabilities of China's high-tech industry and sustainable economic capabilities.
If sanctions are used as a measure to avert such consequences, they will give rise to leverage for Korea. Since it is China that is in a dilemma, Korea must get rid of its obsession with China's possible retaliation and proactively pursue its strategic interests in alliance with the U.S. Korea now is in good hands with the U.S. and other "like-minded states" to maximize its interests.
Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and the director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He is a former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.
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Korea in recent years has built the habit of considering China first before doing anything including in its national interests. What the country learned from the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery here and China's ensuing economic retaliation has taken a toll on the Korean people including decision-makers.
The Korean public's apprehension indeed proved to be well-founded as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi filed a complaint during a virtual meeting with his Korean counterpart later that evening. Wang expressed his opposition by emphasizing the IPEF's negative tendency to decouple and cut off supply chains with his country. He basically demanded that Korea maintain the stability and smooth operation of global industry and supply chains by reconsidering the president's decision to join the IPEF.
Wang later elaborated on China's opposition to the IPEF the day before its official launch. While casting strong skepticism on the prospective success of the framework, he was also highly critical of its inherent intent and purposes. He criticized it as an American attempt to create regional division and confrontation instead of cooperation. He also called on the United States to refrain from politicizing regional economic cooperation and warned that any future regional framework excluding China would be abandoned by "the times."
China's strong opposition sheds light on a new perspective with respect to Korea's rising geo-economic value. Koreans must realize this change in its strategic value to China and take advantage by emancipating themselves from their perpetual fear of China. It has already become apparent that it is more the case that China fears losing Korea, than Korea worries about China's punitive actions for joining current efforts by America, such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and its subset, the IPEF.
Beijing's concerns were made explicit just before Korea's presidential election in March. On two different occasions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media mouthpiece The Global Times employed editorials to convey warning messages to all of Korea's presidential candidates as well as to the president-elect. Such an endeavor is unheard of and unprecedented in past South Korean presidential elections.
On March 9, the day before the election, in the editorial, "China-South Korea ties must move forward not backward," it wanted the presidential candidates to realize the true intent behind America's Indo-Pacific Strategy. Claiming that the United States is either pressing or luring South Korea with a promise of interests to take sides with it against China, it said that the U.S.' intent is delusional. Acting as a good Samaritan, Beijing preached to Seoul about the consequences of falling into Washington's trap. It would mean Seoul falling into the frontline of a geopolitical competition in Northeast Asia. A strategic dichotomy ― as in "pro-China" or "pro-U.S." ― will not serve Seoul's strategic interests, the editorial insisted.
On the day after the election, another editorial was issued, with another "benign" warning message to then-President-elect Yoon. Recognizant of the president's foreign policy priority of rebuilding the alliance with the U.S., China took its anxiety to another level. While confessing that it understands South Korea's interest in the alliance, the CCP's mouthpiece cautioned that "Beijing-Seoul relations should not be seen as an appendix of Washington-Seoul relations."
Furthermore, it also cautioned on the issue of misinterpretation and misjudgment and that China will respect Korea when the latter has a good relationship with the U.S. ― a prevailing belief in Korean society. In the end, the gist of the message was to warn Seoul not to gamble between Washington and Beijing.
China's anxiety reflects its apprehension of Korea's strategic values potentially presenting a threat to its economic interests. In other words, it cannot afford to lose Korea in its supply chains. A disruption in Korea's supply of semiconductors, for instance, would be detrimental to China's aspiration to become a leading force in the 5G industry as well as Industry 4.0, as prescribed by China's national strategic plan, Made in China 2025, and its China Digital Transformation Strategies program. It would also hinder China's goal to become a strong and modern socialist state in 2049, following the realization of its socialist modernization mission by 2035.
For this reason, South Korea as a major manufacturing force in high-tech industries is vital enough to impact the outcomes of China's socialist modernization narratives. Against this background, Beijing cannot afford to subject Seoul to punitive measures just to keep it from veering off to IPEF, as it did with THAAD in 2016. On the contrary, IPEF now presents China with a new strategic dilemma. If it adopts retaliatory measures, it will only transpire to expose the vulnerabilities of China's high-tech industry and sustainable economic capabilities.
If sanctions are used as a measure to avert such consequences, they will give rise to leverage for Korea. Since it is China that is in a dilemma, Korea must get rid of its obsession with China's possible retaliation and proactively pursue its strategic interests in alliance with the U.S. Korea now is in good hands with the U.S. and other "like-minded states" to maximize its interests.
Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and the director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He is a former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.
