Pyongyang’s Talking Points

By Tong Kim

As Ambassador Stephen Bosworth is preparing to leave for Pyongyang on Dec. 8, there are questions surrounding the possible outcome of his visit.

There is no great expectation of a breakthrough. And it would be unlikely that Bosworth will reveal any surprises to the North Koreans.

The Obama administration has stated in unequivocal terms and on so many occasions: (1) it will not recognize the North as a state with nuclear weapon, (2) it will stick to the six-party frame within which bilateral talks are possible and (3) it will seek a ``decisive and comprehensive" resolution in order to achieve a ``complete and verifiable" denuclearization.

In his first bilateral meeting with the North Koreans, Bosworth will probably first define the nature and the purpose of his visit. He will then brief the North Koreans regarding the U.S. positions on the issues of interest to them. Bosworth will be likely to expound on why Washington believes that the six-party process is still the best way forward towards denuclearization, why Washington is seeking North Korea's denuclearization and how Washington will help the North if it cooperates.

If the North Koreans comply with their normal practice, the U.S. Representative on North Korean policy would be scheduled to meet with Pyongyang's chief nuclear negotiator Kim Gye-gwan. Kim will listen carefully to what his visitor will have to say, before he will make some responses or ask specific questions. Kim will make a full report to his boss Kang Suk-ju, first vice foreign minister, concerning Bosworth's initial presentation.

It is possible Bosworth would meet with Kim twice before he meets with Kang. On the sidelines, Bosworth will likely meet with the DPRK's foreign minister Park Ui-chun, who is out of the loop in decision-making, just like the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Young-nam, who is the nominal head of state for North Korea.

Both Park and Kim Young-nam are likely to talk about Pyongyang's diplomatic policy of ``seeking good relations with non-hostile nations." They may cite Chairman Kim Jong-il, who said, ``The United States is not a sworn enemy of the DPRK" more than a decade ago and said recently, ``The hostile relations between the DPRK and the United States should be converted into peaceful ties through bilateral talks without fail."

In the meantime, Kang may consult with a few key members of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and the Worker's Party ― possibly including Lt. General Kim Young-chul, NDC policy staff chief, and Kim Yang-gun, party department chief for international liaison, who has been getting more involved in the nuclear issue as well as inter-Korean relations.

Based on these consultations and recommendations from his subordinates in the foreign ministry, Kang will develop a set of talking points that he will use for his meeting with U.S. special envoy Bosworth. Kang will certainly have Kim Jong-il's blessing. If Kang likes what he hears from Bosworth, he may even recommend that the North Korean leader meet with the U.S. envoy. This possibility is low.

Bosworth will be interested in ascertaining North Korean intentions and to persuade the North to return to multilateral negotiations. However, it is not impossible that the DPRK leader, well known for surprising, dramatic action, may opt to meet the U.S. envoy to convey his personal message to President Obama. Such a chance will be increased if Ambassador Bosworth carries a presidential letter.

In any case, Kang's talking points are likely to proceed along the following lines:

``We welcome Ambassador Bosworth, who is visiting our country in the capacity of a presidential envoy. We appreciate this opportunity to listen to you regarding the Obama administration's policy toward our Republic. We hope our frank and candid exchange of views will help mutual understanding towards eventual resolution of the pending issues lying between us. This meeting is very important as our great general (the dear leader) has said we will decide whether to have multilateral meetings, including the six-party talks, depending on the outcome of bilateral talks."

Or, "I have received a full report on your discussions with Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan. Now I fully understand your position, which has not fundamentally transformed. I appreciate your explanation that will help us decide what we should and can do to find a real breakthrough to the confrontational deadlock of negotiations, without jeopardizing our sovereignty and our security.

"It is not the first time for us to hear from your side that if we give up our nuclear weapons, then, and only then, you will move toward establishing diplomatic relations, and providing economic assistance to us. Our position on the issues of nuclear weapons has been crystal-clear: Our nuclear weapons are the product of hostile U.S. policy. We were forced to have access to nuclear deterrents because of the U.S. policy designed to stifle us ― through means of isolation and sanctions ― and because of the U.S. preemptive strategy that targets Korea for its first nuclear strike.

"We have tried hard to address U.S. concerns over our nuclear program. You should remember that the United States first brought in nuclear weapons to South Korea. You threatened to use nuclear weapons on our land during the Korean War. Since then you have constantly threatened us with nuclear weapons.

"We kept our commitment under the 1994 Agreed Framework until the Bush administration abolished it. Yet, we again worked with you in the six-party talks to the point of disabling most of our nuclear facilities. We dismantled the cooling tower of the Yongbyon reactor. We turned over 8,000 pages of information to your side regarding the operation of the nuclear facilities as part of a verification agreement. Yet, the United States wrecked the process of completing the phase two of the Feb. 13 agreement.

"At the outset of the Obama administration we hoped that President Obama would honor his campaign pledge that he would meet with our leader to resolve the differences. Unfortunately, when we launched a satellite rocket, complying with normal international procedures, the United States and others collaborated to adopt a UNSC presidential statement condemning our rocket launch. Otherwise, we would not have conducted our second nuclear test.

"If the United States can assure that 'respect for sovereignty and equality' will be restored among the participants in the six-party talks, if the unjust and unfair UN sanctions are removed and if the United States shows seriousness to end its hostile policy toward our country, we would consider returning to the multilateral talks

"A promise of normalization or any offer of abstract economic benefits would not interest us as an incentive. One concrete way to build mutual trust to get rid of the danger of war would be to conclude a peace agreement. We should end the war in Korea and replace the dead provisions of the Armistice Agreement with a durable peace regime.

"The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the behest of the great leader Kim Il-sung. Our goal of denuclearization remains unchanged. We are ready for negotiation or continued confrontation. It's up to the United States, whichever path it wants to take."

As we can see, Bosworth's visit will be a renewed starting point, which should not be a surprise. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.

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