By Lee Seong-hyon
The world hasn't resolved the conundrum of why Kim Jong-un came out from his cave to declare a willingness for denuclearization after menacingly developing and improving his country's nuclear capability for years after he took power in late 2011.
Discussions in Seoul so far have centered around three views in terms of affirming the interpretation that Kim is serious about trading his nuclear weapons for the North's economy and diplomatic recognition.
First is a historical view. North Korea has devised its own strategy for achieving the so-called "survival and development in the 21st century" in accordance with the rapidly changing international environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This view is espoused by my colleague, Dr. Paik Hak-soon, who has been analyzing North Korea for more than 30 years.
In particular, as China's influence has over the years expanded in the region, North Korea also wanted to preserve and strengthen its independence with a "balancing strategy" by pulling the U.S. into nuclear geopolitics and using Washington as a countering force against Beijing. North Korea has also wanted to improve relations with the U.S. to speed-dial economic development by opening up to the outside world and seek economic cooperation with the international community.
Under such a strategy, Kim Yong-sun, North Korea's director for international affairs of the Workers' Party, held a high-level meeting with the U.S. Department of State's undersecretary for political affairs Arnold Kantor in January 1992 in New York. Kim at that time expressed a desire to sign a peace treaty, and normalize relations, thereby achieving peaceful coexistence between North Korea and the U.S.
Such a North Korean policy goal has never changed. It is still the case today, according to this view. That means North Korea cannot give up on its efforts to "improve its relationship with the U.S." as a primary diplomatic mandate, given Pyongyang's geopolitical and strategic necessity.
Trump happens to be the first U.S. president who is willing to sit down with North Korea bilaterally in their 25 years of nuclear negotiations. Kim Jong-un therefore is willing to abandon his nuclear weapons through a grand bargain with Trump in exchange for the U.S.'s dropping its hostile policy toward North Korea, conclude a peace treaty, and denuclearize the entire Korean Peninsula (the non-nuclear weaponization of the Korean Peninsula).
In other words, Kim's charm offensive toward the U.S. can be interpreted in congruence with North Korea's decades-long goal that would try to ensure both its security and economic development, a policy that it has continually pursued since the collapse of the Soviet Union. North Korea's declaration that it has mastered a credible nuclear deterrence against the U.S. can be seen as a "conduit" to induce Washington to sit down at the negotiation table.
Second is the "nukes versus economy" paradox. Kim desires to improve his country's economy. The problem is that unless he denuclearizes, he cannot do so due to sanctions. Pompeo said that Washington will agree to lift sanctions on North Korea if the country agrees to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program, a move that would create economic prosperity that "will rival" South Korea. As a rational choice, Kim can opt for denuclearization if it is more "lucrative" than going nuclear.
The third has to do with Kim's young age. Kim is 34. He wants to be around for the next 50 years or more, if he can. It's quite likely that he wants to rule the country for that period as well. However, he doesn't want to rule an impoverished nuclear country for the next 50 years. That will be just a continuation of what North Korea is today with a hobbled economy.
These three narratives are not mutually exclusive. The 12 hours of the inter-Korean summit at Panmunjeom, televised worldwide, was a moment of "rediscovering" the North Korean leader. From the common perception of thinking of him as an abnormal leader in an abnormal country, his behavior and words were too shocking, if not unexpected. Many observers were not equipped with the necessary information and conceptual acceleration, which would necessitate them to change their pre-existing frame of analysis. Thus, they concluded, Kim was playing.
However, remarks from those who met Kim personally, including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, establish some grounds to the proposition that North Korea under Kim III may be different, this time. Pompeo said the U.S. has an "unprecedented opportunity" to change the historical course of the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps Pompeo saw something.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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Discussions in Seoul so far have centered around three views in terms of affirming the interpretation that Kim is serious about trading his nuclear weapons for the North's economy and diplomatic recognition.
First is a historical view. North Korea has devised its own strategy for achieving the so-called "survival and development in the 21st century" in accordance with the rapidly changing international environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This view is espoused by my colleague, Dr. Paik Hak-soon, who has been analyzing North Korea for more than 30 years.
In particular, as China's influence has over the years expanded in the region, North Korea also wanted to preserve and strengthen its independence with a "balancing strategy" by pulling the U.S. into nuclear geopolitics and using Washington as a countering force against Beijing. North Korea has also wanted to improve relations with the U.S. to speed-dial economic development by opening up to the outside world and seek economic cooperation with the international community.
Under such a strategy, Kim Yong-sun, North Korea's director for international affairs of the Workers' Party, held a high-level meeting with the U.S. Department of State's undersecretary for political affairs Arnold Kantor in January 1992 in New York. Kim at that time expressed a desire to sign a peace treaty, and normalize relations, thereby achieving peaceful coexistence between North Korea and the U.S.
Such a North Korean policy goal has never changed. It is still the case today, according to this view. That means North Korea cannot give up on its efforts to "improve its relationship with the U.S." as a primary diplomatic mandate, given Pyongyang's geopolitical and strategic necessity.
Trump happens to be the first U.S. president who is willing to sit down with North Korea bilaterally in their 25 years of nuclear negotiations. Kim Jong-un therefore is willing to abandon his nuclear weapons through a grand bargain with Trump in exchange for the U.S.'s dropping its hostile policy toward North Korea, conclude a peace treaty, and denuclearize the entire Korean Peninsula (the non-nuclear weaponization of the Korean Peninsula).
In other words, Kim's charm offensive toward the U.S. can be interpreted in congruence with North Korea's decades-long goal that would try to ensure both its security and economic development, a policy that it has continually pursued since the collapse of the Soviet Union. North Korea's declaration that it has mastered a credible nuclear deterrence against the U.S. can be seen as a "conduit" to induce Washington to sit down at the negotiation table.
Second is the "nukes versus economy" paradox. Kim desires to improve his country's economy. The problem is that unless he denuclearizes, he cannot do so due to sanctions. Pompeo said that Washington will agree to lift sanctions on North Korea if the country agrees to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program, a move that would create economic prosperity that "will rival" South Korea. As a rational choice, Kim can opt for denuclearization if it is more "lucrative" than going nuclear.
The third has to do with Kim's young age. Kim is 34. He wants to be around for the next 50 years or more, if he can. It's quite likely that he wants to rule the country for that period as well. However, he doesn't want to rule an impoverished nuclear country for the next 50 years. That will be just a continuation of what North Korea is today with a hobbled economy.
These three narratives are not mutually exclusive. The 12 hours of the inter-Korean summit at Panmunjeom, televised worldwide, was a moment of "rediscovering" the North Korean leader. From the common perception of thinking of him as an abnormal leader in an abnormal country, his behavior and words were too shocking, if not unexpected. Many observers were not equipped with the necessary information and conceptual acceleration, which would necessitate them to change their pre-existing frame of analysis. Thus, they concluded, Kim was playing.
However, remarks from those who met Kim personally, including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, establish some grounds to the proposition that North Korea under Kim III may be different, this time. Pompeo said the U.S. has an "unprecedented opportunity" to change the historical course of the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps Pompeo saw something.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.
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