Did US know of martial law plan?

By Oh Young-jin

Disclosed documents prepared by the military for a takeover of the government bring up shameful memories of coups and dictatorships, and disconcert the nation's collective mind.

The Defense Security Command (DSC), which authored a summary and detailed action plan, was headed by Chun Doo-hwan, who staged a coup and brutally suppressed popular protests to rise to power in 1980 after the assassination of Park Chung-hee, also a general-turned president.

But the documents fall short of being a smoking gun to prove then Defense Minister Han Min-koo and top DSC officers had the intent to push for a takeover.

Rather some argue that Han, who is said to have ordered the plan be drawn up, did his duty to stop the nation from spiraling into chaos. In March when Han ordered it, it was ahead of the Constitutional Court's ruling on Park Geun-hye's impeachment.

Weeks of popular candlelit protests involving a million at a time had forced the passage of a bill to fire Park in December and it was feared that those massive protests would be repeated, if the court reinstated Park.

Of course, the current government sees these protests as direct form of anti-democracy and considers the DSC plan nothing less than a coup conspiracy.

Thus, the likelihood is that the two sides will get entangled in an unending series of arguments and counterarguments and end up without a conclusion.

This stalemate may be prevented, if it is confirmed whether Minister Han, who is now barred from traveling overseas on suspicions of conspiracy in a coup, had shared the content of the document with the U.S. military.

The so-called action plan called for the large movement of troops. For instance, the "Martial Law Command" would use six mechanized divisions; two tank regiments and six Special Forces regiments, among others.

The Army's 30th and 20th Divisions and Ninth Special Forces Regiment would be deployed in downtown Seoul to guard Cheong Wa Dae, the Government Complex and defense ministry buildings.

More specifically, the 8th Division on border ne duty would be moved to rear areas in Chungcheong Province; the 26th in Yangju, Gyeonggi Province, would be moved to the Jeolla region and the Capital Mechanized Infantry Division in Gapyeong to the Gyeongsang provinces.

These movements would weaken the nation's defense posture against the North so it would be a top priority for the military to let the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) know of a contingency and cover its back just in case. Of course, the Korean military has taken over the peacetime control of its troops so there is no obligation for it to notify the USFK of troop movements ahead of and during the implementation of martial law.

But the USFK would be the first to know of such movements and could get in the way, jeopardizing the implementation of martial law.

More than anything, it would be natural for Minister Han and DSC officers to obtain the U.S. understanding that martial law was inevitable to stop chaos and restore order.

Han has worked with USFK and top brass in the U.S. military as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as defense chief.

For the ROK military, gaining U.S. support for its intervention in civilian affairs has been all but an unwritten rule because of the two countries' long alliance. The U.S. military presence here and by extension Washington were one way or another involved as shown in the case of Chun and Park.

Even in the manual is a reference to an "invitation" to the U.S ambassador to Korea to explain the military move.

At the time of its making last March, there was no U.S. ambassador after the departure of Mark Lippert. Marc Knapper, Lippert's deputy, was acting ambassador.

Current USFK commander Gen. Vincent Brooks held that post then.

Would the two U.S. officials disclose what happened then?

If they do, it would save Korea a great deal of effort in its endeavor to get to the bottom of a case that could have been a preliminary coup or the military's duty to defend the nation in crisis, depending on who is asked.

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