By Park Jeong-jae
The maritime arms race in Northeast Asia, especially between South Korea, China and Japan, is regarded to be at a serious level. The four neighboring powers, especially the U.S., have greatly contributed to this military competition.
The following are considered the major reasons for this.
First, the U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. held two summits and working-level talks over North Korea's denuclearization but could not come up with a solution. The biggest cause is that the U.S. and North Korea have different aims. And North Korea's denuclearization is already mired in mystery.
North Korea desires complete regime stability and economic reward in return for denuclearization. On the other hand, the U.S. is willing a political strategy. In a way, the U.S. may not necessarily want denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It may be preferable to remain as it is. China seems to have a similar perspective.
The U.S. and North Korea have not budged from their positions. On December 4, U.S. President Donald Trump indirectly implied an attack on North Korea. Such an atmosphere only makes neighboring countries insecure and they have no choice but to come up with self-rescue plans, which is to build up their military.
Washington's demand for South Korea to pay more for U.S. forces stationed there, its pressure on Seoul to extend an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, and even considering the withdrawal of U.S. troops further boosted distrust of the U.S. This lifted South Korea's need for a stronger military. Some are even raising South Korea's nuclear armament.
Second, the U.S. policy on China. Since 2009, China's rapid naval buildup has led the U.S. to continue its "freedom of navigation" operation in the South China Sea. Of course, China is not taking any particular action, because it does not want to cause armed conflict in the region. Next, the U.S. has suggested an Indo-Pacific Strategy in response to China's One Belt One Road Initiative, as well as having a trade dispute with China. Furthermore, after the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) on August 2, rumors of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Asia are fueling the arms race.
Third, Japan's military normalization. Japan is pushing to amend its "pacifist Constitution" that bans armed forces with war potential. For Japan, it won't be easy to overcome the memory of the Sino-Japanese war, therefore, it will not be patient with China's naval buildup. In a similar context, the U.S. also will not only watch China's naval expansion, it will either condone or help Japan build its naval forces.
Fourth, North Korea's nuclearization. North Korea's nuclear armament could invite nuclear armament in Northeast Asia. China already has nuclear weapons. South Korea cannot ignore the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella becomes unclear, while Japan can produce nuclear weapons if it wants to. In this circumstance, the whole of Northeast Asia will inevitably become nuclear armed.
Northeast Asia, under these conditions, should seek any window of opportunity to smoothly overcome the arms escalation. We can think of South Korea-China military cooperation in this regard. But South Korea and China have been in a virtual lull since South Korea's deployment of a U.S. missile defense system (THAAD) in 2017.
While South Korea understands that the conflict over this deployment has been resolved to some extent as President Moon Jae-in has promised the "3 Nos Policy" ― not to join the U.S. missile defense system, to ban additional THAAD deployment and to pursue a military alliance between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan ― China still considers it difficult to completely seal the wound, since THAAD is still deployed in Korea.
For any defense cooperation between South Korea and China, the THAAD system should be removed and other weapons systems that correspond to THAAD should be introduced. We may consider the ongoing deployment of a high-altitude response system deployed on the Aegis combat system in Korea. However, it is technically not easy because a means should be provided to protect the U.S. Forces Korea from any threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons.
Military cooperation between countries is relatively realizable if there are common threats. However, South Korea and China do not belong to this case. Under these circumstances, the two countries could start from very basic military cooperation, such as the prevention of accidental clashes on the seas and in the air, search and rescue drills and prevention operations for large-scale disasters.
The two countries also might think of conducting mutual visits by defense ministers, working-level policy meetings, or any other low-level exchanges, for instance, student exchanges at the National Defense University, installation of direct military telephone lines and visits to the two countries' vessels.
Park Jeong-jae is the Senior Researcher Fellow at the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation.
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| Park Jeong-jae |
The following are considered the major reasons for this.
First, the U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. held two summits and working-level talks over North Korea's denuclearization but could not come up with a solution. The biggest cause is that the U.S. and North Korea have different aims. And North Korea's denuclearization is already mired in mystery.
North Korea desires complete regime stability and economic reward in return for denuclearization. On the other hand, the U.S. is willing a political strategy. In a way, the U.S. may not necessarily want denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It may be preferable to remain as it is. China seems to have a similar perspective.
The U.S. and North Korea have not budged from their positions. On December 4, U.S. President Donald Trump indirectly implied an attack on North Korea. Such an atmosphere only makes neighboring countries insecure and they have no choice but to come up with self-rescue plans, which is to build up their military.
Washington's demand for South Korea to pay more for U.S. forces stationed there, its pressure on Seoul to extend an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, and even considering the withdrawal of U.S. troops further boosted distrust of the U.S. This lifted South Korea's need for a stronger military. Some are even raising South Korea's nuclear armament.
Second, the U.S. policy on China. Since 2009, China's rapid naval buildup has led the U.S. to continue its "freedom of navigation" operation in the South China Sea. Of course, China is not taking any particular action, because it does not want to cause armed conflict in the region. Next, the U.S. has suggested an Indo-Pacific Strategy in response to China's One Belt One Road Initiative, as well as having a trade dispute with China. Furthermore, after the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) on August 2, rumors of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Asia are fueling the arms race.
Third, Japan's military normalization. Japan is pushing to amend its "pacifist Constitution" that bans armed forces with war potential. For Japan, it won't be easy to overcome the memory of the Sino-Japanese war, therefore, it will not be patient with China's naval buildup. In a similar context, the U.S. also will not only watch China's naval expansion, it will either condone or help Japan build its naval forces.
Fourth, North Korea's nuclearization. North Korea's nuclear armament could invite nuclear armament in Northeast Asia. China already has nuclear weapons. South Korea cannot ignore the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella becomes unclear, while Japan can produce nuclear weapons if it wants to. In this circumstance, the whole of Northeast Asia will inevitably become nuclear armed.
Northeast Asia, under these conditions, should seek any window of opportunity to smoothly overcome the arms escalation. We can think of South Korea-China military cooperation in this regard. But South Korea and China have been in a virtual lull since South Korea's deployment of a U.S. missile defense system (THAAD) in 2017.
While South Korea understands that the conflict over this deployment has been resolved to some extent as President Moon Jae-in has promised the "3 Nos Policy" ― not to join the U.S. missile defense system, to ban additional THAAD deployment and to pursue a military alliance between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan ― China still considers it difficult to completely seal the wound, since THAAD is still deployed in Korea.
For any defense cooperation between South Korea and China, the THAAD system should be removed and other weapons systems that correspond to THAAD should be introduced. We may consider the ongoing deployment of a high-altitude response system deployed on the Aegis combat system in Korea. However, it is technically not easy because a means should be provided to protect the U.S. Forces Korea from any threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons.
Military cooperation between countries is relatively realizable if there are common threats. However, South Korea and China do not belong to this case. Under these circumstances, the two countries could start from very basic military cooperation, such as the prevention of accidental clashes on the seas and in the air, search and rescue drills and prevention operations for large-scale disasters.
The two countries also might think of conducting mutual visits by defense ministers, working-level policy meetings, or any other low-level exchanges, for instance, student exchanges at the National Defense University, installation of direct military telephone lines and visits to the two countries' vessels.
Park Jeong-jae is the Senior Researcher Fellow at the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation.
