By Lee Seong-hyon
There are only a handful people in the world who have personally sat down with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and discussed nuclear weapons for hours. There are even fewer people who can talk about it publicly. Even if they do, they tend to refrain from going into detail.
So, it was a rare moment to watch the newly minted Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong's confirmation hearing at the National Assembly last month, as he was grilled by lawmakers.
Chung, as President Moon Jae-in's former National Security Office director, was the one who sat down with Kim in Pyongyang in March 2018 to probe Kim's intentions regarding nuclear weapons. Chung then flew to Washington to brief Trump.
In an extraordinary move, Trump accepted Kim's proposal, conveyed by Chung, for a summit meeting and let Chung, a Korean official, announce the stunning news at the White House. "President Trump would meet Kim Jong-un," Chung announced to the press, standing at the entrance to the Oval Office.
At the hearing, Chung was under oath and on the record. Understandably, lawmakers took full advantage of the opportunity to have Chung let the cat out to the bag, regarding his encounters with Kim and especially what Kim' comments regarding nukes.
Chung's inquisitors were seasoned experts on North Korea too. For example, Rep. Cho Tae-yong of the main opposition People Power Party served as vice foreign minister and deputy national security adviser under the previous President Park Geun-hye administration. He now sits on the Intelligence Committee as well as the Foreign Affairs Committee.
"Did Chairman Kim Jong-un say that he was willing to denuclearize?" Cho asked.
"That's right," Chung answered.
"I'll ask you again," Cho pressed upon Chung. "You said you had a four-hour conversation with Chairman Kim. Did Kim say he would give up or dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, if conditions were met?"
"That's right."
"Did Kim use the specific word 'give up' or 'dismantle'?"
"Kim said if the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is fully guaranteed, there is no need to possess a nuclear program."
"So, you're saying that Kim said he's going to 'give up' or 'dismantle' nuclear weapons?"
"That's right. He also made the same point during the Sept. 19 agreement too." Chung was referring to the summit meeting between Kim and Moon in Pyongyang in 2018.
"Then, Kim surely said he will denuclearize and give up nuclear weapons. But today that is not happening. On the contrary, the number of nuclear weapons [of North Korea] has increased. Did Kim Jong-un lie then?"
"He didn't lie," Chung answered. "The negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. broke down."
The devil is always in details. But the key point argued by Chung, now fully confirmed as foreign minister, is that Kim didn't shift his stance on denuclearization. Rather, the two parties in the negotiation didn't reach an agreement and therefore the negotiation didn't bear fruit.
Due to space limits, I am reproducing Chung's partial answers at the National Assembly here, because they don't seem to have been translated into English yet, despite their research value for foreign academics. In fact, South Korea produces more information and news on North Korea than any other country in the world, but often some important research-worthy materials remain inaccessible to foreign researchers who don't speak Korean. This is problematic.
Despite today's rich academic and policy community interest in North Korea, due to language barriers, many foreign academic researchers turn to media reports that inevitably reduce the complex discourse into a couple of sound bites. As a result, their academic products, understandably with quotes from the media, miss subtleties and nuances. Sometimes it unfortunately produces misunderstandings.
The "asymmetry" of information due to the language barrier has been a perennial problem in the field. Worse, let's admit that the Korean language is a witch; it is pregnant with rich ambiguity and vagueness. A wrong inference could yield a wrong understanding.
Even I, a native Korean speaker, am not quite sure from the above National Assembly hearing whether North Korean leader Kim really did utter 'give up' or 'dismantle' regarding nuclear weapons.
To remedy the situation, the government could either offer more language services or language training to foreign journalists and academics. The purpose is not to induce government-favored views, but promote accurate understanding on the important yet so often polarizing subject.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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So, it was a rare moment to watch the newly minted Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong's confirmation hearing at the National Assembly last month, as he was grilled by lawmakers.
Chung, as President Moon Jae-in's former National Security Office director, was the one who sat down with Kim in Pyongyang in March 2018 to probe Kim's intentions regarding nuclear weapons. Chung then flew to Washington to brief Trump.
In an extraordinary move, Trump accepted Kim's proposal, conveyed by Chung, for a summit meeting and let Chung, a Korean official, announce the stunning news at the White House. "President Trump would meet Kim Jong-un," Chung announced to the press, standing at the entrance to the Oval Office.
At the hearing, Chung was under oath and on the record. Understandably, lawmakers took full advantage of the opportunity to have Chung let the cat out to the bag, regarding his encounters with Kim and especially what Kim' comments regarding nukes.
Chung's inquisitors were seasoned experts on North Korea too. For example, Rep. Cho Tae-yong of the main opposition People Power Party served as vice foreign minister and deputy national security adviser under the previous President Park Geun-hye administration. He now sits on the Intelligence Committee as well as the Foreign Affairs Committee.
"Did Chairman Kim Jong-un say that he was willing to denuclearize?" Cho asked.
"That's right," Chung answered.
"I'll ask you again," Cho pressed upon Chung. "You said you had a four-hour conversation with Chairman Kim. Did Kim say he would give up or dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, if conditions were met?"
"That's right."
"Did Kim use the specific word 'give up' or 'dismantle'?"
"Kim said if the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is fully guaranteed, there is no need to possess a nuclear program."
"So, you're saying that Kim said he's going to 'give up' or 'dismantle' nuclear weapons?"
"That's right. He also made the same point during the Sept. 19 agreement too." Chung was referring to the summit meeting between Kim and Moon in Pyongyang in 2018.
"Then, Kim surely said he will denuclearize and give up nuclear weapons. But today that is not happening. On the contrary, the number of nuclear weapons [of North Korea] has increased. Did Kim Jong-un lie then?"
"He didn't lie," Chung answered. "The negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. broke down."
The devil is always in details. But the key point argued by Chung, now fully confirmed as foreign minister, is that Kim didn't shift his stance on denuclearization. Rather, the two parties in the negotiation didn't reach an agreement and therefore the negotiation didn't bear fruit.
Due to space limits, I am reproducing Chung's partial answers at the National Assembly here, because they don't seem to have been translated into English yet, despite their research value for foreign academics. In fact, South Korea produces more information and news on North Korea than any other country in the world, but often some important research-worthy materials remain inaccessible to foreign researchers who don't speak Korean. This is problematic.
Despite today's rich academic and policy community interest in North Korea, due to language barriers, many foreign academic researchers turn to media reports that inevitably reduce the complex discourse into a couple of sound bites. As a result, their academic products, understandably with quotes from the media, miss subtleties and nuances. Sometimes it unfortunately produces misunderstandings.
The "asymmetry" of information due to the language barrier has been a perennial problem in the field. Worse, let's admit that the Korean language is a witch; it is pregnant with rich ambiguity and vagueness. A wrong inference could yield a wrong understanding.
Even I, a native Korean speaker, am not quite sure from the above National Assembly hearing whether North Korean leader Kim really did utter 'give up' or 'dismantle' regarding nuclear weapons.
To remedy the situation, the government could either offer more language services or language training to foreign journalists and academics. The purpose is not to induce government-favored views, but promote accurate understanding on the important yet so often polarizing subject.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.