By Oh Young-jin
To tweak Mao Zedong's phrase, few would disagree that the United States is comparable to lips that protect teeth ― South Korea.
The ROK-U.S. alliance was forged in blood when Americans came to the South's rescue when North Korea, backed by China and the former Soviet Union, invaded the South in the 1950-53 Korean War. The alliance has worked well so far, enabling Seoul to outgrow Pyongyang many times economically and forcing the reclusive dynasty to count down to its last gasps, or so it was thought.
The North has come up with its trump card (which may turn out to be a death warrant) by leapfrogging in its pursuit of missiles and nuclear weapons. The North's Sept. 4 nuclear blast was a hydrogen bomb test and the Aug. 29 missile launch that crossed Japan was apparently an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), according to experts. To put two and two together, it could mean that Pyongyang will have a nuclear-tipped ICBM within its grasp within a year or so, overcoming the last barriers ― technologies for re-entry and miniaturization.
For Korea, which doesn't have nuclear arms of its own, the U.S. is needed ever more. Assuring is the world's only superpower's show of force by its strategic assets such as B1B flyovers, the dispatch of aircraft carriers, joint exercises and, of course, guarantees of a "nuclear umbrella" or extended deterrence through threats of in-kind retribution when it is attacked with nuclear weapons.
In other words, living without U.S. protection is unthinkable for Seoul.
Just the talk of a U.S. pullout could shake the Korean economy upside down, sending foreign investors packing and leaving.
So if there would be a separation between the two, it would be the U.S. that has a change of heart.
There have been distinct signs that this is happening.
First, Henry Kissinger, a U.S. guru of diplomacy serving as secretary of state and national security adviser in the Nixon and Ford administrations, is a strong advocate for that. Typical of big power politics, wrapped in the trappings of realpolitik, the Nobel Peace Prize winner suggests that the U.S. should deal directly with China to resolve the North Korean crisis.
He suggests that the U.S. address China's biggest concern ― Korean unification led by Seoul that sees American GIs and their Korean allies breathing down its neck with the buffer of the North gone. Kissinger's solution is pulling out U.S. troops out of the Korean Peninsula.
Second, why is the Kissinger formula noteworthy? The answer lies in Steve Bannon, a mentor to U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently was fired as chief strategist. He was right on the money when he referred to the U.S. withdrawal from the South to settle the North Korean crisis, although he dismissed it as a remote possibility.
The real "meaty" part in his swansong interview with the American Spectator is his admitted obsession with China, especially how to keep the rising power at bay in the ongoing Thucydides contest. The Bannon thinking reveals that the top U.S. priority is not with peace on the Korean Peninsula or protection of its friend, South Korea, but encircling China, slowing its growth and staying ahead if it is not possible to beat it outright.
That U.S. Asian policy is anchored in Japan. The bromance between Trump and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has more to do with that policy than their personal rapport.
History is a usual manual.
In January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from the U.S. last line of defense, which turned out to be an invitation for the communist North to stage a war of conquest six months later. The U.S. involvement in the ensuing war and afterward should be seen as a byproduct of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviets. It was a contest for hegemony then as it is now between U.S and China. The North is one of the flashpoints along the two superpowers' game of thrones.
Here is a final pitch.
Throw in Trump's commercialism and the picture could get clearer.
First, he has denied the existing alliances such as North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO). And the ROK-U.S. alliance is no exception. Proof is plenty. He demanded Seoul pay for the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery despite the U.S. promise to pay for it. The billions in losses Seoul is sustaining because of Beijing's retaliatory actions are of no concern to the U.S.
Then, Trump would be the first to boast through tweets of "conceptual approval" or fast track treatment of U.S. weapons sales to Korea as the North has raised tensions. Then, he also talked about allowing the South and Japan to develop their nuclear weapons. There is no telling how realistic his tweets are but that doesn't matter. Trump is a commercial transactional man who happens to lead a transactional nation.
Seoul should be prepared for three contingencies ― a total U.S. withdrawal, partial and maintenance of the status quo. The first scenario is comparable to the Paris peace accord struck by the U.S. and the communist Vietnamese, which led to the fall of Saigon as the U.S. troops were leaving. The examples for the second are Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. has drastically reduced its troops, which has seen an occasional surge. The third is the current situation.
Korea is neither Vietnam nor Iraq, with its economic might overwhelming that of the North. But for China's intervention, the South is well ahead of the North in sustainability when war ― God forbid ― breaks out. But war in the small theater like the peninsula would wreak horrific havoc so keeping peace is a top priority for us. Now is the time for us to ponder how best to make most of U.S. troops, their presence and even their departure, for a change. Let's do some wagging the dog.
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. Contact foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com.
Here are two what ifs in the event U.S. bargains its troops in the South away.
First it would amount to removing a dagger thrust upon the throat of a beast that is China and enabling it to breathe freely.
Second, Trump, a real developer mogul, couldn't recognize the strategic value of the property that is the South. It could mean a retreat of U.S. power.
.jpg/dims/resize/740/optimize) |
The ROK-U.S. alliance was forged in blood when Americans came to the South's rescue when North Korea, backed by China and the former Soviet Union, invaded the South in the 1950-53 Korean War. The alliance has worked well so far, enabling Seoul to outgrow Pyongyang many times economically and forcing the reclusive dynasty to count down to its last gasps, or so it was thought.
 |
| Henry Kissinger |
 |
| Steve Bannon |
For Korea, which doesn't have nuclear arms of its own, the U.S. is needed ever more. Assuring is the world's only superpower's show of force by its strategic assets such as B1B flyovers, the dispatch of aircraft carriers, joint exercises and, of course, guarantees of a "nuclear umbrella" or extended deterrence through threats of in-kind retribution when it is attacked with nuclear weapons.
In other words, living without U.S. protection is unthinkable for Seoul.
Just the talk of a U.S. pullout could shake the Korean economy upside down, sending foreign investors packing and leaving.
So if there would be a separation between the two, it would be the U.S. that has a change of heart.
There have been distinct signs that this is happening.
First, Henry Kissinger, a U.S. guru of diplomacy serving as secretary of state and national security adviser in the Nixon and Ford administrations, is a strong advocate for that. Typical of big power politics, wrapped in the trappings of realpolitik, the Nobel Peace Prize winner suggests that the U.S. should deal directly with China to resolve the North Korean crisis.
He suggests that the U.S. address China's biggest concern ― Korean unification led by Seoul that sees American GIs and their Korean allies breathing down its neck with the buffer of the North gone. Kissinger's solution is pulling out U.S. troops out of the Korean Peninsula.
Second, why is the Kissinger formula noteworthy? The answer lies in Steve Bannon, a mentor to U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently was fired as chief strategist. He was right on the money when he referred to the U.S. withdrawal from the South to settle the North Korean crisis, although he dismissed it as a remote possibility.
The real "meaty" part in his swansong interview with the American Spectator is his admitted obsession with China, especially how to keep the rising power at bay in the ongoing Thucydides contest. The Bannon thinking reveals that the top U.S. priority is not with peace on the Korean Peninsula or protection of its friend, South Korea, but encircling China, slowing its growth and staying ahead if it is not possible to beat it outright.
That U.S. Asian policy is anchored in Japan. The bromance between Trump and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has more to do with that policy than their personal rapport.
History is a usual manual.
In January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from the U.S. last line of defense, which turned out to be an invitation for the communist North to stage a war of conquest six months later. The U.S. involvement in the ensuing war and afterward should be seen as a byproduct of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviets. It was a contest for hegemony then as it is now between U.S and China. The North is one of the flashpoints along the two superpowers' game of thrones.
Here is a final pitch.
Throw in Trump's commercialism and the picture could get clearer.
First, he has denied the existing alliances such as North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO). And the ROK-U.S. alliance is no exception. Proof is plenty. He demanded Seoul pay for the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery despite the U.S. promise to pay for it. The billions in losses Seoul is sustaining because of Beijing's retaliatory actions are of no concern to the U.S.
Then, Trump would be the first to boast through tweets of "conceptual approval" or fast track treatment of U.S. weapons sales to Korea as the North has raised tensions. Then, he also talked about allowing the South and Japan to develop their nuclear weapons. There is no telling how realistic his tweets are but that doesn't matter. Trump is a commercial transactional man who happens to lead a transactional nation.
Seoul should be prepared for three contingencies ― a total U.S. withdrawal, partial and maintenance of the status quo. The first scenario is comparable to the Paris peace accord struck by the U.S. and the communist Vietnamese, which led to the fall of Saigon as the U.S. troops were leaving. The examples for the second are Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. has drastically reduced its troops, which has seen an occasional surge. The third is the current situation.
Korea is neither Vietnam nor Iraq, with its economic might overwhelming that of the North. But for China's intervention, the South is well ahead of the North in sustainability when war ― God forbid ― breaks out. But war in the small theater like the peninsula would wreak horrific havoc so keeping peace is a top priority for us. Now is the time for us to ponder how best to make most of U.S. troops, their presence and even their departure, for a change. Let's do some wagging the dog.
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. Contact foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com.
Here are two what ifs in the event U.S. bargains its troops in the South away.
First it would amount to removing a dagger thrust upon the throat of a beast that is China and enabling it to breathe freely.
Second, Trump, a real developer mogul, couldn't recognize the strategic value of the property that is the South. It could mean a retreat of U.S. power.
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