By Yang Moo-jin
Recently, conservatives and some opposition parties have been criticizing the results of the Moon Jae-in administration's foreign and security policy as well as its policy on North Korea for being insufficient.
To some extent, the government's efforts are being devalued as a "peace show" or a "chant for peace." I would like to look back on the past year and suggest what kind of efforts should be made to move forward toward peace for the Koreas.
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A year ago, the Korean Peninsula was at a critical tipping point. After the Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea, inter-Korean relations were cut off, and tension persisted. After blowing up a liaison office, North Korea became more adversarial toward South Korea and raised the level of tensions by mentioning military provocations.
Inter-Korean relations seemed to be entering a calming phase, after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un withheld military action against South Korea. However, tensions rose again when a South Korean fisheries official was shot and killed in the West Sea.
Relations between the United States and North Korea were also adding to the uncertainty of the situation on the peninsula. After Joe Biden was elected as the president of the United States, some predicted that North Korea would conduct additional nuclear tests or long-range ballistic missile tests to influence U.S. policy priorities. What kind of changes have occurred in the situation on the peninsula under these circumstances, in which there have been no breakthroughs in relations between South and North Korea, or in relations between the United States and North Korea?
First, after inter-Korean communication lines were restored Oct. 4, the South has consistently sent the message that military tensions should not be raised again, and that it is open to dialogue with the North. Although Pyongyang has fired short-range missiles, it has still maintained its nuclear and ICBM moratorium. North Korea recently evaluated the South's proposal for an end-of-war declaration as interesting in its own way, suggesting the possibility of an improvement in relations, albeit conditionally.
Second, at the end of April, the Biden administration announced its North Korea policy would be a "calibrated and practical approach." The Biden administration emphasized that this was a new solution, neither biased toward the Trump administration's approach of seeking a grand bargain, nor the Obama administration's "strategic patience." At the ROK-U.S. May 21 summit, the United States expressed its position that it respected the Panmunjeom Declaration and the Singapore Joint Statement, and supported inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation.
The summit outcome was made possible because of closer communication between South Korea and the United States. Since then, the United States has consistently emphasized that it has no hostile intent toward Pyongyang and is open to meeting anytime and anyplace without preconditions.
Third, the end-of-war declaration for restarting the peace process on the Korean Peninsula is under discussion. In his speech at the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 22, President Moon urged the international community to join forces in supporting the end-of-war declaration.
The declaration is a very meaningful measure, as a gateway to peace and as a catalyst for negotiations on denuclearization, and could become an important starting point for making a new order for the two Koreas. The two leaders of South and North Korea confirmed in the 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration as well as in the North-South Korea Summit Declaration on Oct. 4, 2007 that ending the abnormal conflict halted with an armistice for the last 68 years is a historical task that cannot be continuously deferred.
Although inter-Korean relations and North Korean nuclear issues are still in a stalemate, there are signs of positive change on the other side. The efforts of managing the situation in a stable manner and setting the stage for peace over the past year will have to be assessed as it comes.
The continuance of the current stalemate does nobody any good. It is time to lead the conversation with the North by arranging concrete incentives for the North to discard its nuclear ambitions, rather than waiting for the North to return to talks. Since the North Korean nuclear issue is an agenda item that the United States and China can cooperate on, even during a conflict, I hope that the United States uses the initiative to push forward the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang needs to show flexibility, instead of playing hardball. For the United States, there may be political constraints that make it hard to offer substantial concessions to the North before starting talks. I think it is more reasonable and practical that the North gets back to the negotiating table and listens to the Biden administration's policy in the first place, and then proceeds with negotiations so as to achieve what it wants to get out of them.
Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.kr) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies and the vice chairman of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is also a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy consultant at the Ministry of Unification.
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To some extent, the government's efforts are being devalued as a "peace show" or a "chant for peace." I would like to look back on the past year and suggest what kind of efforts should be made to move forward toward peace for the Koreas.
]
A year ago, the Korean Peninsula was at a critical tipping point. After the Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea, inter-Korean relations were cut off, and tension persisted. After blowing up a liaison office, North Korea became more adversarial toward South Korea and raised the level of tensions by mentioning military provocations.
Inter-Korean relations seemed to be entering a calming phase, after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un withheld military action against South Korea. However, tensions rose again when a South Korean fisheries official was shot and killed in the West Sea.
Relations between the United States and North Korea were also adding to the uncertainty of the situation on the peninsula. After Joe Biden was elected as the president of the United States, some predicted that North Korea would conduct additional nuclear tests or long-range ballistic missile tests to influence U.S. policy priorities. What kind of changes have occurred in the situation on the peninsula under these circumstances, in which there have been no breakthroughs in relations between South and North Korea, or in relations between the United States and North Korea?
First, after inter-Korean communication lines were restored Oct. 4, the South has consistently sent the message that military tensions should not be raised again, and that it is open to dialogue with the North. Although Pyongyang has fired short-range missiles, it has still maintained its nuclear and ICBM moratorium. North Korea recently evaluated the South's proposal for an end-of-war declaration as interesting in its own way, suggesting the possibility of an improvement in relations, albeit conditionally.
Second, at the end of April, the Biden administration announced its North Korea policy would be a "calibrated and practical approach." The Biden administration emphasized that this was a new solution, neither biased toward the Trump administration's approach of seeking a grand bargain, nor the Obama administration's "strategic patience." At the ROK-U.S. May 21 summit, the United States expressed its position that it respected the Panmunjeom Declaration and the Singapore Joint Statement, and supported inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation.
The summit outcome was made possible because of closer communication between South Korea and the United States. Since then, the United States has consistently emphasized that it has no hostile intent toward Pyongyang and is open to meeting anytime and anyplace without preconditions.
Third, the end-of-war declaration for restarting the peace process on the Korean Peninsula is under discussion. In his speech at the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 22, President Moon urged the international community to join forces in supporting the end-of-war declaration.
The declaration is a very meaningful measure, as a gateway to peace and as a catalyst for negotiations on denuclearization, and could become an important starting point for making a new order for the two Koreas. The two leaders of South and North Korea confirmed in the 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration as well as in the North-South Korea Summit Declaration on Oct. 4, 2007 that ending the abnormal conflict halted with an armistice for the last 68 years is a historical task that cannot be continuously deferred.
Although inter-Korean relations and North Korean nuclear issues are still in a stalemate, there are signs of positive change on the other side. The efforts of managing the situation in a stable manner and setting the stage for peace over the past year will have to be assessed as it comes.
The continuance of the current stalemate does nobody any good. It is time to lead the conversation with the North by arranging concrete incentives for the North to discard its nuclear ambitions, rather than waiting for the North to return to talks. Since the North Korean nuclear issue is an agenda item that the United States and China can cooperate on, even during a conflict, I hope that the United States uses the initiative to push forward the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang needs to show flexibility, instead of playing hardball. For the United States, there may be political constraints that make it hard to offer substantial concessions to the North before starting talks. I think it is more reasonable and practical that the North gets back to the negotiating table and listens to the Biden administration's policy in the first place, and then proceeds with negotiations so as to achieve what it wants to get out of them.
Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.kr) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies and the vice chairman of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is also a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy consultant at the Ministry of Unification.
