By Lee Jong-eun
As nuclear talks with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continue to face diplomatic gridlock, public sentiment in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has shifted in favor of either a redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or the ROK's independent nuclear armament. Several stalwart politicians from the opposition People Power Party have also expressed at least conditional support for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nukes in South Korea.
Until now, U.S. policy circles have generally been opposed or skeptical toward deploying nuclear assets in South Korea or supporting its nuclear armament. But could this stance change? Recently, the Washington Post published an op-ed describing nuclear armament as a "highly unpalatable but increasingly likely solution" for South Korea's security.
As North Korea continues to advance its nuclear armament and is likely to develop a capacity to target U.S. territory in the near future, the op-ed predicts the U.S.-ROK alliance is facing the similar assurance dilemma the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced during the Cold War: "Would Americans sacrifice Boston to protect Bonn?"
The U.S. could address the ROK's security dilemma through one of three solutions tried in Europe: expansion of its conventional military presence, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons under a nuclear co-sharing framework, or to permit its ally's nuclear armament.
Of these three options, the U.S. is currently more likely to decrease its conventional military presence in ROK. The NATO-like "nuclear-sharing" framework is also problematic. First, as the U.S. president will ultimately decide on the use of tactical nukes, it is uncertain whether the security dilemma, "Sacrifice Seattle to protect Seoul," would be remedied, even if tactical nukes are to be redeployed.
Second, the current Biden administration's policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, creating a reluctance to establish a new nuclear-sharing agreement with its allies.
For these reasons, the op-ed recommended for the U.S. to support its ally if the ROK decides to develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed ROK would then be more assured of its security, not only from the DPRK but also from China. But for the United States, would a nuclear-armed ally in the Far East be the least burdensome outcome for U.S. regional security interests?
First, allowing the ROK to develop nuclear weapons could lessen the burden of the U.S. direct security commitment to its ally. Washington might also persuade a more security-confident Seoul to restructure its military structure into more mobile forces, which could more readily participate in US-led global security operations. Second, the ROK's nuclear armament would likely not improve but also not seriously deteriorate the current security situation in the Korean Peninsula.
While during the Cold War, the U.S. was concerned by the militant characteristics of the ROK's past regimes, the ROK now has embedded liberal political institutions that should reassure the U.S. that its ally would not abuse its nuclear arms for geopolitical ambitions.
However, the ROK's nuclear armament will be viewed as a failure of 30 years of diplomatic efforts to denuclearize North Korea. If the prospects of denuclearization were already difficult, the ROK's nuclear armament could fatally doom the chances of the DPRK relinquishing its nuclear arms, creating a security stand-off similar to that of nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Future U.S. negotiations with North Korea would then be with a de-facto nuclear state.
Another consequence would be the risk of "over-escalation" of security tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. While implementing measures that implicitly deter China's rise, the Biden Administration has also shown restraint in mitigating bilateral tensions. However, the ROK's nuclear armament will cause a shift in the regional status quo that could escalate uncertainties outside the Korean Peninsula.
Would Japan then be justified in developing its nuclear arms to deter threats from North Korea? What about Taiwan? Like South Korea, Taiwan also attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Taiwan currently still has operational nuclear power plants that could produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Even if the U.S. defends the ROK's nuclear armament as an exception, China would perceive the nuclear-armed ROK as a signal that similar armament for Japan and Taiwan could become real possibilities. Such a signal would be perceived as more hostile and provocative than other U.S.-led restraint measures (Such as Quad, AUKUS) toward China.
The alternative, then, for the U.S. is to continue its security reassurance measures for ROK, while nuclear talks with North Korea also continue. Such measures (whether the deployment of tactical nuclear assets or other types of military integration) pose a security burden to the United States.
The longer the nuclear talks stagnate and the DPRK's nuclear capacity increases, the burden could increase. However, would reducing this burden by granting the ROK a "nuclear self-reliance" be a more optimal outcome? The admission of denuclearization failure, the heightening of uncertainties with China could pose a different and perhaps greater burden for the current U.S. administration.
The tight, bilateral alliances the U.S. has maintained with the ROK and Japan during the Cold War have sometimes been described as "pacts of restraint" by the U.S. over its allies. Despite the costs entailed from such security arrangements, U.S. policymakers viewed the benefits of safeguarding regional stability as outweighing the costs.
In the present regional security context (viewed by some as an early stage of a new Cold War), continuing denuclearization talks with North Korea and direct security reassurance to South Korea might be a less burdensome alternative; so that the U.S. can avoid "even more unpalatable costs" in the Asia-Pacific.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, East Asian regional security.
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Until now, U.S. policy circles have generally been opposed or skeptical toward deploying nuclear assets in South Korea or supporting its nuclear armament. But could this stance change? Recently, the Washington Post published an op-ed describing nuclear armament as a "highly unpalatable but increasingly likely solution" for South Korea's security.
As North Korea continues to advance its nuclear armament and is likely to develop a capacity to target U.S. territory in the near future, the op-ed predicts the U.S.-ROK alliance is facing the similar assurance dilemma the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced during the Cold War: "Would Americans sacrifice Boston to protect Bonn?"
The U.S. could address the ROK's security dilemma through one of three solutions tried in Europe: expansion of its conventional military presence, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons under a nuclear co-sharing framework, or to permit its ally's nuclear armament.
Of these three options, the U.S. is currently more likely to decrease its conventional military presence in ROK. The NATO-like "nuclear-sharing" framework is also problematic. First, as the U.S. president will ultimately decide on the use of tactical nukes, it is uncertain whether the security dilemma, "Sacrifice Seattle to protect Seoul," would be remedied, even if tactical nukes are to be redeployed.
Second, the current Biden administration's policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, creating a reluctance to establish a new nuclear-sharing agreement with its allies.
For these reasons, the op-ed recommended for the U.S. to support its ally if the ROK decides to develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed ROK would then be more assured of its security, not only from the DPRK but also from China. But for the United States, would a nuclear-armed ally in the Far East be the least burdensome outcome for U.S. regional security interests?
First, allowing the ROK to develop nuclear weapons could lessen the burden of the U.S. direct security commitment to its ally. Washington might also persuade a more security-confident Seoul to restructure its military structure into more mobile forces, which could more readily participate in US-led global security operations. Second, the ROK's nuclear armament would likely not improve but also not seriously deteriorate the current security situation in the Korean Peninsula.
While during the Cold War, the U.S. was concerned by the militant characteristics of the ROK's past regimes, the ROK now has embedded liberal political institutions that should reassure the U.S. that its ally would not abuse its nuclear arms for geopolitical ambitions.
However, the ROK's nuclear armament will be viewed as a failure of 30 years of diplomatic efforts to denuclearize North Korea. If the prospects of denuclearization were already difficult, the ROK's nuclear armament could fatally doom the chances of the DPRK relinquishing its nuclear arms, creating a security stand-off similar to that of nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Future U.S. negotiations with North Korea would then be with a de-facto nuclear state.
Another consequence would be the risk of "over-escalation" of security tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. While implementing measures that implicitly deter China's rise, the Biden Administration has also shown restraint in mitigating bilateral tensions. However, the ROK's nuclear armament will cause a shift in the regional status quo that could escalate uncertainties outside the Korean Peninsula.
Would Japan then be justified in developing its nuclear arms to deter threats from North Korea? What about Taiwan? Like South Korea, Taiwan also attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Taiwan currently still has operational nuclear power plants that could produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Even if the U.S. defends the ROK's nuclear armament as an exception, China would perceive the nuclear-armed ROK as a signal that similar armament for Japan and Taiwan could become real possibilities. Such a signal would be perceived as more hostile and provocative than other U.S.-led restraint measures (Such as Quad, AUKUS) toward China.
The alternative, then, for the U.S. is to continue its security reassurance measures for ROK, while nuclear talks with North Korea also continue. Such measures (whether the deployment of tactical nuclear assets or other types of military integration) pose a security burden to the United States.
The longer the nuclear talks stagnate and the DPRK's nuclear capacity increases, the burden could increase. However, would reducing this burden by granting the ROK a "nuclear self-reliance" be a more optimal outcome? The admission of denuclearization failure, the heightening of uncertainties with China could pose a different and perhaps greater burden for the current U.S. administration.
The tight, bilateral alliances the U.S. has maintained with the ROK and Japan during the Cold War have sometimes been described as "pacts of restraint" by the U.S. over its allies. Despite the costs entailed from such security arrangements, U.S. policymakers viewed the benefits of safeguarding regional stability as outweighing the costs.
In the present regional security context (viewed by some as an early stage of a new Cold War), continuing denuclearization talks with North Korea and direct security reassurance to South Korea might be a less burdensome alternative; so that the U.S. can avoid "even more unpalatable costs" in the Asia-Pacific.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, East Asian regional security.
