By Kim Won-soo
Last week South and North Korea resumed operation of cross-border hot lines. The move came as a pleasant surprise after the North unilaterally severed them over a year ago. It was likely intended by Pyongyang as an initial response to the policy review performed by the Biden administration in the United States as well as the following summit between the presidents of the U.S. and South Korea.
This is good news. But whether and how it will be followed up with further dialogue remains to be seen. Given the complex array of challenges facing North Korea, its leadership may have spent sleepless nights agonizing over what steps should be taken. Their silence for the last couple of months was seen by some experts as a calm before the storm, which may have culminated in provocative actions by the North, as has been the case in the past.
The past couple of years have arguably been the toughest period North Korea has ever faced. The unprecedentedly harsh self-imposed restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic seriously aggravated the already growing pains caused by international sanctions on top of existing socioeconomic hardships. Pyongyang is facing a conundrum as arduous as the Gordian knot. It is entangled in a three by three equation; three levels (domestic, inter-Korean and international) and three domains (politico-security, socioeconomic and humanitarian/human rights).
Unfortunately for the North, there is no magic solution as the legend goes with Alexander the Great, who was said to have cut the Knot with one bold sword stroke. North Korea may have coveted its nuclear weapon capability development as a magic "sword." But to the contrary, its simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development has increasingly turned out to be unattainable in the real world. The economy is being hurt by the international sanctions that show no signs of being eased without corresponding denuclearization measures to be taken by North Korea.
It becomes all the more clearer that the North does not have any good options as long as it sticks to nuclear deterrence as its primary security guarantee. North Korea may want to emulate what India and Pakistan did. But the tragedy of North Korea is that it lacks the geostrategic value India has as a counterweight to China for the U.S. and Pakistan as that to India for China.
Conversely, a nuclear-armed North Korea is perceived both by the US and China as a geostrategic burden. A nuclear-armed North Korea runs the risk of a nuclear domino in Northeast Asia with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan likely to follow suit. This scenario is strategically unacceptable not only to the U.S. but also to China. It is also likely to cause the beginning of the end of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which is unacceptable to other recognized nuclear weapon states including Russia.
Given the long history of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons development, however, it is also unrealistic to expect it to make the strategic choice to forego the nuclear option upfront, before it is fully convinced about its security without its precious nuclear "sword." This puts North Korea in a Catch-22 situation. It does not want to give up the nuclear option until everything is secured as it wishes. But it cannot get anything either, unless it shows a willingness to give up the nuclear option.
Under this situation, North Korea may have chosen a safe path; that is to test the waters with the new Biden team in Washington through Seoul. Therefore, we have to assume that Pyongyang has made a tactical move this time and its next steps will be calibrated, depending on how Seoul and Washington react. In that sense, North Korea has kicked the ball back to us while waiting to see our next moves. Now is the time for Seoul and Washington to refine our common but differentiated strategy toward Pyongyang.
Biden team's policy review came out as safe and bland as expected. In a larger sense, it meets midway between the approaches of the previous Trump and Obama administrations; neither a top-down package nor strategic patience. But much remains to be filled in on the specifics. The Biden-Moon summit provided more optics than substance. The summit communique was positive but largely declaratory on the North Korea policy with a surprising quid-pro-quo compromise to reflect Washington's priorities on China and Seoul's priorities on North Korea.
On the Korean Peninsula, two clocks are ticking on the politico-security (nuclear) and the socioeconomic fronts. For North Korea, the nuclear clock is moving forward but the socioeconomic clock is going backward. The reverse is the case with South Korea. In this situation, Seoul's strategy should be geared on how to synchronize the two clocks to its advantage; using the socioeconomic clock to slow down, suspend and eventually reverse the nuclear clock. It can be done with step by step and tit for tat movements on the two clocks toward the end point of durable peace with full denuclearization and sustainable co-prosperity.
Synchronizing these two clocks is a tough task. But it is doable with creative and flexible thinking as well as long-term patience and persistence. It will help Pyongyang untie their Gordian knot in a peaceful and mutually beneficial way. Seoul must secure two things; domestic bipartisan consensus and tight alliance coordination.
Securing a domestic consensus is particularly challenging in Seoul, as it enters the political season with the next presidential election scheduled for March next year. Now is the time for political leaders here to desist from their past patterns of using North Korea policy for vote catching. The South's North Korea policy must be decoupled from domestic politics. Only that way, can Seoul prevent Pyongyang's drive-wedging between it and Washington as well as China's inertia. It is also the best way for Seoul to ensure effective coordination with Washington.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).
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This is good news. But whether and how it will be followed up with further dialogue remains to be seen. Given the complex array of challenges facing North Korea, its leadership may have spent sleepless nights agonizing over what steps should be taken. Their silence for the last couple of months was seen by some experts as a calm before the storm, which may have culminated in provocative actions by the North, as has been the case in the past.
The past couple of years have arguably been the toughest period North Korea has ever faced. The unprecedentedly harsh self-imposed restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic seriously aggravated the already growing pains caused by international sanctions on top of existing socioeconomic hardships. Pyongyang is facing a conundrum as arduous as the Gordian knot. It is entangled in a three by three equation; three levels (domestic, inter-Korean and international) and three domains (politico-security, socioeconomic and humanitarian/human rights).
Unfortunately for the North, there is no magic solution as the legend goes with Alexander the Great, who was said to have cut the Knot with one bold sword stroke. North Korea may have coveted its nuclear weapon capability development as a magic "sword." But to the contrary, its simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development has increasingly turned out to be unattainable in the real world. The economy is being hurt by the international sanctions that show no signs of being eased without corresponding denuclearization measures to be taken by North Korea.
It becomes all the more clearer that the North does not have any good options as long as it sticks to nuclear deterrence as its primary security guarantee. North Korea may want to emulate what India and Pakistan did. But the tragedy of North Korea is that it lacks the geostrategic value India has as a counterweight to China for the U.S. and Pakistan as that to India for China.
Conversely, a nuclear-armed North Korea is perceived both by the US and China as a geostrategic burden. A nuclear-armed North Korea runs the risk of a nuclear domino in Northeast Asia with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan likely to follow suit. This scenario is strategically unacceptable not only to the U.S. but also to China. It is also likely to cause the beginning of the end of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which is unacceptable to other recognized nuclear weapon states including Russia.
Given the long history of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons development, however, it is also unrealistic to expect it to make the strategic choice to forego the nuclear option upfront, before it is fully convinced about its security without its precious nuclear "sword." This puts North Korea in a Catch-22 situation. It does not want to give up the nuclear option until everything is secured as it wishes. But it cannot get anything either, unless it shows a willingness to give up the nuclear option.
Under this situation, North Korea may have chosen a safe path; that is to test the waters with the new Biden team in Washington through Seoul. Therefore, we have to assume that Pyongyang has made a tactical move this time and its next steps will be calibrated, depending on how Seoul and Washington react. In that sense, North Korea has kicked the ball back to us while waiting to see our next moves. Now is the time for Seoul and Washington to refine our common but differentiated strategy toward Pyongyang.
Biden team's policy review came out as safe and bland as expected. In a larger sense, it meets midway between the approaches of the previous Trump and Obama administrations; neither a top-down package nor strategic patience. But much remains to be filled in on the specifics. The Biden-Moon summit provided more optics than substance. The summit communique was positive but largely declaratory on the North Korea policy with a surprising quid-pro-quo compromise to reflect Washington's priorities on China and Seoul's priorities on North Korea.
On the Korean Peninsula, two clocks are ticking on the politico-security (nuclear) and the socioeconomic fronts. For North Korea, the nuclear clock is moving forward but the socioeconomic clock is going backward. The reverse is the case with South Korea. In this situation, Seoul's strategy should be geared on how to synchronize the two clocks to its advantage; using the socioeconomic clock to slow down, suspend and eventually reverse the nuclear clock. It can be done with step by step and tit for tat movements on the two clocks toward the end point of durable peace with full denuclearization and sustainable co-prosperity.
Synchronizing these two clocks is a tough task. But it is doable with creative and flexible thinking as well as long-term patience and persistence. It will help Pyongyang untie their Gordian knot in a peaceful and mutually beneficial way. Seoul must secure two things; domestic bipartisan consensus and tight alliance coordination.
Securing a domestic consensus is particularly challenging in Seoul, as it enters the political season with the next presidential election scheduled for March next year. Now is the time for political leaders here to desist from their past patterns of using North Korea policy for vote catching. The South's North Korea policy must be decoupled from domestic politics. Only that way, can Seoul prevent Pyongyang's drive-wedging between it and Washington as well as China's inertia. It is also the best way for Seoul to ensure effective coordination with Washington.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).
