By Lee Seong-hyon
Although the U.S. and China are not on good terms, they have not stopped trying to communicate. After Joe Biden took office in January, he was on the phone with Xi Jinping in February ― for two hours! In March, the two sides held a ministerial meeting in Alaska.
Although the latter meeting became a crazy TV reality show that revealed U.S.-China discord to the world, in July, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sat face-to-face in Tianjin, China. Recently, Qing Gang, the new Chinese ambassador to the U.S., has also flown to Washington.
Looking at this series of events, some observers commented that the U.S.-China relationship is "hardline in words but (consisting of) compromise in reality." The wording reflects the saying summarizing the U.S.-China relationship during the 20th century, which goes, "If they fight, they will both be harmed, so they will eventually compromise."
The reason that this outdated observation, however, cannot be ignored is U.S. officials themselves still characterize the relationship in that way. They argue that the U.S.-China relationship is complex and contains all three of the following aspects: competition, cooperation and confrontation. The three elements progress simultaneously.
The global audience is confused by this description, and apparently, it's meant to be that way. It's like saying that the U.S.-China relationship is a concept in Zen Buddhism, or like the yin and yang. It is dualistic. It has both elements of cooperation and competition. It is now also triadic, adding confrontation.
But diplomacy is like investing in stocks: if you simply act on what others are saying publicly, you are likely to fail. In addition, as with stock prices, a diplomatic strategy should be forward-looking into the future. In other words, any plan should be in anticipation of the future, not merely based on what is unfolding today.
It should be noted that the current axis of U.S.-China relations has clearly leaned toward "competition" rather than "cooperation" at the government-level, and "confrontation" (if not animosity) has become the mainstay discourse in terms of the U.S. public sentiment toward Xi Jinping's China. Countries betting on U.S.-China relations will have to look more closely.
It is fortunate that the U.S. and China are still in contact, but the bigger problem is that, even if they meet, they do not really communicate. Rather, the more they meet, the more they find how different they are from each other.
The prime reason is that the U.S., the sitting superpower, cannot afford to accept the demand of China, the challenging power, to recognize "a new era" (xin shidai). This abstract vocabulary, used by Xi Jinping, has been included in the Chinese Communist Party's Constitution. In China, the party constitution has authority over the state constitution.
As such, the "new era" is a de facto state mandate that dictates changing the status quo of international relations, centered on the United States. Xi famously said, "China has already been able to see the world as flat." This quote means that China has now grown strong (qiang guo) and that the U.S. should get used to accepting China as an equal power.
Le Yucheng, the vice minister of foreign affairs, put it more directly. He said, "The U.S. has declared, 'America is back!' but the world has already changed," arguing that the U.S. should "proactively adapt" to this change. China's ambassador to South Korea, Xing Haiming, who recently sparked controversy, also struck the same chord when he declared publicly: "Those who follow the prevailing trend of time will flourish" (tianxiadashi, shunzhizhechang).
It is predicted that the top leaders of the U.S. and China, Biden and Xi, will hold a meeting at the G20 summit in Italy in October. Yet they are unlikely to succeed in narrowing the gap in their fundamental competition over the leadership of the global order. As the old Chinese saying goes, there cannot be two tigers on the same mountain. There are things one can compromise; there are things one can't.
Looking at the big picture, the competition between the U.S. and China is not just a battle over economic benefits. It has gone beyond the political systems and ideologies too. Now, it has even expanded to the very fundamental levels of values and "ways of living."
In a comprehensive assessment, as of today, no reason has been found to recalibrate the current prognosis that U.S.-China contacts and negotiations in the coming months will have difficulty finding an agreement. In fact, the more they talk, the more they will find out how fundamentally different they are.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He is the former director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
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Although the latter meeting became a crazy TV reality show that revealed U.S.-China discord to the world, in July, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sat face-to-face in Tianjin, China. Recently, Qing Gang, the new Chinese ambassador to the U.S., has also flown to Washington.
Looking at this series of events, some observers commented that the U.S.-China relationship is "hardline in words but (consisting of) compromise in reality." The wording reflects the saying summarizing the U.S.-China relationship during the 20th century, which goes, "If they fight, they will both be harmed, so they will eventually compromise."
The reason that this outdated observation, however, cannot be ignored is U.S. officials themselves still characterize the relationship in that way. They argue that the U.S.-China relationship is complex and contains all three of the following aspects: competition, cooperation and confrontation. The three elements progress simultaneously.
The global audience is confused by this description, and apparently, it's meant to be that way. It's like saying that the U.S.-China relationship is a concept in Zen Buddhism, or like the yin and yang. It is dualistic. It has both elements of cooperation and competition. It is now also triadic, adding confrontation.
But diplomacy is like investing in stocks: if you simply act on what others are saying publicly, you are likely to fail. In addition, as with stock prices, a diplomatic strategy should be forward-looking into the future. In other words, any plan should be in anticipation of the future, not merely based on what is unfolding today.
It should be noted that the current axis of U.S.-China relations has clearly leaned toward "competition" rather than "cooperation" at the government-level, and "confrontation" (if not animosity) has become the mainstay discourse in terms of the U.S. public sentiment toward Xi Jinping's China. Countries betting on U.S.-China relations will have to look more closely.
It is fortunate that the U.S. and China are still in contact, but the bigger problem is that, even if they meet, they do not really communicate. Rather, the more they meet, the more they find how different they are from each other.
The prime reason is that the U.S., the sitting superpower, cannot afford to accept the demand of China, the challenging power, to recognize "a new era" (xin shidai). This abstract vocabulary, used by Xi Jinping, has been included in the Chinese Communist Party's Constitution. In China, the party constitution has authority over the state constitution.
As such, the "new era" is a de facto state mandate that dictates changing the status quo of international relations, centered on the United States. Xi famously said, "China has already been able to see the world as flat." This quote means that China has now grown strong (qiang guo) and that the U.S. should get used to accepting China as an equal power.
Le Yucheng, the vice minister of foreign affairs, put it more directly. He said, "The U.S. has declared, 'America is back!' but the world has already changed," arguing that the U.S. should "proactively adapt" to this change. China's ambassador to South Korea, Xing Haiming, who recently sparked controversy, also struck the same chord when he declared publicly: "Those who follow the prevailing trend of time will flourish" (tianxiadashi, shunzhizhechang).
It is predicted that the top leaders of the U.S. and China, Biden and Xi, will hold a meeting at the G20 summit in Italy in October. Yet they are unlikely to succeed in narrowing the gap in their fundamental competition over the leadership of the global order. As the old Chinese saying goes, there cannot be two tigers on the same mountain. There are things one can compromise; there are things one can't.
Looking at the big picture, the competition between the U.S. and China is not just a battle over economic benefits. It has gone beyond the political systems and ideologies too. Now, it has even expanded to the very fundamental levels of values and "ways of living."
In a comprehensive assessment, as of today, no reason has been found to recalibrate the current prognosis that U.S.-China contacts and negotiations in the coming months will have difficulty finding an agreement. In fact, the more they talk, the more they will find out how fundamentally different they are.
Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He is the former director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.
