By Yang Moo-jin
Amid the U.S.-China conflict, the Moon Jae-in administration's diplomatic strategy appears to constitute "balancing diplomacy" and "strategic ambiguity." The United States and China are by no means subjects of choice for us. The United States is an ally, which forms the basis for all cooperation, and China is a strategic partner. As we have to live together with China as a neighboring country, balancing diplomacy is based on reality.
Some critics of balancing diplomacy insist that we choose either the U.S. or China. Admittedly, if abandoning one country greatly benefits our national interest, choosing one between the two would be acceptable. The U.S., along with its forces stationed in South Korea, is the core of our national interest; while China is an important partner for our economic development. Last year, the trade volume between South Korea and China was $240 billion, which is larger than the combined trade volume with the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, balancing diplomacy is seen as a very realistic strategy from the perspective of the national interest.
The current situation of the U.S.-China conflict is worrisome. The United States seems to be dividing countries into two teams or making countries take sides in order to hold China in check. China is working on a joint action plan together with North Korea and Russia in order to counter the checks by the U.S. The international order affected by the U.S.-China conflict seems to be entering the threshold of a new cold war. The competition in semiconductors between the U.S. and China is also in the same context. The response by the U.S. to the rise of China in terms of semiconductors comes from the concern that it could be defeated in their hegemonic competition, especially if Washington loses its lead in the strategic constituents of all electronic devices and equipment including military equipment, to Beijing.
There is a term the "Thucydides Trap" from the ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides. He argued that there was no choice but to compete for hegemony between Athens, the then hegemonic state, and Sparta, the emerging city-state. It is appropriate to predict that the United States, the dominant state today will eventually collide with China, the emerging power. As Washington has established the Quad system to check Beijing, and the latter works with North Korea and Russia to respond to this, the confrontation between the camps will inevitably intensify. It feels like we have already entered the threshold of a new cold war.
Strategic ambiguity is part of a strategy and tactics commonly used in diplomacy, regardless of age or region. It should be made clear that the ROK-U.S. alliance comes first. However, if a wise diplomatic strategy that does not confront China is "strategic ambiguity," such a strategy is essential. The Korean government says that there is no reason not to participate in the Quad if the three conditions of capacity, openness, and transparency regarding its issues are satisfied. The government has made its position clear; it will not join a cooperative body designed to keep a specific nation in check or excluding it. If the Korean government declares its participation in the expanded Quad, or Quad+, the Chinese administration may react to such an announcement. Or, if Seoul declares it will not join the Quad+, the U.S. government may register its opposition to this. Upon firm principles of capacity, openness, and transparency, it will be better for Seoul's diplomacy and security to maintain ambiguity on the one hand and manage the U.S.-China conflict so as not to go to extremes, on the other.
South Korea and the U.S. will hold a summit near the end of May. To a larger extent, pending issues between the two sides to expand the bilateral alliance, regional issues for keeping China in check, global issues such as COVID-19 and the climatic environment are supposed to be at the top of the agenda. President Moon is expected to concentrate on North Korea policy and cooperation with regard to COVID-19 vaccines. Regarding North Korea policy, Moon seems to want to earnestly request the U.S. to enter into dialogue with the North in the near future based on the Singapore Declaration. Regarding the "anti-China" alliance, it appears that Moon is explaining our particular stance by underlining that South Korea-U.S. vs. North Korea-China in new cold war is not at all helpful to the two Koreas, the U.S. and China.
Given that it has refrained from criticism and has carefully controlled levels of provocation, North Korea is thought to be anticipating the new U.S. policy. Of course, if the new policy focuses on North Korea's human rights issues and states nothing about possible sanctions relief after denuclearization, North Korea will announce a tough statement and gradually increase its level of provocative actions from testing short range missiles to launching SLBMs and ICBMs.
It seems that next month will be a turning point for Korean Peninsula issues, whether there will be a continuation of confrontation or a transition to conversation. The Korean government should not neglect pursuit of a Korean Peninsula peace process. North Korea needs to be made aware of the greater benefits found through conversation rather than provocation. The U.S. must also keep an open mind to understand the uniqueness of the Korean Peninsula. It should not overlook the fact that it is possible to activate inter-Korean exchanges, improve the human rights of the North Korean people and get clues on the denuclearization of the North if Pyongyang is allowed to access the outside world.
Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.k) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies).
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Some critics of balancing diplomacy insist that we choose either the U.S. or China. Admittedly, if abandoning one country greatly benefits our national interest, choosing one between the two would be acceptable. The U.S., along with its forces stationed in South Korea, is the core of our national interest; while China is an important partner for our economic development. Last year, the trade volume between South Korea and China was $240 billion, which is larger than the combined trade volume with the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, balancing diplomacy is seen as a very realistic strategy from the perspective of the national interest.
The current situation of the U.S.-China conflict is worrisome. The United States seems to be dividing countries into two teams or making countries take sides in order to hold China in check. China is working on a joint action plan together with North Korea and Russia in order to counter the checks by the U.S. The international order affected by the U.S.-China conflict seems to be entering the threshold of a new cold war. The competition in semiconductors between the U.S. and China is also in the same context. The response by the U.S. to the rise of China in terms of semiconductors comes from the concern that it could be defeated in their hegemonic competition, especially if Washington loses its lead in the strategic constituents of all electronic devices and equipment including military equipment, to Beijing.
There is a term the "Thucydides Trap" from the ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides. He argued that there was no choice but to compete for hegemony between Athens, the then hegemonic state, and Sparta, the emerging city-state. It is appropriate to predict that the United States, the dominant state today will eventually collide with China, the emerging power. As Washington has established the Quad system to check Beijing, and the latter works with North Korea and Russia to respond to this, the confrontation between the camps will inevitably intensify. It feels like we have already entered the threshold of a new cold war.
Strategic ambiguity is part of a strategy and tactics commonly used in diplomacy, regardless of age or region. It should be made clear that the ROK-U.S. alliance comes first. However, if a wise diplomatic strategy that does not confront China is "strategic ambiguity," such a strategy is essential. The Korean government says that there is no reason not to participate in the Quad if the three conditions of capacity, openness, and transparency regarding its issues are satisfied. The government has made its position clear; it will not join a cooperative body designed to keep a specific nation in check or excluding it. If the Korean government declares its participation in the expanded Quad, or Quad+, the Chinese administration may react to such an announcement. Or, if Seoul declares it will not join the Quad+, the U.S. government may register its opposition to this. Upon firm principles of capacity, openness, and transparency, it will be better for Seoul's diplomacy and security to maintain ambiguity on the one hand and manage the U.S.-China conflict so as not to go to extremes, on the other.
South Korea and the U.S. will hold a summit near the end of May. To a larger extent, pending issues between the two sides to expand the bilateral alliance, regional issues for keeping China in check, global issues such as COVID-19 and the climatic environment are supposed to be at the top of the agenda. President Moon is expected to concentrate on North Korea policy and cooperation with regard to COVID-19 vaccines. Regarding North Korea policy, Moon seems to want to earnestly request the U.S. to enter into dialogue with the North in the near future based on the Singapore Declaration. Regarding the "anti-China" alliance, it appears that Moon is explaining our particular stance by underlining that South Korea-U.S. vs. North Korea-China in new cold war is not at all helpful to the two Koreas, the U.S. and China.
Given that it has refrained from criticism and has carefully controlled levels of provocation, North Korea is thought to be anticipating the new U.S. policy. Of course, if the new policy focuses on North Korea's human rights issues and states nothing about possible sanctions relief after denuclearization, North Korea will announce a tough statement and gradually increase its level of provocative actions from testing short range missiles to launching SLBMs and ICBMs.
It seems that next month will be a turning point for Korean Peninsula issues, whether there will be a continuation of confrontation or a transition to conversation. The Korean government should not neglect pursuit of a Korean Peninsula peace process. North Korea needs to be made aware of the greater benefits found through conversation rather than provocation. The U.S. must also keep an open mind to understand the uniqueness of the Korean Peninsula. It should not overlook the fact that it is possible to activate inter-Korean exchanges, improve the human rights of the North Korean people and get clues on the denuclearization of the North if Pyongyang is allowed to access the outside world.
Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.k) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies).
