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This worst threat can be attributed to an imminent perfect storm brewing from three different directions: 1) nuclear and other WMD (weapons of mass destruction); 2) climate change; and 3) disruptive new technologies.
Coping with this perfect storm requires a new global compact in which all countries participate. Efforts involving the compact to deal with the second threat of climate change started with the Paris Climate Accords of 2015. Follow-up measures are now back on track with President Joe Biden of the United States returning to the agreement from which his predecessor, former U.S. President Donald Trump, withdrew earlier.
Regarding the first and third threats, however, the international community stands on much shakier ground. The existing compact for the first threat of WMD has regressed. The INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty was nullified during the Trump era and the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) barely survived. No new arms control negotiations between the largest possessors of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Russia, are on the horizon. Nor are any signs of arms control or confidence-building talks in sight vis-a-vis China, which is keen to catch up in terms of strategic parity.
On top of the weakening ground on the old WMD, the new threat of emerging disruptive technologies may add another layer of WMD, which denotes weapons of mass "disruption." Rapid technological evolution in both cyberspace and outer space brings enormous benefits through hyper-connectivity in our lives. But it also dramatically increases the risks of massive disruption that happens in an instant. Technological advances in artificial intelligence and synthetic bio-technology can be also abused for malevolent purposes to instigate fear threatening human security. The gap in mitigating these emerging risks is growing, as the technology is advancing faster than the normative work.
Furthermore, the nexus of these twin WMDs with terrorism is even more horrifying. It is no longer a fantasy to imagine a scenario in which a terrorist organization steals the first WMD material (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear), using cyber-hacking with the help of an insider, and uses it as a terrible means of indiscriminate terror inflicted on an innocent civilian population. The Nuclear Security Summit process had been pursued by the Obama administration to mitigate this horrifying risk.
Northeast Asia is undoubtedly one of the world's hot spots where the danger of the twin WMDs is present and regional tensions remain unabated. Recently, the security dynamics have been displaying signs of volatility on the Korean peninsula as well as in the East and South China seas. The U.S. and China are at the front and center of this complex equation. The security climate looks likely to become more and more tense as the US and China are widely expected to intensify their strategic competition. Even their appetite for resuming bilateral strategic dialogue seems to be low due to frustration and fatigue with the previous efforts, which are largely perceived as formalistic and insubstantial.
It is evident that the global compact to cope with the twin WMD threats is unattainable without the U.S. and China working together. Their failure to do so would be dangerous, not only for them, but also for the whole region of Northeast Asia and beyond.
Therefore, for their enlightened self-interest and collective global interest, the U.S. and China must find a way to start talking to each other for arms control. The longer it takes, the more they are likely to become the source of the problem pushing the doomsday clock even closer to midnight. This should not be an option. The US and China can pick up from where they left off before. Such examples include reviving the Nuclear Security Summit process and/or discussing ways to help the respective ratification process of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty). If the U.S. and China begin to talk to each other on arms control, it will serve to restore their working trust that may pave the way for them to manage their differences in other issues in a less confrontational mode.
Working for arms control and disarmament is like riding a bicycle uphill toward an eventual peak of a world free of nuclear and other weapons.
Reaching the peak may be nearly impossible in a zero-sum world composed of sovereign states with divergent interests and mutual suspicion.
On the way to the peak, however, we may reach a hilltop that is lower but replete with ensuing peace dividends, as has been the case with the past milestone instruments such as the NPT, INF and CTBT. Therefore, no matter how challenging it is, we should not stop pedaling for it. Otherwise our bicycle will fall down or slide off the slippery slopes. Efforts toward arms control must resume to prevent the perfect storm of threats from hitting the human race. The world now calls for global leadership more than ever. The U.S. and China must live up to that call.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).