A tale of two hegemons

By Lee Geun

The buzzwords of today's international politics, “the U.S.-China hegemonic competition,” refer to two superpowers that want to either defend or newly obtain the title of hegemon. Hegemons are the ones that build hegemony, and hegemony is a long surviving concept which existed more than 2,000 years ago in the days of the Roman and Chinese empires.

It commonly denoted absolute power with no daring challengers in the vicinity of that empire. Of course, the concept evolved into different meanings in accordance with the evolution of our living environments, and especially with the arrival of the modern-day liberal hegemon ― the United States ― hegemony came to bear somewhat positive connotations to the co-dwelling countries in the world.

If hegemons of the past were agrarian territorial powers that pursued their own “long peace” or absence of invasion or raids by neighboring “barbarians,” modern-day hegemons like the U.S. are global market powers that want stability in international markets and global supply chains.

Pax Romana or Pax Sinica are therefore very different from Pax Americana. If Pax of Pax Sinica refers to “selfish long peace” resulting from subduing neighboring “barbarians,” Pax of Pax Americana means “global peace and prosperity” as a result of stable liberal international markets and global supply chains.

As such, hegemony built by the U.S. is commonly conceptualized as the “liberal international order.” Hegemons in the liberal international order, therefore, do not necessarily have territorial ambitions, but pursue market power and economic interests, while trying to construct international markets in their favor.

Naturally, rules, norms and institutions that surround today's international markets are mostly those of the U.S.' making or those made under the leadership of the U.S. If the military's role in ancient hegemons was conquering the “barbarian territories,” the military's role of a liberal hegemon is to provide stability to the liberal international market.

These fundamental differences between the old territorial hegemon and new liberal hegemon are of utmost importance in understanding, and hopefully settling current conflicts between the U.S. and China. It is highly probable that today's Chinese leaders still cherish the core elements of its old territorial hegemonic worldview and that may clash with a modern U.S. worldview of how a superpower should lead and behave to maintain the liberal international order.

If that is the case, the U.S. engagement policy toward China ought to be socializing China into today's non-territorial liberal international order. Moreover, as the world goes through the so-called digital transformation, the liberal international order will become much less territorial, and overwhelmingly virtual.

China had been a hegemon within its own sphere of influence for almost all the time since the beginning of human history except for about 100 years in the 20th century. Therefore, China may now find it quite natural to return to the highest position of the world.

When China tried to maintain its hegemony up until the 19th century, there were frequent nomadic invasions and raids. And in response, China had to militarily conquer them to bring stability and peace to its empire.

The resulting Chinese hegemony was good for the Chinese people in the sense that soldiers need not be mobilized during the busy farming season to kill and injure neighboring barbarians in the battlefields. On the other hand, the conquered had to stand humiliation and agony while being robbed of their identity, property, and dignity.

The culture, rules, institutions, social classes of the conquered are replaced by those of the hegemon, and the vast area under the hegemony is unified by the hegemonic system which is often called Chinese civilization.

As of today, bordering 14 countries and having 55 ethnic groups, China may still have the same security mindset of its ancient agrarian empire that was constantly vigilant against neighboring nomadic powers. That mindset oftentimes translates into hegemonic behaviors of assimilating its small neighbors into Chinese civilization, and a tributary hierarchical order.

Such a grand strategy of China may look natural and peaceful in the eyes of the Chinese, but it poses a serious security threat not only to the neighboring countries, but also to the U.S. that is supposed to protect the current liberal international order and global supply chains.

The strategic competition between the U.S. and China is a clash of two superpowers. But it is also a clash of two different kinds of hegemons. One still dwells in the days of territorial invasion and conquest, and the other is concerned more about the stability of international markets and preserving core principles, norms, and values of the liberal international order.

If China regards the markets as an extension of territorial space, be they physical markets or virtual markets, China may want to conquer the international markets and bring hierarchical order to them as old Chinese empires used to do. That is a teleportation of the ancient hegemonic view of China, and is utterly anachronistic.

As long as China holds such a worldview, the clash of two different hegemons is going to develop into a zero-sum game, and the rest of the world will naturally forge a balancing coalition against China. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the Quad, is one revelation of the balancing acts by liberal powers, and the British idea of the D10 Summit of Democracies is another.

These are precursors of de-coupling, and I am sure that China does not want to turn the political clock backward to the old Cold War days. We all hope that the tale of two hegemons does not end as a tragedy.

Lee Geun (

softpowerlg@gmail.com

) is president of the Korea Foundation. He served as professor of Seoul National University.