By Yoon Suk-joon
On June 30, U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un crossed a line dividing the South and North Korean parts of Panmunjeom in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Trump thus became the first sitting U.S. president to step onto North Korean soil.
Also present was South Korean President Moon Jae-In, who is keen to help mediate between the U.S. and North Korea in hopes of reviving stalled denuclearization talks after the debacle of the abandoned February Hanoi summit.
This unprecedented three-way summit, apparently arranged at very short notice, appears to have been little more than a made-for-TV spectacular designed for Trump and Kim's domestic audiences, in the military conflict zone of the Korean Peninsula.
Trump's publicity machine constantly emphasizes the feel-good, one-to-one personal relationship between Trump and Kim, but is there any actual progress on denuclearization? Supposedly, this meeting will lead to a resumption of working-level talks, but there are clear indications that the U.S. side is no longer committed to "complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization."
So what does Chairman Kim get from the meeting? It seems he is closer to persuading Trump to accept the North Korean agenda: no pressure for regime change or reform, and a freeze on North Korea's missile and nuclear program instead of a ban. This would essentially enshrine the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and would tacitly recognize North Korea as a nuclear power. Probably it means that the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facility will be traded for the partial lifting of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against North Korea. Clearly Kim is a big winner from the meeting.
And what about President Moon? Despite his broad smiles during the photo session, he seems ready to make significant concessions to the U.S. and North Korea. Instead of maintaining a balanced stance between the two regional great powers, Moon may intend to toe the U.S. line more assiduously. For example, by joining in with sanctions against Huawei, by participating in U.S.-led freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, by buying more U.S.-made weapons and systems to ensure interoperability for a combined military posture toward North Korea, and by increased burden-sharing to support the U.S. military presence. Any such concessions would reveal Moon as the greatest loser from the meeting.
Lastly there is Trump to consider. He successfully distracted attention from his utter failure to achieve even the tiniest step toward North Korean denuclearization by pretending that his personal relationship with Kim is some kind of historic accomplishment. Kim, of course, is happy to indulge this pathetic charade, since he is playing the same game. Moreover, by focusing the attention of U.S. TV screens on foreign policy, Trump also displaced coverage of his democratic opponents' presidential primary campaigns and of the continuing investigations into his own conduct. All-in-all this meeting was a big win for Trump.
So, putting this eye-catching TV show to one side, what is actually happening now on the Korean Peninsula? There are several important questions outstanding.
First, is there any prospect that we may finally escape from the military standoff that has blighted the peninsula for almost seven decades? The U.S. and the Koreas are still involved in continuing military frictions, which might easily escalate into the nightmare scenario of a major confrontation. And as yet there is no hint of conventional arms control or reduction, never mind the North Korean nuclear capabilities. All that has happened is the scaling-down of bilateral joint military drills between the ROK armed forces and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and a weakening of their combined defense posture through the decision to transfer of wartime operational control authority from USFK to the South Korean military no later than 2021.
Since the signing of an agreement between the two Korean militaries in September 2018, there has also been some work to recover the remains of U.S. personnel missing in action, but none of this has changed the facts on the ground: peace has not broken out on the Korean Peninsula, where the Cold War continues.
Second, is it time to sign a peace treaty to finally end the Korean War after an uneasy truce that has lasted many decades? The three leaders' meeting at Panmunjeom should remind us that the Korean Peninsula is divided into two countries with competing ideologies and remains technically at war. Thus, Trump was escorted by U.S. soldiers of the United Nations Command, their commander now dual-hatted and in charge of both ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and USFK.
Anyone who believes that war is now unlikely or impossible is ignoring North Korean and Chinese policy that has always insisted on a complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula. Does this suggest that China will leave Koreans to determine their own affairs? Surely President Moon is not so naive, and though his earnest pursuit of a genuine Korean peace process may be laudable, it is not yet practicable, because none of the other parties are acting in good faith.
Third, is there now no possibility that North Korean nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems can be removed? Most observers believe the best that can be achieved is a freeze in the continuing development of North Korean nuclear capabilities and that full denuclearization is an unrealistic fantasy, since the North Korean regime relies on its nuclear deterrent for its very survival.
So, North Korea will retain the ability to threaten U.S. cities with nuclear weapons for the indefinite future, yet Trump's failure goes beyond this disturbing reality, since even if he was discussing a nuclear freeze in his meeting with Kim, North Korea is yet to provide a comprehensive listing of all North Korean nuclear assets and facilities, and without this any freeze would be a joke. Kim was happy to show up in Panmunjeom without working-level negotiations on denuclearization, because he does not intend to denuclearize, ever. It is improbable that North Korea would adhere even to an agreed nuclear freeze, though its current stock of perhaps 20-60 nuclear bombs is already sufficient to achieve recognition as a nuclear power, uncomfortable though that is for South Korea, and even for China. The situations of India, Pakistan and Israel are all different, but in every case the possession of an effective nuclear deterrent has resulted in permanent geopolitical shifts.
Fourth, is there any substance whatever behind the summit of the three leaders? Could personal diplomacy between Trump and Kim perhaps moderate Trump's capriciousness, making erratic military action by Trump less likely? But domestic politics is surely the driving force behind the meeting. Trump needs a foreign policy success (even a faked one will do for his base) to help his reelection campaign. Kim gets to pose as an equal with the U.S. President, to his newly reshuffled team and to the North Korean people. And Moon gets the benefit of diverting South Koreans' attention from historical and economic frictions with Japan and China; by presenting himself as a peacemaker he hopes to win a majority in the coming National Assembly elections. For the present, there is no indication that anyone is serious about the kind of diplomacy that is needed to find the long-term flexible solutions that regional security requires and on which the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula depends.
In summary: The Panmunjeom meeting of June 30 between President Trump and Chairman Kim, with President Moon as facilitator, was a triumph of presentation over substance and delivered very much less than it promised. The military standoff on the Korean Peninsula continues unabated, no one is serious about a genuine peace treaty, no progress whatever was made toward North Korean denuclearization and all of the leaders demonstrated their hypocrisy, though Moon showed more sincerity than Trump or Kim. The meeting was a shallow exercise in personal promotion by the respective leaders for their domestic ends. It was a TV entertainment spectacular and feel-good moment that made no useful contribution to the urgent and dire problems of the Korean Peninsula, whose people are the starkest losers from this fiasco.
Yoon Suk-joon is a senior fellow of the Korea Institute for Military Affairs and a retired ROK Navy captain.
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| Yoon Suk-joon |
Also present was South Korean President Moon Jae-In, who is keen to help mediate between the U.S. and North Korea in hopes of reviving stalled denuclearization talks after the debacle of the abandoned February Hanoi summit.
This unprecedented three-way summit, apparently arranged at very short notice, appears to have been little more than a made-for-TV spectacular designed for Trump and Kim's domestic audiences, in the military conflict zone of the Korean Peninsula.
Trump's publicity machine constantly emphasizes the feel-good, one-to-one personal relationship between Trump and Kim, but is there any actual progress on denuclearization? Supposedly, this meeting will lead to a resumption of working-level talks, but there are clear indications that the U.S. side is no longer committed to "complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization."
So what does Chairman Kim get from the meeting? It seems he is closer to persuading Trump to accept the North Korean agenda: no pressure for regime change or reform, and a freeze on North Korea's missile and nuclear program instead of a ban. This would essentially enshrine the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and would tacitly recognize North Korea as a nuclear power. Probably it means that the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facility will be traded for the partial lifting of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against North Korea. Clearly Kim is a big winner from the meeting.
And what about President Moon? Despite his broad smiles during the photo session, he seems ready to make significant concessions to the U.S. and North Korea. Instead of maintaining a balanced stance between the two regional great powers, Moon may intend to toe the U.S. line more assiduously. For example, by joining in with sanctions against Huawei, by participating in U.S.-led freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, by buying more U.S.-made weapons and systems to ensure interoperability for a combined military posture toward North Korea, and by increased burden-sharing to support the U.S. military presence. Any such concessions would reveal Moon as the greatest loser from the meeting.
Lastly there is Trump to consider. He successfully distracted attention from his utter failure to achieve even the tiniest step toward North Korean denuclearization by pretending that his personal relationship with Kim is some kind of historic accomplishment. Kim, of course, is happy to indulge this pathetic charade, since he is playing the same game. Moreover, by focusing the attention of U.S. TV screens on foreign policy, Trump also displaced coverage of his democratic opponents' presidential primary campaigns and of the continuing investigations into his own conduct. All-in-all this meeting was a big win for Trump.
So, putting this eye-catching TV show to one side, what is actually happening now on the Korean Peninsula? There are several important questions outstanding.
First, is there any prospect that we may finally escape from the military standoff that has blighted the peninsula for almost seven decades? The U.S. and the Koreas are still involved in continuing military frictions, which might easily escalate into the nightmare scenario of a major confrontation. And as yet there is no hint of conventional arms control or reduction, never mind the North Korean nuclear capabilities. All that has happened is the scaling-down of bilateral joint military drills between the ROK armed forces and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and a weakening of their combined defense posture through the decision to transfer of wartime operational control authority from USFK to the South Korean military no later than 2021.
Since the signing of an agreement between the two Korean militaries in September 2018, there has also been some work to recover the remains of U.S. personnel missing in action, but none of this has changed the facts on the ground: peace has not broken out on the Korean Peninsula, where the Cold War continues.
Second, is it time to sign a peace treaty to finally end the Korean War after an uneasy truce that has lasted many decades? The three leaders' meeting at Panmunjeom should remind us that the Korean Peninsula is divided into two countries with competing ideologies and remains technically at war. Thus, Trump was escorted by U.S. soldiers of the United Nations Command, their commander now dual-hatted and in charge of both ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and USFK.
Anyone who believes that war is now unlikely or impossible is ignoring North Korean and Chinese policy that has always insisted on a complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula. Does this suggest that China will leave Koreans to determine their own affairs? Surely President Moon is not so naive, and though his earnest pursuit of a genuine Korean peace process may be laudable, it is not yet practicable, because none of the other parties are acting in good faith.
Third, is there now no possibility that North Korean nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems can be removed? Most observers believe the best that can be achieved is a freeze in the continuing development of North Korean nuclear capabilities and that full denuclearization is an unrealistic fantasy, since the North Korean regime relies on its nuclear deterrent for its very survival.
So, North Korea will retain the ability to threaten U.S. cities with nuclear weapons for the indefinite future, yet Trump's failure goes beyond this disturbing reality, since even if he was discussing a nuclear freeze in his meeting with Kim, North Korea is yet to provide a comprehensive listing of all North Korean nuclear assets and facilities, and without this any freeze would be a joke. Kim was happy to show up in Panmunjeom without working-level negotiations on denuclearization, because he does not intend to denuclearize, ever. It is improbable that North Korea would adhere even to an agreed nuclear freeze, though its current stock of perhaps 20-60 nuclear bombs is already sufficient to achieve recognition as a nuclear power, uncomfortable though that is for South Korea, and even for China. The situations of India, Pakistan and Israel are all different, but in every case the possession of an effective nuclear deterrent has resulted in permanent geopolitical shifts.
Fourth, is there any substance whatever behind the summit of the three leaders? Could personal diplomacy between Trump and Kim perhaps moderate Trump's capriciousness, making erratic military action by Trump less likely? But domestic politics is surely the driving force behind the meeting. Trump needs a foreign policy success (even a faked one will do for his base) to help his reelection campaign. Kim gets to pose as an equal with the U.S. President, to his newly reshuffled team and to the North Korean people. And Moon gets the benefit of diverting South Koreans' attention from historical and economic frictions with Japan and China; by presenting himself as a peacemaker he hopes to win a majority in the coming National Assembly elections. For the present, there is no indication that anyone is serious about the kind of diplomacy that is needed to find the long-term flexible solutions that regional security requires and on which the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula depends.
In summary: The Panmunjeom meeting of June 30 between President Trump and Chairman Kim, with President Moon as facilitator, was a triumph of presentation over substance and delivered very much less than it promised. The military standoff on the Korean Peninsula continues unabated, no one is serious about a genuine peace treaty, no progress whatever was made toward North Korean denuclearization and all of the leaders demonstrated their hypocrisy, though Moon showed more sincerity than Trump or Kim. The meeting was a shallow exercise in personal promotion by the respective leaders for their domestic ends. It was a TV entertainment spectacular and feel-good moment that made no useful contribution to the urgent and dire problems of the Korean Peninsula, whose people are the starkest losers from this fiasco.
Yoon Suk-joon is a senior fellow of the Korea Institute for Military Affairs and a retired ROK Navy captain.
