By Song Wha-sup
Today, Korean-Japanese relations are going through a turbulent period. Efforts to analyze the reasons behind the strained relationship case by case would be futile because agreement would be difficult.
Instead, now is the time for us to reflect on the bilateral history together to diagnose why we are in a constant state of conflict and seek long-term plans for reconciliation and cooperation.
There are a couple of characteristics when it comes to the bilateral relationship between the countries. First, we assume we are familiar with one another when in fact we lack deeper mutual understanding. Second, we do not recognize the "difference" between the two when it is perfectly natural for Korea and Japan to be different.
The Koreans easily ask, "What is going on with Japan these days?" whenever some international issues occur between Korea and Japan. They are led to the notion that it is because Japanese society as a whole is being radicalized. The Japanese, on their part, also ask, "What is going on with Korea these days?" when faced with the same situation.
Korea and Japan are similar in the way that we both achieved substantial economic development and established democracies in the East Asian region. We also share common values such as freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights. Due to these similarities, however, we easily expect that the other will react in a similar way to a common issue.
But Koreans and Japanese can come to different conclusions because they are different. However, the emphasis should be on the fact that one should be able to understand the other despite the different conclusions drawn. Once we expect the other party to act in accordance with us based on the assumption that we are alike, we are prone to be disappointed and that could easily change to having a negative impression of the other, or even to being angry.
Anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea and anti-Korean sentiment in Japan arise from this context. For example, the anti-Japanese sentiment is based on the thought that Japan lacks adequate historical awareness. The idea, when analyzed more comprehensively, is due to sentiment from the Koreans that Japan, the colonizer, did not repent enough and yet lacks the understanding of the colonized by Korean standards.
On the other hand, the Japanese expect Koreans to perceive and act according to Japanese standards and rationale. They are quick to condemn Korea and ponder anti-Korean sentiment when Koreans deviate from Japanese expectations.
Such mutual disappointment, based on the mutual similarities, is also apparent in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Both countries have shared a common recognition of the problem and have strengthened bilateral security cooperation against military threats from North Korea. However, when it comes to tackling the nuclear issue, Korea hopes to resolve it through dialogue while Japan hopes to pressure North Korea to denuclearize. Under such circumstances, Korea feels regret toward Japan for not joining forces in this endeavor for denuclearization and such feeling is rooted in the said false premise of mutual similarities.
The same applies to the respective policies toward China. Both countries share understanding regarding Chinese military threats. However, they are at odds at how to address the issue.
Japan emphasizes security and military cooperation between Korea and Japan as well as Japan-Korea-U.S. trilateral cooperation. Korea is rather passive when it comes to security cooperation with the international partners targeting China, to avoid any direct conflicts with its northern neighbor. Instead, Korea prefers to remedy military threats through further exchanges and cooperation.
Again, Japan fails to understand the position Korea is taking and argues that Korea is prioritizing China even though Korea is merely demonstrating the "difference" after considering its respective security concerns.
The Chinese-Japanese relationship has been improving since last year. Even though Japan is still being menaced by Chinese military threats, it has drifted to the notion of ameliorating bilateral relations through cooperating with China as well as keeping China in check. As such, maritime and aerial communication mechanisms have been established between the two and they are pushing for additional endeavors to prevent accidental clashes.
Changes in the Japanese approach allow room for mutual grounds between Korea and Japan in responding to China. The improvement of Chinese-Japanese relations will guide us to broader trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan and China. And I sincerely hope that the chance of future trilateral cooperation will be the small stepping stone to reconciliation between Korea and Japan and even to peaceful cooperation for Northeast Asia.
Song Wha-sup is a Senior Research Fellow in the Global Strategy Division of the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA). He joined KIDA in 1989 and his major research area includes Japan's Defense Policy, U.S.-Japan security relations, ROK-Japan and ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation. He studied at Tokyo University for about five years, and by that experience came to have deep understanding of Japanese society and have many acquaintances. He hosted the KIDA-NIDS (National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan) Research Exchange Conference for 20 years and by that opportunity he has shared security situation recognition and ROK-Japan cooperation for peace in Northeast Asia with the Japanese side. Song Min-ju, a researcher at the Global Security Cooperation Center, translated the article.
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Song Wha-sup |
Instead, now is the time for us to reflect on the bilateral history together to diagnose why we are in a constant state of conflict and seek long-term plans for reconciliation and cooperation.
There are a couple of characteristics when it comes to the bilateral relationship between the countries. First, we assume we are familiar with one another when in fact we lack deeper mutual understanding. Second, we do not recognize the "difference" between the two when it is perfectly natural for Korea and Japan to be different.
The Koreans easily ask, "What is going on with Japan these days?" whenever some international issues occur between Korea and Japan. They are led to the notion that it is because Japanese society as a whole is being radicalized. The Japanese, on their part, also ask, "What is going on with Korea these days?" when faced with the same situation.
Korea and Japan are similar in the way that we both achieved substantial economic development and established democracies in the East Asian region. We also share common values such as freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights. Due to these similarities, however, we easily expect that the other will react in a similar way to a common issue.
But Koreans and Japanese can come to different conclusions because they are different. However, the emphasis should be on the fact that one should be able to understand the other despite the different conclusions drawn. Once we expect the other party to act in accordance with us based on the assumption that we are alike, we are prone to be disappointed and that could easily change to having a negative impression of the other, or even to being angry.
Anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea and anti-Korean sentiment in Japan arise from this context. For example, the anti-Japanese sentiment is based on the thought that Japan lacks adequate historical awareness. The idea, when analyzed more comprehensively, is due to sentiment from the Koreans that Japan, the colonizer, did not repent enough and yet lacks the understanding of the colonized by Korean standards.
On the other hand, the Japanese expect Koreans to perceive and act according to Japanese standards and rationale. They are quick to condemn Korea and ponder anti-Korean sentiment when Koreans deviate from Japanese expectations.
Such mutual disappointment, based on the mutual similarities, is also apparent in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Both countries have shared a common recognition of the problem and have strengthened bilateral security cooperation against military threats from North Korea. However, when it comes to tackling the nuclear issue, Korea hopes to resolve it through dialogue while Japan hopes to pressure North Korea to denuclearize. Under such circumstances, Korea feels regret toward Japan for not joining forces in this endeavor for denuclearization and such feeling is rooted in the said false premise of mutual similarities.
The same applies to the respective policies toward China. Both countries share understanding regarding Chinese military threats. However, they are at odds at how to address the issue.
Japan emphasizes security and military cooperation between Korea and Japan as well as Japan-Korea-U.S. trilateral cooperation. Korea is rather passive when it comes to security cooperation with the international partners targeting China, to avoid any direct conflicts with its northern neighbor. Instead, Korea prefers to remedy military threats through further exchanges and cooperation.
Again, Japan fails to understand the position Korea is taking and argues that Korea is prioritizing China even though Korea is merely demonstrating the "difference" after considering its respective security concerns.
The Chinese-Japanese relationship has been improving since last year. Even though Japan is still being menaced by Chinese military threats, it has drifted to the notion of ameliorating bilateral relations through cooperating with China as well as keeping China in check. As such, maritime and aerial communication mechanisms have been established between the two and they are pushing for additional endeavors to prevent accidental clashes.
Changes in the Japanese approach allow room for mutual grounds between Korea and Japan in responding to China. The improvement of Chinese-Japanese relations will guide us to broader trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan and China. And I sincerely hope that the chance of future trilateral cooperation will be the small stepping stone to reconciliation between Korea and Japan and even to peaceful cooperation for Northeast Asia.
Song Wha-sup is a Senior Research Fellow in the Global Strategy Division of the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA). He joined KIDA in 1989 and his major research area includes Japan's Defense Policy, U.S.-Japan security relations, ROK-Japan and ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation. He studied at Tokyo University for about five years, and by that experience came to have deep understanding of Japanese society and have many acquaintances. He hosted the KIDA-NIDS (National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan) Research Exchange Conference for 20 years and by that opportunity he has shared security situation recognition and ROK-Japan cooperation for peace in Northeast Asia with the Japanese side. Song Min-ju, a researcher at the Global Security Cooperation Center, translated the article.