By Kwei-Bo Huang
The 72nd World Health Assembly (WHA) began on May 20. But Taiwan (ROC) has been unable to participate meaningfully in the WHA as an observer three times since its last attendance in May 2016. This is a critical indicator of cross-Taiwan Strait relations.
All three major conditions for Taiwan's meaningful participation in the WHA were met during Ma Ying-jeou's presidency between mid-2008 and May 2016. They are: consent in Taiwan; support from the mainstream international community, and the tacit understanding or purposeful compromise of mainland China. When they were met, Taiwan could send its minister of health under the title "Chinese Taipei" to Geneva for the WHA.
As Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen administration is crying foul at the refusal of the WHA Secretariat to deliver an invitation letter to Taiwan, at least one condition for Taiwan's participation must have gone wrong. Obviously, in recent years worsening cross-strait relations have affected Taiwan's desire for WHA attendance, because the Beijing authorities have remained reluctant to see participation of "Chinese Taipei" if Tsai does not accept the "1992 consensus" ― understood either as a deliberately equivocal version of Lee Teng-hui's "one China, respective interpretations" or as an expression echoing the Beijing authorities' "one China" principle.
Because the Ma administration accepted the "1992 consensus," Beijing authorities softened their posture toward Taiwan's participation in the WHA, albeit in an unwavering resistance that "Chinese Taipei" be part of China (defined by Beijing). The never-ending attacks from Tsai and her party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), criticized Ma for using an inferior title and downgrading "Taiwan sovereignty."
Tsai surely knows that Beijing's ultimate goal is to retake Taiwan and that Taiwan's international space has been limited seriously by Beijing. Accordingly, at the very beginning of her presidency, she did endeavor to lower the Beijing leaders' suspicion toward her pro-Taiwan independence record, in hopes that Taiwan's delegation could show up at the WHA again. And she made it.
In May 2016, with the majority's support in Taiwan and a similar endorsement of major countries, the Tsai administration's minister of health held a WHA invitation letter specifying the "one China" principle for the very first time since 2009 and led a "Chinese Taipei" delegation to attend the WHA as an observer. Tsai argued that "the title was not downgraded" and that Taiwan's participation "was not confined by any political framework." Besides, she gave her appreciation to Taiwan's officials and civilian groups working on the WHA case, as well as to major countries and diplomatic allies showing support, while intentionally neglecting the significance of cross-strait relations.
Unfortunately, since 2017, Taiwan has been deprived of the right of participating in the WHA and making contributions to the World Health Organization. There are three knots that cannot be untied at the moment. The first has to do with the loss of minimum mutual trust between the DPP government and the Beijing authorities. The second is created by Tsai embracing certain pro-independence measures, explicitly or implicitly, for the consolidation of her own supporters and the victories of the DPP's primary in summer 2019 and the ensuing presidential election in January 2020. The last, but not least, is concerned with the likelihood that Chinese President Xi Jinping must be resolute when firmness is needed due to his "hard is harder, soft is softer" strategy toward Taiwan and due to his concern that not resisting the WHA participation of Taiwan, whose leadership is working subtly on pro-independence programs, would result in an almost lethal consequence of his reign on mainland China, particularly when there could be many potential challengers after the anti-corruption campaign.
Tsai's current strategy of participation in the WHA is just like banging one's head against a brick wall. The opposition of mainland China can be described as a gigantic wall in front of Taiwan. Some major or middle powers such as the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Japan have been giving moral support and calling for the principle of universal participation, but they basically avoid touching or moving the wall.
For a certain time, with the political foundation of cross-strait dialogue, Taiwan found a pathway that could lead it to another side of the wall and mingle with and present thoughts to the world, although Taiwan had to return to the place where it has been isolated for decades afterward. It is unfair to Taiwan, but it is not the worst situation for Taiwan, either.
Having gradually withdrawn from her predecessor's "quasi-rapprochement" policy toward mainland China, Tsai has abandoned what she actually practiced in May 2016 and chosen to hit the gigantic wall directly with little political armor. Then, she blamed the wall ― mainland China ― for not letting Taiwan in.
Tsai is not lying to you about the case of Taiwan's meaningful participation in the WHA. She just does not tell you the whole truth.
Kwei-Bo Huang is Vice Dean at the College of International Affairs, National ChengChi University (NCCU), Taiwan, ROC. He is teaching full-time at the NCCU Department of Diplomacy and International Master's Program in International Studies. Between February 2009 and January 2011, he was on public service leave to serve as Chairman of the Research and Planning Committee at the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He once served as an advisor to the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. He was a Fulbright visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, as well as a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He earned his M.A. from the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and his doctorate from the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park.
 |
| Kwei-Bo Huang |
All three major conditions for Taiwan's meaningful participation in the WHA were met during Ma Ying-jeou's presidency between mid-2008 and May 2016. They are: consent in Taiwan; support from the mainstream international community, and the tacit understanding or purposeful compromise of mainland China. When they were met, Taiwan could send its minister of health under the title "Chinese Taipei" to Geneva for the WHA.
As Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen administration is crying foul at the refusal of the WHA Secretariat to deliver an invitation letter to Taiwan, at least one condition for Taiwan's participation must have gone wrong. Obviously, in recent years worsening cross-strait relations have affected Taiwan's desire for WHA attendance, because the Beijing authorities have remained reluctant to see participation of "Chinese Taipei" if Tsai does not accept the "1992 consensus" ― understood either as a deliberately equivocal version of Lee Teng-hui's "one China, respective interpretations" or as an expression echoing the Beijing authorities' "one China" principle.
Because the Ma administration accepted the "1992 consensus," Beijing authorities softened their posture toward Taiwan's participation in the WHA, albeit in an unwavering resistance that "Chinese Taipei" be part of China (defined by Beijing). The never-ending attacks from Tsai and her party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), criticized Ma for using an inferior title and downgrading "Taiwan sovereignty."
Tsai surely knows that Beijing's ultimate goal is to retake Taiwan and that Taiwan's international space has been limited seriously by Beijing. Accordingly, at the very beginning of her presidency, she did endeavor to lower the Beijing leaders' suspicion toward her pro-Taiwan independence record, in hopes that Taiwan's delegation could show up at the WHA again. And she made it.
In May 2016, with the majority's support in Taiwan and a similar endorsement of major countries, the Tsai administration's minister of health held a WHA invitation letter specifying the "one China" principle for the very first time since 2009 and led a "Chinese Taipei" delegation to attend the WHA as an observer. Tsai argued that "the title was not downgraded" and that Taiwan's participation "was not confined by any political framework." Besides, she gave her appreciation to Taiwan's officials and civilian groups working on the WHA case, as well as to major countries and diplomatic allies showing support, while intentionally neglecting the significance of cross-strait relations.
Unfortunately, since 2017, Taiwan has been deprived of the right of participating in the WHA and making contributions to the World Health Organization. There are three knots that cannot be untied at the moment. The first has to do with the loss of minimum mutual trust between the DPP government and the Beijing authorities. The second is created by Tsai embracing certain pro-independence measures, explicitly or implicitly, for the consolidation of her own supporters and the victories of the DPP's primary in summer 2019 and the ensuing presidential election in January 2020. The last, but not least, is concerned with the likelihood that Chinese President Xi Jinping must be resolute when firmness is needed due to his "hard is harder, soft is softer" strategy toward Taiwan and due to his concern that not resisting the WHA participation of Taiwan, whose leadership is working subtly on pro-independence programs, would result in an almost lethal consequence of his reign on mainland China, particularly when there could be many potential challengers after the anti-corruption campaign.
Tsai's current strategy of participation in the WHA is just like banging one's head against a brick wall. The opposition of mainland China can be described as a gigantic wall in front of Taiwan. Some major or middle powers such as the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Japan have been giving moral support and calling for the principle of universal participation, but they basically avoid touching or moving the wall.
For a certain time, with the political foundation of cross-strait dialogue, Taiwan found a pathway that could lead it to another side of the wall and mingle with and present thoughts to the world, although Taiwan had to return to the place where it has been isolated for decades afterward. It is unfair to Taiwan, but it is not the worst situation for Taiwan, either.
Having gradually withdrawn from her predecessor's "quasi-rapprochement" policy toward mainland China, Tsai has abandoned what she actually practiced in May 2016 and chosen to hit the gigantic wall directly with little political armor. Then, she blamed the wall ― mainland China ― for not letting Taiwan in.
Tsai is not lying to you about the case of Taiwan's meaningful participation in the WHA. She just does not tell you the whole truth.
Kwei-Bo Huang is Vice Dean at the College of International Affairs, National ChengChi University (NCCU), Taiwan, ROC. He is teaching full-time at the NCCU Department of Diplomacy and International Master's Program in International Studies. Between February 2009 and January 2011, he was on public service leave to serve as Chairman of the Research and Planning Committee at the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He once served as an advisor to the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. He was a Fulbright visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, as well as a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He earned his M.A. from the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and his doctorate from the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park.
