By Stephen Costello
Those who suggest a larger or bolder role for South Korea, toward either North Korea or its U.S. ally, are often met with objections bordering on hysteria. Their suggestions are equated instantly with "breaking the alliance" or "going it alone."
Similarly, the threats by U.S. officials to "bring U.S. troops home" if Seoul doesn't pay more seem to strike fear into the hearts of many otherwise thoughtful people, including some in Cheong Wa Dae, the National Assembly and the press. These are "straw man" threats. Not realistic, and not remotely possible.
The small, slow and often uncoordinated policy initiatives by Cheong Wa Dae, along with contradictory messaging, may help provoke such misunderstandings. This is why the joint press conference Nov. 10 by presidential National Security Office (NSO) head Chung Eui-yong, Chief of Staff Noh Young-min, and Chief Policy Secretary Kim Sang-jo was so welcome.
Let's hope there is more of this kind of well-thought-out presentation to come. Perhaps one will be forthcoming on the North Korea deal, or on the cost-sharing debate.
Experienced and realistic suggestions for upgrading and modernizing the South Korea-U.S. alliance have become more numerous, and they come at a particularly delicate time. The current U.S. administration is uniquely unable to support its responsibilities to the alliance, or even to recognize them. And Seoul has reasons to feel under strategic pressure from Japan, China and Russia.
At the "DMZ Forum 2019" in September former Unification Minister and NSC adviser Lee Jong-seok asked if it was time for Seoul to be "one step ahead" of the U.S. in North Korea policy. Last month a delegation of experienced civic leaders spoke at the U.N. in New York and in Washington, noting among other things that the alliance should be upgraded to reflect Seoul's increased capacities and greater share of responsibility. No one suggested breaking or leaving the alliance.
What would a rebalanced alliance allow, and what would it require? The answer may not lie in technical changes or adjustments. Rather, it may be a matter of accurate analysis, and modest self-confidence.
For instance, what is stopping President Moon Jae-in from arranging a quick, informal visit, again, to Panmunjeom? At a meeting with Kim Jong-un, he could review what they both want, and propose the deal that most experienced experts believe would break this impasse.
That would involve major and trustworthy sanctions relief from the five U.N. sanctions mentioned at the Hanoi summit. Other smaller but important items could be added, such as unblocking humanitarian relief. In return Kim would have to cap and dismantle the Yongbyon facilities, and welcome international inspectors. Then he would have to add capping and inspecting all fissile material production. Finally, he would need to agree to a road map, with zero at the end.
Moon would have to publicly post this deal, and then lobby for it among the invested players. He would also have to center its implementation at the U.N., and in an international coalition. Such a proposal would finally acknowledge that his U.S. ally will not be a trustworthy guarantor of any deal for at least two years, although it would benefit any achievable deal.
Robert Carlin, Washington's top Korea expert, said Nov. 14 at a speech in Seoul, "In Washington, we're seeing the most poisonous atmosphere, so that no matter what the president proposes, it will be torn to shreds."
Moon Chung-in, unification and national security adviser to President Moon, noted Nov. 11, "It seems highly unlikely that North Korea will make any significant concessions without corresponding measures on sanctions relief. Reaching such a compromise will not be easy amid Trump's impending impeachment process and Kim's immense domestic disappointment."
Seoul would know that those concessions by North Korea are exactly what the U.S. needs, and what other countries need from them, in an initial deal. It would have to work to persuade the U.N. and other countries to support that deal, but there is every reason to think they would. And Korea has the diplomatic depth to do this. The U.S. should support it too, since it would finally, after almost 20 years, bring policy back to placing denuclearization first, right ahead of development and security.
Regarding demands by the U.S. president that Seoul pay more for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), a solution that enhances and upgrades the role of Korea could be rather simple. Korea could set its budgeted amount, perhaps at the 2016 level, and stick to that for the next five years.
Then the U.S. could adjust its contribution to any level it judged appropriate. Given Seoul's increased military expenditures and capabilities, this is logical rather than radical. Any debate in the U.S. about the best level of troops in Korea would be good, and could clarify, and even upgrade the U.S. side of the alliance.
Regarding the GSOMIA agreement, that is between Korea and Japan, and its military value is far outweighed by its symbolic importance. In fact both the U.S. and Japan have good, deep, and strategic reasons for cooperating with a democratic South Korea that behaves like a modest-but-confident middle power. Trends in the region and around the globe increase common interests. After the joint press conference, as well as a dinner discussion among all political party leaders, Seoul's position on this seems pretty clear.
For South Korea, the policies that would give it more activism, and more of a leadership role, should each reinforce the others. Such a mutually-reinforcing group of initiatives is exactly what the times require, and that dynamic would make implementation of each less difficult.
Needless to say, if South Korea were to assert a bit more sovereignty by taking the lead on these pressing diplomatic/security/development issues, it would not constitute "being nice to Kim Jong-un." On the contrary, progress on an initial deal ― just as implementation of the Agreed Framework in 1994-2002 ― would force the North into the inevitable openings that would accompany its new economic development.
Anticipating that, Seoul and Pyongyang would need to establish a robust mechanism for channeling aid and investment. It should be clear from recent Chinese, Russian, and American proposals that the two Koreas together are the only actors who could prevent predatory and untrustworthy economic development, and thereby avoid the tragic history of other states.
Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) managed the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation Washington office in the 1990s. He directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council there from 1999 to 2004. He now directs AsiaEast.Org, a policy initiative focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington and Seoul.
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Similarly, the threats by U.S. officials to "bring U.S. troops home" if Seoul doesn't pay more seem to strike fear into the hearts of many otherwise thoughtful people, including some in Cheong Wa Dae, the National Assembly and the press. These are "straw man" threats. Not realistic, and not remotely possible.
The small, slow and often uncoordinated policy initiatives by Cheong Wa Dae, along with contradictory messaging, may help provoke such misunderstandings. This is why the joint press conference Nov. 10 by presidential National Security Office (NSO) head Chung Eui-yong, Chief of Staff Noh Young-min, and Chief Policy Secretary Kim Sang-jo was so welcome.
Let's hope there is more of this kind of well-thought-out presentation to come. Perhaps one will be forthcoming on the North Korea deal, or on the cost-sharing debate.
Experienced and realistic suggestions for upgrading and modernizing the South Korea-U.S. alliance have become more numerous, and they come at a particularly delicate time. The current U.S. administration is uniquely unable to support its responsibilities to the alliance, or even to recognize them. And Seoul has reasons to feel under strategic pressure from Japan, China and Russia.
At the "DMZ Forum 2019" in September former Unification Minister and NSC adviser Lee Jong-seok asked if it was time for Seoul to be "one step ahead" of the U.S. in North Korea policy. Last month a delegation of experienced civic leaders spoke at the U.N. in New York and in Washington, noting among other things that the alliance should be upgraded to reflect Seoul's increased capacities and greater share of responsibility. No one suggested breaking or leaving the alliance.
What would a rebalanced alliance allow, and what would it require? The answer may not lie in technical changes or adjustments. Rather, it may be a matter of accurate analysis, and modest self-confidence.
For instance, what is stopping President Moon Jae-in from arranging a quick, informal visit, again, to Panmunjeom? At a meeting with Kim Jong-un, he could review what they both want, and propose the deal that most experienced experts believe would break this impasse.
That would involve major and trustworthy sanctions relief from the five U.N. sanctions mentioned at the Hanoi summit. Other smaller but important items could be added, such as unblocking humanitarian relief. In return Kim would have to cap and dismantle the Yongbyon facilities, and welcome international inspectors. Then he would have to add capping and inspecting all fissile material production. Finally, he would need to agree to a road map, with zero at the end.
Moon would have to publicly post this deal, and then lobby for it among the invested players. He would also have to center its implementation at the U.N., and in an international coalition. Such a proposal would finally acknowledge that his U.S. ally will not be a trustworthy guarantor of any deal for at least two years, although it would benefit any achievable deal.
Robert Carlin, Washington's top Korea expert, said Nov. 14 at a speech in Seoul, "In Washington, we're seeing the most poisonous atmosphere, so that no matter what the president proposes, it will be torn to shreds."
Moon Chung-in, unification and national security adviser to President Moon, noted Nov. 11, "It seems highly unlikely that North Korea will make any significant concessions without corresponding measures on sanctions relief. Reaching such a compromise will not be easy amid Trump's impending impeachment process and Kim's immense domestic disappointment."
Seoul would know that those concessions by North Korea are exactly what the U.S. needs, and what other countries need from them, in an initial deal. It would have to work to persuade the U.N. and other countries to support that deal, but there is every reason to think they would. And Korea has the diplomatic depth to do this. The U.S. should support it too, since it would finally, after almost 20 years, bring policy back to placing denuclearization first, right ahead of development and security.
Regarding demands by the U.S. president that Seoul pay more for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), a solution that enhances and upgrades the role of Korea could be rather simple. Korea could set its budgeted amount, perhaps at the 2016 level, and stick to that for the next five years.
Then the U.S. could adjust its contribution to any level it judged appropriate. Given Seoul's increased military expenditures and capabilities, this is logical rather than radical. Any debate in the U.S. about the best level of troops in Korea would be good, and could clarify, and even upgrade the U.S. side of the alliance.
Regarding the GSOMIA agreement, that is between Korea and Japan, and its military value is far outweighed by its symbolic importance. In fact both the U.S. and Japan have good, deep, and strategic reasons for cooperating with a democratic South Korea that behaves like a modest-but-confident middle power. Trends in the region and around the globe increase common interests. After the joint press conference, as well as a dinner discussion among all political party leaders, Seoul's position on this seems pretty clear.
For South Korea, the policies that would give it more activism, and more of a leadership role, should each reinforce the others. Such a mutually-reinforcing group of initiatives is exactly what the times require, and that dynamic would make implementation of each less difficult.
Needless to say, if South Korea were to assert a bit more sovereignty by taking the lead on these pressing diplomatic/security/development issues, it would not constitute "being nice to Kim Jong-un." On the contrary, progress on an initial deal ― just as implementation of the Agreed Framework in 1994-2002 ― would force the North into the inevitable openings that would accompany its new economic development.
Anticipating that, Seoul and Pyongyang would need to establish a robust mechanism for channeling aid and investment. It should be clear from recent Chinese, Russian, and American proposals that the two Koreas together are the only actors who could prevent predatory and untrustworthy economic development, and thereby avoid the tragic history of other states.
Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) managed the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation Washington office in the 1990s. He directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council there from 1999 to 2004. He now directs AsiaEast.Org, a policy initiative focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington and Seoul.
