South Korea's 'exclusive clubs' dilemma

By Ramon Pacheco Pardo

This year is shaping up to be a busy one for South Korea on the multilateral diplomacy front. Seoul has received and accepted an invitation to the G7 meeting scheduled for June, which could well become the springboard for a more permanent Democracy 10 (D10). The Joe Biden administration is planning a "summit of democracies," with South Korea at the front of the queue among potential attendees. And there is incessant talk of opening up the Quad to new members, with Seoul as one of the preferred partners.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo

In short, South Korea is one of the very few countries in the world being openly courted to join a set of "exclusive clubs" that are becoming increasingly central features of global politics. How should South Korea proceed with its privileged status?

Seoul's foreign policy dating back to its transition to democracy clearly pulls it toward membership of these clubs. Every president has sought to embed South Korea in these types of groups, be it the G20, the Bank for International Settlements, or, at the regional level, ASEAN+3 or ADMM-Plus. In the past, South Korea was simply happy to have a seat at the table. Today, it also wants to have a leading voice. The Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030 (P4G) in the area of green growth or partnership between Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia (MIKTA) as a middle power club are cases in point.

However, the new wave of clubs that Seoul is being invited to join differs from other groupings in an important way: China is not invited to the party. This is a crucial consideration for South Korea, for geography matters. The Korean Peninsula borders China. This stubborn fact is not going to change.

Seoul therefore has to carefully consider the pros and cons of joining groups that China may perceive as antagonistic. On balance, however, the Moon Jae-in government should pursue membership of the G7/D10, "summit of democracies," and, yes, an expanded Quad.

To begin with, the way these groups present themselves matter. It is one thing for the groups to focus on shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, or a market economy. It is very different to explicitly label themselves as anti-China. Under Biden, it seems that the former will prevail.

Indeed, G7 members such as France, Germany, or Italy and potential members of an expanded Quad such as Indonesia or New Zealand, are closer to South Korea's view of relations with China in that they don't believe in openly confronting Beijing as the policy of choice. And Biden wants to take a more balanced approach toward the Chinese government than his predecessor Donald Trump did. Therefore, South Korea would be joining clubs of countries defined by what they have in common rather than what they oppose.

In addition, the governments of democratic governments should at least strive to reflect their views of their citizens. And South Koreans value the strong democracy that they have built above anything else. Joining clubs that promote the values that South Koreans uphold would send a strong message that their government listens to the people. The expanded G7 and "summit of democracies" neatly fit with this view.

South Koreans of course also value their country being recognized for what it is: one of the strongest democracies at the global level, a top-10 world economy, and a reliable contributor to international security. In this respect, membership of the Quad would also help to underscore that Seoul has become a crucial security actor, in line with the way South Koreans see their country.

Opponents of South Korea joining a potential D10 or an expanded Quad will argue that this will worsen relations with China. But will it? Japan has just signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) also including China, and maintains the position that the door for Beijing to join Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is open. The two countries obviously have their political and security differences. But when it comes to their core interests, they can reach agreements.

There is no reason to think that South Korea could not also maintain good working relations with China even after joining these "exclusive clubs." As the experience with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment demonstrates, Beijing can decide to retaliate at any point and for any reason. If the Chinese government wants to "punish" South Korea, it will find a reason to do so. Membership of a D10 or the Quad, so far, has been no reason for China to "punish" Japan, though. South Korea probably would be treated in the same way.

Ultimately, Seoul has to think about what type of international actor it wants to be. And the experience of the past few decades has shown that it wants to be a player, not a follower. An expanded G7, a "club of democracies," and the Quad would make South Korea an even greater player in regional and global affairs.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo is associate professor in International Relations at King's College London and the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance.