By John Burton
If there was one overarching theme about President Donald Trump's policy toward Asia, it was growing power competition with China. This was reflected not only in an escalating trade war, but also in Washington strengthening relations with Japan, India and Australia, members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the so-called Quad bloc, to counter China's increasing influence in Asia.
The Quad initiative was a rare example of multilateralism in the Trump administration. However, it was undermined to some extent by trade disputes with these countries that reflected the unilateral "America First" policy that dominated the Trump administration.
The Trump policy toward Asia created a diplomatic dilemma for Korea. Although Korea shares the democratic values of the Quad countries and has a military pact with the U.S., it is also aware that Beijing regards the grouping as an anti-Chinese alliance and Seoul does not want to alienate its biggest trading partner.
Korea is likely to come under increased U.S. pressure to join the Quad, even with the arrival of the administration of President Joe Biden in January. The test for President Moon Jae-in and his successor in 2022 will be to maintain a balancing act between Beijing and Washington without completely committing itself to one side or the other.
Seoul's hopes that Biden might soften Trump's tough stance on China is unlikely to occur since there is a strong bipartisan consensus in Washington on a hardline approach, although attempts will be made to seek Sino-American cooperation on such issues as climate change.
Given Korea's growing trade dependence on China and the economic costs it would entail if it shifted to a more pro-American position, the Biden administration could offer Seoul the prospects of increased trade with the U.S. if Washington joined pan-Asian trade pacts such as the revamped Trans-Pacific Partnership, which President Trump rejected. That is unlikely to happen, however, since there is an increased protectionist mood in the U.S.
Another carrot that the Biden administration could offer Korea would be to reach a compromise on defense burden-sharing costs and drop Trump's threat to withdraw U.S. troops. Biden could follow up on a renewed agreement with a visit to Seoul.
Nonetheless, Korea has more freedom of maneuver in its relations with Washington than in the past since U.S. primacy in Asia has been weakened as a result of Trump's actions as well as increasingly polarized politics in the U.S. The Biden administration is likely to be absorbed by domestic issues over the next couple of years. This could provide an opportunity for Korea to influence U.S. policy on China if Washington seeks more cooperation with its major allies in Asia.
Meanwhile, Sino-American tensions are ironically benefitting the Korean economy as it seeks to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. A widening divide over technology between the U.S. and China could boost global sales of the Korean electronics industry as Washington imposes limits on Chinese companies participating in U.S. supply chains.
For example, restrictions on the use of equipment manufactured by China's Huawei in the 5G mobile networks of major Western markets, including the U.S., the U.K., Japan and Australia, means that Korea could step into the breach in providing this equipment. Samsung, which is already the world's largest smartphone producer, is now ramping up its 5G equipment business. Meanwhile, Korean chipmakers Samsung and SK Hynix are applying for U.S. permission to continue supplying semiconductors to Huawei under a sanctions regime imposed by the Trump administration this year.
There are two possible courses that Korea could follow in response to pressure from Washington over China. One is to find like-minded countries in the region that want to avoid being sucked into the Sino-American rivalry. This is particularly true with Southeast Asia, where President Moon has sought closer cooperation with his New Southern Policy. This is part of a broader trend that has recently been seen. Asian countries are seeking to reduce their dependence on the U.S., including forming pan-regional trade pacts such as the newly launched Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world's largest trade agreement.
An alternative would be Korea following the lead of the U.S. on China. This could happen if a conservative president is elected to replace Moon. This outcome would reflect public disenchantment about Moon's failure to achieve concrete results from his policy of rapprochement toward North Korea.
Anti-China sentiment has already grown in Korea over the last few years due to China's retaliatory economic measures in response to Korea's agreement to allow the basing of a U.S. THAAD anti-missile system in the country. Koreans might also become frustrated over Beijing's failure to put pressure on Pyongyang to roll back its nuclear and missile programs when the North is posing an increasing military threat. This will incline public opinion toward supporting a hardline approach on China.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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The Quad initiative was a rare example of multilateralism in the Trump administration. However, it was undermined to some extent by trade disputes with these countries that reflected the unilateral "America First" policy that dominated the Trump administration.
The Trump policy toward Asia created a diplomatic dilemma for Korea. Although Korea shares the democratic values of the Quad countries and has a military pact with the U.S., it is also aware that Beijing regards the grouping as an anti-Chinese alliance and Seoul does not want to alienate its biggest trading partner.
Korea is likely to come under increased U.S. pressure to join the Quad, even with the arrival of the administration of President Joe Biden in January. The test for President Moon Jae-in and his successor in 2022 will be to maintain a balancing act between Beijing and Washington without completely committing itself to one side or the other.
Seoul's hopes that Biden might soften Trump's tough stance on China is unlikely to occur since there is a strong bipartisan consensus in Washington on a hardline approach, although attempts will be made to seek Sino-American cooperation on such issues as climate change.
Given Korea's growing trade dependence on China and the economic costs it would entail if it shifted to a more pro-American position, the Biden administration could offer Seoul the prospects of increased trade with the U.S. if Washington joined pan-Asian trade pacts such as the revamped Trans-Pacific Partnership, which President Trump rejected. That is unlikely to happen, however, since there is an increased protectionist mood in the U.S.
Another carrot that the Biden administration could offer Korea would be to reach a compromise on defense burden-sharing costs and drop Trump's threat to withdraw U.S. troops. Biden could follow up on a renewed agreement with a visit to Seoul.
Nonetheless, Korea has more freedom of maneuver in its relations with Washington than in the past since U.S. primacy in Asia has been weakened as a result of Trump's actions as well as increasingly polarized politics in the U.S. The Biden administration is likely to be absorbed by domestic issues over the next couple of years. This could provide an opportunity for Korea to influence U.S. policy on China if Washington seeks more cooperation with its major allies in Asia.
Meanwhile, Sino-American tensions are ironically benefitting the Korean economy as it seeks to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. A widening divide over technology between the U.S. and China could boost global sales of the Korean electronics industry as Washington imposes limits on Chinese companies participating in U.S. supply chains.
For example, restrictions on the use of equipment manufactured by China's Huawei in the 5G mobile networks of major Western markets, including the U.S., the U.K., Japan and Australia, means that Korea could step into the breach in providing this equipment. Samsung, which is already the world's largest smartphone producer, is now ramping up its 5G equipment business. Meanwhile, Korean chipmakers Samsung and SK Hynix are applying for U.S. permission to continue supplying semiconductors to Huawei under a sanctions regime imposed by the Trump administration this year.
There are two possible courses that Korea could follow in response to pressure from Washington over China. One is to find like-minded countries in the region that want to avoid being sucked into the Sino-American rivalry. This is particularly true with Southeast Asia, where President Moon has sought closer cooperation with his New Southern Policy. This is part of a broader trend that has recently been seen. Asian countries are seeking to reduce their dependence on the U.S., including forming pan-regional trade pacts such as the newly launched Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world's largest trade agreement.
An alternative would be Korea following the lead of the U.S. on China. This could happen if a conservative president is elected to replace Moon. This outcome would reflect public disenchantment about Moon's failure to achieve concrete results from his policy of rapprochement toward North Korea.
Anti-China sentiment has already grown in Korea over the last few years due to China's retaliatory economic measures in response to Korea's agreement to allow the basing of a U.S. THAAD anti-missile system in the country. Koreans might also become frustrated over Beijing's failure to put pressure on Pyongyang to roll back its nuclear and missile programs when the North is posing an increasing military threat. This will incline public opinion toward supporting a hardline approach on China.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
