Hard choices for South Korea

By Tong Kim

While North Korea's nuclear arsenal is being advanced, South Korea struggles to keep the cohesion of its alliance with the United States, to close the gaps in divergence of views, and to enlist U.S. support for its policy on the North.

Following multiple, recent discussions in Washington between Seoul's senior national security officials and their U.S. counterparts, they agreed to maintain a strong alliance to meet common challenges: to contain the nuclear threats of North Korea and to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

However, it is still not clear to what extent Seoul will support, or participate in, Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy against China's aggressive military modernization that aims at regional hegemony, destabilizing the rules-based, open and free international order.

A joint statement after the Oct. 14 Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, defined the state of the U.S.-ROK Alliance as “strong” and the U.S. secretary of defense reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to “the combined defense of the ROK”, and “to provide extended deterrence to the ROK using the full range of military capabilities.”

Some contentious alliance issues remain unresolved. On the issue of burden sharing, both sides are still haggling over how much is “a fair and equitable” amount. Troop levels for U.S. forces in Korea remain flexible. The conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea is taking more time than expected. It may not happen during the remainder of Moon's presidency.

Incidentally, Moon's benign proposal for an “end-of-war” declaration does not seem to be drawing the interest of Pyongyang or Washington. Such a declaration could be a precursor to the discussion of a peace regime, as part of a denuclearization process.

In Pyongyang at the start of Oct. 10, North Korea staged a grand nighttime show using modern lighting technology, with tens of thousands of military and civilian participants with no masks, to mark the 75th founding anniversary of its Workers Party.

It was like a theatric presentation, displaying where North Korea is today. The North was claiming that it had overcome COVID-19; power shortages were no longer a big problem; the people, united behind their leader Kim Jong-un, were defeating the adversities of the pandemic and flood disasters despite “the harsh and prolonged sanctions”; and the North has a formidable nuclear force.

More importantly, North Korea is hardening its position to keep its nuclear weapons ― bad news for denuclearization. Kim said the North would continue to strengthen its strategic deterrence against any hostile forces that may threaten the security of its regime. Perhaps, peaceful coexistence is more realistic to pursue than denuclearization at this stage of the game.

Kim reserves the option of a first strike. He said he would not abuse or use his nuclear arms for a preemptive strike, except “if, and if, any forces infringe upon the security of our state and attempt to use military force against us.” But, he also knows his first use of nuclear weapons would end his regime.

The finale of the military parade rolled out a new, untested liquid fueled ICBM, the world's largest mobile launcher-mounted missile, and a solid fueled SLBM, also new and never tested, but larger than the previously known version. The ICBM in particular raised a multitude of questions for experts to scramble for answers with respect to potential changes in range, payload, technology, purpose, etc.

Most experts agree that a large ICBM is more difficult to transport and conceal. It is not clear whether the North intends to mount Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), or a single super-large hydrogen bomb, targeting at the U.S. homeland. Alternatively, it may carry decoys to confuse interceptors.

Some questioned that the ICBM on display could be simply a Khrushchevian mock-up, not a real, deployable missile, but a political propaganda tactic, as Khrushchev used during the Cold War. This kind of talk may only encourage its test launch that would be more difficult to deal with.

On relations with the U.S., it is preparing to deal with any outcome of the U.S. election. It will not yield to sanctions: it will stick to the principle of reciprocity and gradualism, leveraging its nuclear power.

Kim's nice words to the South ― “I also send this warm wish of mine to our dear fellow countrymen in the south, and hope that … the day would come when the North and South take each other's hand again.” ― were a repeat of what he said in his earlier letter to Moon. The North will not resume inter-Korean talks as the South wishes.

South Korea will soon be more pressed to make hard choices on the matters of the alliance, North Korea and China.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a visiting professor with the University of North Korean Studies, a visiting scholar with Korea University, a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and a columnist for The Korea Times.