By Tong Kim
 |
The purpose of an NWFZ is to permanently prevent and prohibit any presence or transit of nuclear weapons in or through its zone, and to guarantee the protection of its members from external nuclear threats. Hence, the establishment of such a zone should provide an additional tool of security assurance for North Korea, in addition to, or as part of, a peace regime that should also be settled on among the countries concerned.
When nuclear talks resume between the U.S. and North Korea, the concept of an NWFZ also will help the two parties to agree on a common definition of what "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" means. This will clarify the end state of nuclear negotiations.
In the past, South Korea and the U.S. dismissed NWFZ proposals as propaganda, largely because they were offered by North Korea or Communist countries during the Cold War. The North Korean proposal also included a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.
North Korea may still demand a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South. However, this issue should not be a precondition for an NWFZ. In 2000, Kim Jong-il, the father of Kim Jong-un, said he would not object to the presence of U.S. troops in the South, if their role were changed from "invasion of North Korea" to that of peacekeeping on the peninsula and in the region.
In negotiating a Northeast Asia NWFZ, North Korea may demand a provision that does not only prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons in the territorial boundaries of the two Koreas and Japan, but also bans the transit of such weapons through international waters and airspace surrounding the three countries.
In other words, North Korea may propose to establish an extended nuclear-free zone to international waters, in order to keep at a further distance U.S. strategic bombers, submarines, and aircraft carriers that may carry nuclear weapons.
Existing international law does not allow an NWFZ to control navigation in international waters for any vessels, including those carrying nuclear weapons. However, it is not impossible that the five nuclear states that recognized the Non-Proliferation Treaty ― the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France ― may agree on nuclear-free zones on international waters and in international airspace.
The termination of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence provided to South Korea and Japan will have to be addressed cautiously, as a replacement of the extended nuclear deterrence by a deterrence system of conventional forces will not be readily acceptable to South Korea or Japan, until North Korea has been completely denuclearized.
In the meantime, it is important to continue pursuing a refined approach to the following three areas, building on the Singapore U.S.-DPRK summit agreement of 2018: (1) the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang, (2) the establishment of a peace regime, and (3) the "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
A long-term, phased, reciprocal, and verifiable process of negotiations with built-in conditions for lifting sanctions and snap-back measures is still considered the most realistic approach to the goal of the ultimate denuclearization of the peninsula.
If all necessary terms and provisions are agreed in the three areas mentioned above, they can be incorporated within the framework of an NEA-NWFZ, into one comprehensive settlement package for: peace, denuclearization and protection against future nuclear threats.
An NEA-NWFZ, if successfully established with an effective verification mechanism, could serve as a nuclear buffer between the U.S. and China, minimizing the chances of an apocalyptic nuclear clash in the region.
For this reason, China would probably welcome it, as it has traditionally sought a buffer zone against U.S. encroachment, while supporting stability in the region. Japan, as the only country that actually experienced the horrific devastation of nuclear bombing, is also expected to accept the proposal for an NWFZ. It can also serve as a buffer for Japan against China's expanding nuclear forces.
Would the U.S. accept an NEA-NWFZ as a buffer against China? Probably not, as long as Trump occupies the White House. But, who knows?
Anyway, it is time to seek a new approach to denuclearize the peninsula and secure peace and stability in the region. Diplomacy must continue its work, harder, towards achieving what it has yet to achieve in the last 25 years.
Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a visiting professor with the University of North Korean Studies, a visiting scholar with Korea University, a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and a columnist for The Korea Times.
![[INTERVIEW] K-pop fan turned songwriter shares how she wrote ITZY, NMIXX's hits](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/2e8b0c716e484dcea679ccbfb97c5836.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
