By Do Thanh Hai
A important story in the Vietnamese media last week concerned the ramming and sinking of a fishing vessel flying the Vietnamese flag by a Chinese government ship near the disputed Paracel Islands.
The poor fishermen were left clinging to the ship's bow and were luckily saved two hours later by another Vietnamese fishing trawler. The Chinese account, provided by China's Global Times, was somewhat different ― it was Chinese rescuers who saved the crew.
It should be noted that fishing incidents in the South China Sea are a daily matter. It is not the first time the Chinese coastguard has reportedly utilised such a violent act to scare Vietnamese fishermen away from the disputed area, also their traditional fishing ground.
Over the past decade, there have been numerous reports of Chinese law enforcement forces maltreating Vietnamese fishermen ― firing flares, seizing ships, damaging engines and gear, spoiling drinking water reserves, confiscating catches, capturing and beating crew, asking for ransom for their release and sinking vessels.
China took control of the entire islet chain after using force to expel the occuping South Vietnamese in January 1974. In 1996, on ratification of UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), China unilaterally drew a straight baseline around the chain, claiming a large area within the line as internal waters. Having the advantage of de facto control, the Chinese denied Vietnam's repeated requests to negotiate the sovereignty issue and attempted to impose an exclusive jurisdiction over the area within and around these features.
The Chinese may have calculated that sporadic but brutal assaults would terrify and intimidate Vietnamese fishermen while discouraging strong responses from Vietnamese officialdom. It is reasonable to foresee that China's massive size and its comprehensive relations would serve as a constraining factor on any of its neighbors' calculations. Besides, it might also be intended that the Paracels is a matter only between Vietnam and China, so such unlawful actions may not draw significant attention from regional countries and the international community.
However, the Chinese failed to notice that such a short piece of news has had a powerful effect. It triggered hundreds of comments across social forums, expressing not only empathy about the danger and misery facing their fishing countrymen, but also anger and resentment against the actions of the Chinese coastguard and its affiliates. Some commentators also urged Vietnamese authorities to take forceful action to protect the country's fishing community. It surely adds to the already strong anti-Chinese feeling that has been simmering across the country for a while.
This sentiment has not been confined to individual minds, private conversations or communal discourse, it has translated into collective action on several occasions.
In December 2007, the first time since normalization of relations between the two countries, Vietnamese students and youngsters took the streets to protest against China's decision to upgrade its administration of the disputed islets. In 2011, there were 11 consecutive weekend rallies prompted by China's forceful interference with Vietnam's oil exploration off its central coast. In 2014, demonstrations busted up into widespread violence against foreign companies apparently looking like the Chinese when the giant Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig was deployed near the Paracels.
Turning a blind eye to this popular sentiment is perilous. Though the South China Sea dispute is among the rare remaining contentious points in the vast cooperative relations between Vietnam and China, it should not be underrated. Maritime tensions have spilled over and permeated society. A case in point is the violent rally that erupted in Phan Ri, Binh Thuan, in mid-2018 to voice disapproval of a bill to establish three special economic zones in Vietnam. There existed an unjustifiable but prevalent fear that such zones would give way to Chinese infiltration of the country's strategic locations.
Rising negative sentiment toward China in Vietnam is evident in several surveys. The Pew Research Center's 2014 and 2017 Global Attitudes Survey showed most people surveyed in Vietnam viewed China as a threat to their country's future. A survey by Prof. Shigeto Sonoda of the University of Tokyo indicated that the positive view of China's influence in Asia among Vietnamese students collapsed from 37 percent in 2008 to around 14 percent in 2013 and hit 21 percent in 2018. This trend largely coincides with the trajectory of the South China Sea tension.
Worryingly, the foundation of a good neighborhood has been weakened seriously. Healthy relations between Vietnam and China cannot just be built on regular high-level meetings and official dialogue. Strong economic ties are thick and continue to expand but are not sufficient to reverse the collision course. When the popular perception of China turns sour, distrust and suspicion will seriously undermine efforts to further cooperation. Even worse, it will cause serious strategic rethinking in the long run as all leaders must factor public opinion into the policymaking process.
Clearly, ordinary people might not be aware of the improvements and positive developments in ties between the two countries over the past three decades. Relations between Vietnam and China have never been better, with mutifaceted cooperation. Since 1991, some prominent problems have been resolved, for example disputes over the land border and maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. If the fishing issue is not resolved properly, it will most probably demean all previous efforts but also wreck entire relations.
Therefore, it is high time for China and Vietnam to take the case seriously, embarking on meaningful negotiations to the settle the sovereign dispute and related matters in the Paracels. There is a claim that the dispute is so complicated that it should be left for next generations to resolve. However, this is unjustifiable and reckless. Any delays in talking about the dispute will make it more difficult to resolve. Focusing on managing the dispute only is no different from "treating a disease with painkillers." The seed of discord remains and the zone of conflict will be widened.
In the meantime, the fishermen of Vietnam and China should be allowed to fish in the Paracels as this area is not delimited and it is their traditional fishing ground. An attempt to monopolize this area is not in line with international law. The ruling in the case between the Philippines and China on July 12, 2016, found that all the Spratly features could not qualify as islands, and if same line of argument is applied, the Paracel islets are no more than rocks in legal terms. Also, it said that it is illegal to draw a straight baseline around these groups of insular features as China is not an archipelagic state. From this standpoint, China's retreat from its intimidating tactics would constitute the most meaningful confidence-building measure, which would help ease tensions and open up a pathway for substantive talks between Vietnam and China over related issues.
Do Thanh Hai is a senior fellow at the Bien Dong Institute for Maritime Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. Views and opinions expressed in the article are his own.
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| Do Thanh Hai |
The poor fishermen were left clinging to the ship's bow and were luckily saved two hours later by another Vietnamese fishing trawler. The Chinese account, provided by China's Global Times, was somewhat different ― it was Chinese rescuers who saved the crew.
It should be noted that fishing incidents in the South China Sea are a daily matter. It is not the first time the Chinese coastguard has reportedly utilised such a violent act to scare Vietnamese fishermen away from the disputed area, also their traditional fishing ground.
Over the past decade, there have been numerous reports of Chinese law enforcement forces maltreating Vietnamese fishermen ― firing flares, seizing ships, damaging engines and gear, spoiling drinking water reserves, confiscating catches, capturing and beating crew, asking for ransom for their release and sinking vessels.
China took control of the entire islet chain after using force to expel the occuping South Vietnamese in January 1974. In 1996, on ratification of UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), China unilaterally drew a straight baseline around the chain, claiming a large area within the line as internal waters. Having the advantage of de facto control, the Chinese denied Vietnam's repeated requests to negotiate the sovereignty issue and attempted to impose an exclusive jurisdiction over the area within and around these features.
The Chinese may have calculated that sporadic but brutal assaults would terrify and intimidate Vietnamese fishermen while discouraging strong responses from Vietnamese officialdom. It is reasonable to foresee that China's massive size and its comprehensive relations would serve as a constraining factor on any of its neighbors' calculations. Besides, it might also be intended that the Paracels is a matter only between Vietnam and China, so such unlawful actions may not draw significant attention from regional countries and the international community.
However, the Chinese failed to notice that such a short piece of news has had a powerful effect. It triggered hundreds of comments across social forums, expressing not only empathy about the danger and misery facing their fishing countrymen, but also anger and resentment against the actions of the Chinese coastguard and its affiliates. Some commentators also urged Vietnamese authorities to take forceful action to protect the country's fishing community. It surely adds to the already strong anti-Chinese feeling that has been simmering across the country for a while.
This sentiment has not been confined to individual minds, private conversations or communal discourse, it has translated into collective action on several occasions.
In December 2007, the first time since normalization of relations between the two countries, Vietnamese students and youngsters took the streets to protest against China's decision to upgrade its administration of the disputed islets. In 2011, there were 11 consecutive weekend rallies prompted by China's forceful interference with Vietnam's oil exploration off its central coast. In 2014, demonstrations busted up into widespread violence against foreign companies apparently looking like the Chinese when the giant Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig was deployed near the Paracels.
Turning a blind eye to this popular sentiment is perilous. Though the South China Sea dispute is among the rare remaining contentious points in the vast cooperative relations between Vietnam and China, it should not be underrated. Maritime tensions have spilled over and permeated society. A case in point is the violent rally that erupted in Phan Ri, Binh Thuan, in mid-2018 to voice disapproval of a bill to establish three special economic zones in Vietnam. There existed an unjustifiable but prevalent fear that such zones would give way to Chinese infiltration of the country's strategic locations.
Rising negative sentiment toward China in Vietnam is evident in several surveys. The Pew Research Center's 2014 and 2017 Global Attitudes Survey showed most people surveyed in Vietnam viewed China as a threat to their country's future. A survey by Prof. Shigeto Sonoda of the University of Tokyo indicated that the positive view of China's influence in Asia among Vietnamese students collapsed from 37 percent in 2008 to around 14 percent in 2013 and hit 21 percent in 2018. This trend largely coincides with the trajectory of the South China Sea tension.
Worryingly, the foundation of a good neighborhood has been weakened seriously. Healthy relations between Vietnam and China cannot just be built on regular high-level meetings and official dialogue. Strong economic ties are thick and continue to expand but are not sufficient to reverse the collision course. When the popular perception of China turns sour, distrust and suspicion will seriously undermine efforts to further cooperation. Even worse, it will cause serious strategic rethinking in the long run as all leaders must factor public opinion into the policymaking process.
Clearly, ordinary people might not be aware of the improvements and positive developments in ties between the two countries over the past three decades. Relations between Vietnam and China have never been better, with mutifaceted cooperation. Since 1991, some prominent problems have been resolved, for example disputes over the land border and maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. If the fishing issue is not resolved properly, it will most probably demean all previous efforts but also wreck entire relations.
Therefore, it is high time for China and Vietnam to take the case seriously, embarking on meaningful negotiations to the settle the sovereign dispute and related matters in the Paracels. There is a claim that the dispute is so complicated that it should be left for next generations to resolve. However, this is unjustifiable and reckless. Any delays in talking about the dispute will make it more difficult to resolve. Focusing on managing the dispute only is no different from "treating a disease with painkillers." The seed of discord remains and the zone of conflict will be widened.
In the meantime, the fishermen of Vietnam and China should be allowed to fish in the Paracels as this area is not delimited and it is their traditional fishing ground. An attempt to monopolize this area is not in line with international law. The ruling in the case between the Philippines and China on July 12, 2016, found that all the Spratly features could not qualify as islands, and if same line of argument is applied, the Paracel islets are no more than rocks in legal terms. Also, it said that it is illegal to draw a straight baseline around these groups of insular features as China is not an archipelagic state. From this standpoint, China's retreat from its intimidating tactics would constitute the most meaningful confidence-building measure, which would help ease tensions and open up a pathway for substantive talks between Vietnam and China over related issues.
Do Thanh Hai is a senior fellow at the Bien Dong Institute for Maritime Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. Views and opinions expressed in the article are his own.
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